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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Ahıska Turks and Koreans in Post-Soviet Kazakstan and Uzbekistan:  
The Making of Diaspora Identity and Culture 
 
 Chong Jin OH 
Ph.D., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor : Associate Professor Hakan Kırımlı 
December 2006 
 
 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, all of the newly independent governments 
in Central Asia aimed at nationalizing or indigenizing the territories under their control 
and rectifying what many saw as decades of dominance by foreign actors. These states 
made great efforts to undertake various nation-building projects. For individuals in many 
nationalizing states in Central Asia, knowledge of the titular language became 
increasingly important in order to obtain, maintain and advance their career and position 
in the society. In other words, members of the titular nations had somewhere to go and 
settle after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but the non-titular groups, which included 
group such as the Jews, the Volga Germans, the Koreans, the Crimean Tatars, Ahıska 
Turks, had nowhere to go. These diasporas found themselves in the middle of nowhere. 
These ethnic minorities or diasporas are, perhaps, the main losers in the nation-building 
process in post-Soviet Central Asia due to their powerlessness and vulnerability. As 
peoples deported by the Soviet regime, these groups were forced to migrate against their 
will.  
By using Korean and Ahıska Turkish diasporas in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan as 
cases, this study examines, to some extent, how diasporas are influenced by nationalizing 
 iii
states in Central Asia. It attempts to inquire into the factors which influence the existence, 
nature and intensity of ethno-nationalism in the diasporas’ context. Therefore, it analyzes 
both the existence and transmission of ethno-nationalism between the diasporas’ settings 
and homelands and specifically will deal with the transmission of ethno-nationalist 
sentiments across diasporas’ generations. Above all, the task of this inquiry is to examine 
the sources of diversity within diaspora relations and to move toward an analysis of the 
patterns of interaction among trans-border ethnic groups, their traditional ethnic 
homelands, and the states in which they reside. The comparative content of this 
investigation will show considerable variations in these practices in different settings and 
groupings.  
 iv
  
ÖZET 
 
Sovyetler Birliği Sonrası Kazakistan ve Özbekistan’da Ahıska Türkleri ve Koreliler: 
Diaspora Kimlik ve Kültürünün İnşası 
 
Chong Jin OH 
Doktora, Uluslararası İlşkiler Bölümü 
Tez Danışmanı : Doçent Dr. Hakan Kırımlı 
Aralık 2006 
 
 
 
Sovyetler Birliği'nin dağılmasının ardından Orta Asya'da yeni kurulan 
bağımsız devletler kontrolleri altındaki toprakları millîleştirmeyi ya da 
yerelleştirmeyi ve böylelikle onlarca yıl devam ettiğini düşündükleri yabancı 
egemenliğini temizlemeyi amaçladılar. Bu devletler sayısız millet inşâsı projesinde 
büyük gayretler harcadılar. Bu sebeple Orta Asya'nın millîleşen pek çok devletinde 
egemen toplumun dilini bilmek kariyer ve makam sahibi olmak için gittikçe daha da 
önem kazandı. Diğer bir deyişle, 'titüler' bir devletin üyesi olanların gidecek bir 
yerleri var iken, Yahudiler, Volga Almanları, Koreliler, Kırım Tatarları ve Ahıska 
Türkleri için durum farklıydı. Bu diasporalar kendilerini yersiz yurtsuz buldular. 
Belki de bu etnik gruplar ve diasporalar zayıf ve hassas vaziyetlerinden dolayı 
Sovyetler sonrası Orta Asya'daki milllet inşâsı sürecinin asıl kaybedenleri oldular.  
Bu çalışma, Özbekistan ve Kazakistan'daki Ahıska Türkü ve Kore 
diasporalarını konu alarak bir ölçüde diasporaların millîleşen Orta Asya 
devletlerinden nasıl etkilendiğini incelemekte ve diasporalar bağlamında etno-
milliyetçiliğin varlığını, tabiatını ve yoğunluğunu etkileyen faktörleri irdelemeyi 
amaçlamaktadır. Bu sebeple, bir taraftan diasporaların yaşadıkları ülke ve 
 v
anavatanları arasında etno-milliyetçiliğin varlığını ve geçişini analiz ederken, 
özellikle etno-milliyetçi duyguların diaspora nesillerinde tevarüsü üzerinde 
duracaktır. Herşeyden öte, bu araştırmanın amacı diaspora ilişkileri arasındaki 
farklılaşmanın kaynaklarının incelenmesi ve sınır ötesi etnik gruplar, bunların 
geleneksel etnik vatanları ve ikâmet ettikleri devletler arasındaki etkileşim 
şekillerinin analizi olacaktır. Bu araştırmanın içeriği farklı mekân ve topluluklardaki 
pratiklerde önemli değişmeler olduğunu göstermektedir. 
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CHAPTER I. 
 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
 
 
A diaspora is a migrant community which crosses borders, retains an ethnic 
group consciousness and peculiar institutions over extended periods.1 It is an 
ancient social formation, comprised of people living out of their ancestral homeland, 
who retain their loyalties toward their co-ethnics and the homeland from which they 
were forced out.2  The Jews have been one of the most ancient and well-known 
diasporic people. For a long time the term, “diaspora” was used almost exclusively 
in relation to the Jews. Hence diaspora signified a collective trauma, a banishment, 
where one dreamed of home but lived in exile.  However, in recent years other 
peoples, such as Palestinians, Armenians, Chinese, and Tatars, etc., who have 
settled outside their natal territories but maintain strong collective identities, also 
                                                 
1 Robin Cohen, Global diasporas; An introduction (London: UCL Press Limited, 1997), p.ix. 
2 Milton Esman, “Diasporas and International Relations” in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds.), 
Ethnicity (Oxford University Press, 1996), p.317. 
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have defined themselves as diasporas. As Cohen states, “the description or self-
description of such groups as diasporas is now common”, which allows a certain 
degree of social distance to displace a high degree of psychological alienation.  
Accordingly, during the last decades, diaspora has been rediscovered and expanded 
to include refugees, gastarbeiter, migrants, expatriates, expellees, political refugees, 
and ethnic minorities.3 
Although ideas concerning diaspora and its types vary, the concept of 
diaspora in this study is limited to the following: an expatriate community dispersed 
from an original homeland, often traumatically, to alien lands; a community which 
has a collective memory and myth about the homeland including its location, 
history and achievements; a community which has a strong ethnic group 
consciousness sustained over a long period of time and based on a sense of 
distinctiveness.4 These are, perhaps, the crucial factors that distinguish them from 
other migrant communities or ethnic minorities.  Mere physical dispersion does 
not automatically connote diaspora; there has to be more, such as an acute memory 
or image of, or contact with, the homeland.5 Moreover, in order to illuminate 
relations between an expatriate community and its homeland, this definition well 
                                                 
3 William Safran, “Diasporas in modern societies: myths of homeland and return,” Diaspora 1: 1(1991), p.83. 
4 For a list of features of a diaspora see Robin Cohen, Global diasporas; An introduction (London: UCL Press 
Limited, 1997), p.26. 
5 On the issue William Safran, Milton Esman, and Gabriel Sheffer give in-depth analysis.  
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captures the triadic bases of diaspora: host state, homeland, and diaspora 
community.   
For instance, German-Americans whose ancestors emigrated to the United 
States more than a century ago are not a diaspora; neither are Polish-American or 
Italian American who no longer speak Polish or Italian, no longer attend a 
homeland-oriented church, have no clear idea of the homeland’s past, and retain no 
more than a fondness for the cuisine of their ethnicity, a predilection often shared by 
people who do not belong to their ethnic group. They have no external cultural 
orientation and no myth of return.  Notably, the will to survive as a minority is 
weak. The use of the homeland language has virtually disappeared and the heritage, 
if any, that is transmitted hardly goes beyond family recollections or culinary 
preference. 
To stress this point once more, a fundamental characteristic of diasporas is 
that they maintain their ethno-national identities, which are strongly and directly 
derived from their homelands and related to them. They generally either have well 
developed communal organizations or, if not, the determination to establish such 
organizations. In addition, ethno-national diasporas display communal solidarity, 
which give rise to social cohesion. They are engaged in a variety of cultural, social, 
 3
political and economic activities through their communal organizations. They also 
take part in a range of cultural, social, political and economic exchanges with their 
homelands, which might be states or territories within states. Diasporas often create 
trans-state networks that permit and encourage exchanges of significant resources 
with their homelands as well as with other parts of the same diaspora. 
Interestingly, we can find defined diasporas in the post-Soviet borderlands. 
In spite of the predictions of marxists, ethno-national diasporas have not 
disappeared in these regions. On the contrary, their numbers, the scope of 
membership, their organization and the range of their activities have been 
increasing dramatically since the collapse of the Soviet Union.6 We should, perhaps, 
not pass over the fact that at the center of the collapse of the Soviet Union was the 
dramatic rise of nationalism. There can be no question that many factors contributed 
to the fall of communism; however, it was nationalism and its capacity to mobilize 
broad masses of citizens on behalf of independence that proved the decisive force in 
the unraveling of totalitarianism. Despite the Soviet ideology’s apparent rejection of 
nationalism in favor of internationalism, the civic identity fostered by communism 
was never able to overcome the more deeply embedded moral and cultural codes of 
                                                 
6 Garbriel Scheffer, “Ethno-national Diasporas and Security”, Survival 35, no.1. (Spring, 1994), p. 77. 
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ethnonationalism.7 
As mid-1980s began, many national activisms were found in the Soviet 
empire. For nearly three quarters of a century, many of the Soviet Union’s citizens 
kept their most deeply held views to themselves.  Their outward submissiveness 
even led many Western experts to conclude that the traditions, values, and bonds of 
the past had been sundered and irretrievably lost. The West’s misconceptions about 
the Soviet Union were, perhaps, best demonstrated by the interchangeable use of the 
terms “USSR” and “Russia”. 8 Soviet citizens were frequently called “Russians” in 
chic shorthand. This practice made the non-Russian peoples, in essence, hidden 
nations. Even today, the deep spiritual crisis of identity among non-Russian peoples 
is only weakly understood by the rest of the world. To be sure, there are a few 
Western experts, most notably Helene Carrere D’Encausse, Alexandre Bennigsen, 
Edward Allworth, Zibigniew Brzezinski, and Richard Pipes, who have pointed to 
the potential of the non-Russian factors. However, as of the mid-1980s, the majority 
of the Western academic community was convinced that the force of nationalism in 
the Soviet Union had been successfully suppressed by state control. Undoubtedly, 
much of the national spirit and energy of the Soviet peoples was hidden under the 
                                                 
7 Geroge Schopflin, “Nationhood, communism and state legitimating”, Nations and Nationalism 1, no.1 (1995), 
pp.81-91. 
8 Nadia Diuk and Adrian Karatnycky, New Nation Rising. The Fall of the Soviet and the Challenge of 
Independence, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1993), p. 12. 
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superficial and glib assertions of the self-confident totalitarian media. 
The Soviet system not only hid national spirit among non-Russian peoples 
in the federation but conversely also created a national consciousness for some 
ethnic peoples.  For instance, before the Soviet era, there was no widespread 
notion of national consciousness among the Central Asian Turkic peoples. It could 
be argued that the Uzbek, Turkmen, Tajik, Kyrgyz, and Kazak nations, as they are 
new, were essentially formed under communism, although each of these peoples 
were the descendants of a rich and ancient Turkish heritage. 9  The idea of 
nationhood and the concept of a nation state with its essential element of popular 
sovereignty was originally alien to these cultures and traditions. Thus, we can 
conclude that in spite of Soviet internationalism, a territorial trope for the idea of 
the nation was generated by the Soviets, since the Soviets’ idea of cultural unity 
was linked to the idea of territorially based ethnic groups.10 By federalizing ethnic 
homelands into ethno-republics, the Soviet state actually created nations whose sense 
of nation-ness had previously barely existed.  In other words, the Soviet Union created a 
much more complicated social space, in which identity was in many ways rooted to 
                                                 
9 Ibid., p. 178. 
10 Greta Lynn Uehling, “The Crimean Tatars in Uzbekistan: Speaking with the dead and living homeland,” 
Central Asian Survey vol. 20, no.3 (2001), p.396. 
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territory and helped determine both the rights and opportunities of titular nations.11  
Even though the forced differentiation of peoples that took place under 
Stalin was largely artificial, there is today an increasing tendency, especially among 
the urban intelligentsia, for individuals, to identify themselves strongly and 
voluntarily as Uzbek, Kazak, Tajik, and Turkmen.  Especially after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, each titular state in Central Asia has been rapidly developing its 
own profile in domestic as well as international affairs. These states are making all 
possible efforts to revitalize and reformulate their national identities. Due to these 
developments, the problems of diasporas, cultural rights and state protection of 
national minorities are growing throughout post-Soviet Central Asia, since these 
nationalizing states do not have effective ways of harmonizing the relationships of 
citizenship, ethnic affiliation and religious and national identity. Moreover, as 
Annette Bohr has observed, the titular nationals have been squeezing out the non-
titular nationals from leading positions since the time of the creation of the new 
republics up through today, to make room for themselves.12 In other words, the 
notorious “fifth article” in the Soviet internal passports which was the most eminent 
manifestation of the institutionalization of nationality that would play a role in 
                                                 
11 Ibid. 
12 Annette Bohr, “The Central Asian States as Nationalising regimes”, in Graham Smith, Edward Allworth, 
Vivien Law, Andrew Wilson, and Annette Bohr (eds.), Nation-building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands. The 
Politics of National Identities (Cambridge University Press, 1998) 
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hindering a citizen’s chance of gaining employment or admission to institutes of 
higher learning, was to succeed in all Central Asian states.  The “fifth article” was 
stealthily restored in all of the Central Asian states in order to secure their political 
and cultural resurgence during their nation-building processes.13 Within the context 
of this environment, this study seeks to examine and explore the situation of small 
diaspora groups in the nationalizing Central Asian states. 
 
Objectives and Scope of the Study 
According to Russian writer and philosopher Aleksandr Zinoviev14, the 
communist system had a strong capacity to destroy national barriers and eliminate 
ethnic differences. He argued that communism created a new, bland, homogenized 
community of people.15  However, his assessment has since been disproven by the 
remarkable national rebirth that helped cause the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
And, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, all of the newly independent 
governments in Central Asia aimed at nationalizing or indigenizing the territories 
                                                 
13 For example, the governments of Kazakstan and Uzbekistan have found innovative ways to keep the ‘fifth 
column’ as an ethnic marker in the new passports by denoting ethnic nationality in native language or Russian 
on the first page for the internal consumption, but on the second page, which is written in English for external 
consumption, omits all references to ethnicity. Instead, it only indicates citizenship. It is probable that by doing 
so, they could avoid potential accusation of ethnocratic behavior from abroad. (see appendix for the example of 
Kazakstan Passport) 
14 He characterized national issues in the Soviet Union in his deeply cynical book The Reality of Communism 
published in 1983. 
15 cited in Nadia Diuk and Adrian Karatnycky, New Nation Rising. The Fall of the Soviet and the Challenge of 
Independence, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1993), pp. 3-4  
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under their control and rectifying what many saw as decades of dominance by 
foreign actors. These states made great efforts to undertake various nation-building 
projects. For individuals in many nationalizing states in Central Asia, knowledge of 
the titular language became increasingly important in order to obtain, maintain and 
advance their career and position in the society. In other words, members of the 
titular nations had somewhere to go and settle after the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
but the non-titular groups, which included group such as the Jews, the Volga 
Germans, the Koreans, the Crimean Tatars, Ahıska Turks, had nowhere to go. 
These diasporas found themselves in the middle of nowhere. To be sure, deportation 
and Sovietization had provided a serious challenge to the primordial notion of 
nationality.   
Under these circumstances, we should not overlook the fact that primary 
targets of the titular nations’ nationalizing measures are not only confined to ethnic 
Russians but also to Russified ethnic minorities and other diasporas. These ethnic 
minorities or diasporas rather than Russian diasporas in the region are, perhaps, the 
main losers in the nation-building process in post-Soviet Central Asia due to their 
powerlessness and vulnerability. As peoples deported by the Soviet regime, these 
groups, unlike the Russian diaspora, were forced to migrate against their will. Thus, 
 9
the intention of this study is to focus on the ethnic minority and diaspora issues in 
nationalizing Central Asia, which have generally been ignored by western academic 
and political circles.  
Specifically, this study is an analysis of two deported diaspora groups in 
Central Asia, Korean and Ahıska Turks, both of which experienced Stalin’s brutal 
deportations and which now facing new challenges in the nationalizing states.  
These small ethnic groups have no powerful protector to whom they can appeal for 
help and little chance to return to their homelands. This increases their sense of 
anxiety and vulnerability even though they have not been harassed or victimized in 
any discernible way.  The objective of this work is to examine their survival and 
the existence of the diaspora nationalism in the nationalizing Central Asian states. 
There is a growing academic literature in the West concerning the origins and future 
of the Russian diasporas.16 However, non-Russian diasporas have rarely been the 
subjects of these books and have been at best relegated to cursory chapters.  The 
potential significance of this study lies in filling this lacuna in diaspora studies, 
given the paucity and poor quality of the literature in this area of the subject. 
                                                 
16 For instance, on Russian diasporas see Bremmer, I., “The Politics of Ethnicity: Russians in the New 
Ukraine”, Europe-Asia Studies 46, no.2 (1994), pp. 261-283. / Kolstoe, Paul, Russians in the Former Soviet 
Republics (London: Hurst, 1995) / Melvin, Neil., Russians beyond Russia’s Borders (London: Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1995),  Shlapentokh, Vladimir., M. Sendich and E. Payin (eds.), The New Russian 
Diaspora: Russian Minorities in the Former Soviet Republics (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1994). 
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Post-Soviet Central Asia now faces an inharmony of state and nation which 
nationalists are increasingly reluctant to accept. However, many ethnic diasporas in 
the region are living symbols of this split and these diasporas have increasingly 
become the focus of political debates. Unfortunately, as mentioned above, most of 
these debates have concerned the situation of the Russian diaspora in the region and 
to some extent other major diasporas, such as Soviet Germans and Jews.  This 
study, in contrast, by focusing on other ethnic minority diasporas that are more 
vulnerable, powerless, and receive little concern or consideration from Western 
political and academic circles, will extend the political implications of the 
diasporas’ existence in the region.  Although these implications may be far from 
clear as yet, studying narratives of deported diasporas in nationalizing states raises 
important questions about the applicability of the primordial notion of diaspora 
identity.  In political terms, the narrative of the nation articulated by diasporas 
challenges the nationalists’ idea of the nation as a homogenous cultural unit formed 
on a common territory and linked by blood ties.  Moreover, the cultural hybridity 
of diaspora identity suggests another narrative of nationalism which disrupts the 
unifying myth of the modern nationalizing nation. As Bhabha argues, the 
recognition of such hybridity may provide the space to raise the real questions about 
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nation, citizenship and national belonging necessary to avoid the politics of polarity 
and emerge as the others of ourselves.17 
By using Korean and Ahıska Turkish diasporas in Uzbekistan and 
Kazakstan as cases, this study examines, to some extent, how diasporas are 
influenced by nationalizing states in Central Asia. It attempts to inquire into the 
factors which influence the existence, nature and intensity of ethno-nationalism in 
the diasporas’ context. Therefore, it analyzes both the existence and transmission of 
ethno-nationalism between the diasporas’ settings and homelands and specifically 
will deal with the transmission of ethno-nationalist sentiments across diasporas’ 
generations. To understand the effects and consequences of diaspora nationalism 
fully, this work proceeds from an analysis of nationalism’s public symptoms to an 
analysis of the relatively private domain of diasporic ethno-communal existence. By 
doing so, the researcher attempts to illustrate how ethno-nationalist sentiments in 
the diaspora setting can draw their strength, ideas, material support, or simply 
nationalist enthusiasm from homelands.  Above all, the task of this inquiry is to 
examine the sources of diversity within diaspora relations and to move toward an 
analysis of the patterns of interaction among trans-border ethnic groups, their 
traditional ethnic homelands, and the states in which they reside. The comparative 
                                                 
17 Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London: Routledge, 1992). 
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content of this investigation will show considerable variations in these practices in 
different settings and groupings. To be sure, knowledge about these processes is 
inevitably highly contextual. 
 
Case Selection 
Until national movements emerged in the late 1980s, native culture seemed 
like something second-rate or inferior, which is also linked to the less intelligent 
and low standard of education among titular inhabitants in Central Asia.18 The 
systemic superiority enjoyed by Russians and their language led only three percent 
of all Russians to bother learning any of the non-Russian languages. Thus, for the 
non-Russian national minorities in the region there was no choice to learn titular 
language or culture, but to accept Russian culture and language for their prosperity 
and survival. In Kazakstan, where the number of Russians was about equal to the 
number of indigenous Kazak, Soviet rule meant that there was less room for Kazak 
language and culture in the society. In 1989, there were no kindergartens for Kazak 
children, and Kazak language instruction was often unavailable in schools.19 Its 
heterogeneous demographic composition made Kazakstan relatively less authoritarian 
                                                 
18 Nadia Diuk and Adrian Karatnycky, p.52. 
19 Ibid., p. 53. 
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in its system of rule and more open in nature compared to other Central Asian states. 
Consequently, Kazakstan, the most Russified of the states (with the possible 
exception of Kyrgyzstan), stands a bit apart from the others in many respects. It is 
said that, even today, a walk around Almaty suggests a mode of life much more 
Europeanized than in the other Central Asian capitals. 
On the other hand, the Uzbeks were the third most numerous ethnic group 
in the Soviet Union, numbering close to 26 million. Unlike the situation in 
Kazakstan, the Uzbeks compose the majority of Uzbekistan’s population. 
Nevertheless, their numerical strength never turned into an equivalent access to 
political power at the highest levels of government during the Soviet period.  Thus, 
Uzbekistan employs more ethnic codes in all of its policies to provide an important 
avenue for indigenous social mobility and political status and position. Since 
independence, Uzbekistan has been the most overtly anti-Russian of the Central 
Asian states, attempting to eliminate all Slavic heritage and influences. 
If we consider the language law for instance, we can see the difference 
between the two states more clearly. Uzbekistan removed Russian’s normative 
status as the language of inter-ethnic communication in the state in 1995.20 The 
                                                 
20 Annette Bohr, “The Central Asian States as Nationalising regimes”, in Graham Smith, Edward Allworth, 
Vivien Law, Andrew Wilson, and Annette Bohr (eds.), Nation-building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands. The 
Politics of National Identities (Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 150. 
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Uzbekistani constitution does not provide the Russian language with any protection.  
By contrast, in Kazakstan, Russian is still the de facto lingua franca in all spheres of 
public life. Moreover, the 1995 constitution upgraded the status of Russian from the 
language of inter-ethnic communication to an official language.21 
Thus, this study examines as cases two diverse nationalizing states in 
Central Asia, Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, since they have relatively different 
conditions and settings.22 The comparative content of this inquiry in different 
settings will show considerable variations in diaspora practices and relations in 
different groupings. Moreover, many deported Ahıska Turks and Koreans ended up 
primarily in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan. These two diasporas are still concentrated 
in the above-mentioned states even after their independence.  
In the meantime, this study makes some distinctions between different 
types of diaspora communities. There are two dominant types: diasporas that are 
stateless but maintain strong contacts with co-ethnics who reside in a territory that 
is regarded by most members of the group as their homeland (Ahıska Turk) and 
diasporas that are related to societies that form the majority in their own established 
states (Korean).  
                                                 
21 Ibid., p.151. 
22 However, it should be underlined that even if there is some difference between Kazakstan and Uzbekistan in 
terms of their nationalizing degree, for the most part, the post-independent political landscape in Kazakstan and 
Uzbekistan looks decidedly mono-ethnic. There are few political groups or movements that span ethnic division. 
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Research Questions 
The present study is built on the assumption that the formation of new 
diasporas is an ongoing process, closely related to a combination of economic, 
cultural, and political factors. On this basis, it will examine the current political, 
economic, and social situations of Uzbekistan and Kazakstan after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and the ways in which Koreans and Ahıska Turks have confronted 
tasks in the transition period. Since the Korean and Ahıska Turkish diasporas 
consist of only about one percent of the population in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, it 
is impossible to understand the minority diaspora society without knowing the host-
states’ political, socio-economic, and ethnic situations. Therefore, sufficient 
attention will be given to the macro context of the nationalizing regimes where the 
Korean and Ahıska Turkish diasporas are situated. 
One of the common features between the two diasporas is that they do not 
have ample possibilities to return to their respective homelands, due to various 
reasons. Consequently, it is crucial to examine how they organize their lives in 
nationalizing titular states. As a matter of fact, the majority of Koreans and Ahıska 
Turks in Central Asia now seem to accept their new status as diasporas in newly 
independent states and are adapting rapidly to their host-societies. However, due to 
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dramatic changes in the economic, social, and political environment, both diasporas 
are in the process of reconstructing their national or diaspora identity in order to 
unify themselves. 
Past years have demonstrated their ability to overcome considerable 
hardship. Whether the future will allow them similar avenues of group survival is a 
question that remains open but to be studied carefully in this dissertation. Hence, 
their fate in post-Soviet Central Asia likewise poses interesting questions.  Will 
they be able to assimilate into the Turkic cultures of the majorities in the Central 
Asian republics?  If not, will they be able to maintain their diaspora ethnic identity, 
or will they opt for a greater Russian identity?  By asking such questions, this 
study focuses on a more crucial question: how strong and how significant is the 
interaction between diasporas and homelands in the post-Soviet Central Asia? This 
kind of question will lead us to explore the process of diaspora nationalism, its 
persistence over time, and whether it has the potential to be transmitted through the 
generations. If it has, what then are the mechanisms involved in such transmission?  
In other words, what are the factors that enable the successful transmission of 
ethno-nationalism across generational boundaries? What roles, if any, are played by 
the homelands and what difficulties do they have with the nationalizing host-states?  
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Is an active and highly interactive relationship between the ethnic homelands and 
diasporas necessary for intense ethno-national sentiments to develop in the 
diasporas? These and other questions will be examined in this work as it elaborates 
diasporas’ collective-individual identity formation and identity transmission 
between the older and younger generations. By looking at the case of the Korean 
and Ahıska Turkish diasporas, we may see how different diasporas respond 
differently to ethno-national challenges in the host-states. These and similar 
questions are worth exploring because they provide one of the important keys to 
understanding diaspora identity. 
Based on fieldwork carried out in 2003 and 2005, it can be argued that 
many diaspora members are ambivalent, since they expressed both affection and 
disaffection with regard to life in Central Asia. As Uehling argues, for many 
diasporas of Central Asia, the ideologies of home, soil, and roots fail to line up with 
the practicalities of residence, so that territorial referents and civic loyalty are 
perplexingly divided.23 Diaspora identity contains disparate and even contradictory 
elements and is constantly evolving in reaction to changing circumstances. In short, 
degrees of diasporaness, or diasporacity, are not static. Thus, this study aims to 
                                                 
23 Greta Lynn Uehling, “The Crimean Tatars in Uzbekistan: Speaking with the dead and living homeland”, 
Central Asian Survey 20, no.3 (2001), p.394. 
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clarify certain aspects of these confusions by examining two different diaspora 
groups, which examination will offer a window on the much broader process of 
diaspora identity and nationalism. This kind of inquiry can reveal the homeland 
image of the diasporas (Korean and Ahıska Turk), their actual fatherland and 
alternative homeland. 
 
Plan of the Dissertation 
For purpose of this study I have dismissed the conventional idea of 
presenting the life of ethnic groups purely in terms of formal structures and 
organizations. My approach focuses more on the ethno-cultural identity perceptions 
and relationships developed by the Ahıska Turkish and Korean diasporas in Central 
Asia.  In order to elaborate this discussion and understand the phenomenon of the 
Korean and Ahıska Turkish diaspora movement more thoroughly in the context of 
nationalizing Central Asian states, the first discussion starts with a theoretical 
orientation. Thus, chapter two will consist of a brief overview of the conceptual 
understanding of ethnicity, nation and nationalism. The theoretical framework in 
which different approaches to ethnicity and ethnic identity are debated and relate 
these to the case of the Ahıska Turkish and Korean diasporas.  
As contemporary Central Asian societies have become increasingly 
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multicultural, a growing number of people (especially in the diasporas) come to 
have access to dual (or multiple) cultures and identities. They are coping with 
difficulties of “cross-cultural transition” and the burden of minority status24. They 
have learned and are learning more than one culture and are engaging in “cultural 
frame switching.” More often than not, they have to overcome formidable barriers 
of social disadvantage and ethnic discrimination to improve their status in the host 
society. Thus, the author was concerned about a diaspora’s group level change after 
their deportation to Central Asia.  In other words, how acculturation can be taken 
into account in multicultural diasporas is a topic that will be discussed. Accordingly, 
in order to examine these acculturated minority groups during the Soviet and the 
post-Soviet period, the author will look over in terms of acculturation theory. Under 
the general heading of acculturation, the researcher will variously use either social 
contact, cultural shift, or identity-type measures of adaptation in the following 
chapters while examining the Ahıska Turkish and Korean diasporas.  Furthermore, 
the concepts of nation and nationalism will be discussed in order to give an in-depth 
grasp of nationalizing Kazakstan and Uzbekistan and their state-building (or nation-
building) in theoretical manner.  
                                                 
24 John Berry, U. Kim, T. Minde, and D. Mok, “Comparative studies of acculturative stress,” International 
Migration Review, no. 21 (1996), pp. 491-493. 
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Chapter three will be devoted to a brief historical review of the Ahıska 
Turkish and Korean diasporas in Central Asia. It will be a bare-boned sketch of 
historical circumstances which have impacted upon Ahıska Turks and Koreans in 
Central Asia. Hence, this chapter will cover their deportation and Sovietization 
before the independence of the titular nations in Central Asia. The significance of 
more specific historical factors, including deportation, population distribution, 
official status etc., will be further elaborated. Specific attention will be given to 
diasporic conceptualizations and the way in which the diasporas’ distance from 
their homelands in time and space impacts on their construction. It will show that 
the links that exist between diaspora individuals and the homeland, regardless of 
generation, can reveal many issues, including the intensity of ethno-national 
identification. The author will elaborate on this identification process by looking at 
the extent to which the homeland is portrayed in a romantic fashion, abstracted from 
complex political and economic realities. For the Ahıska Turks in particular, the 
question of return to the homeland turns out to be one of the central considerations 
in assessing the attraction of diasporic conceptualizations to their diaspora 
population. In this context the Korean and Ahıska Turk samples become highly 
differentiated, with Ahıska Turks expressing relatively strong links to the homeland 
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and a desire to return. Representatives of the Korean sample revealed relatively 
limited and more-or-less symbolic links with the homeland. These differences 
between the samples are supported by the initial historical assessment of 
deportation and Sovietization patterns. 
Chapter four will discuss the social, demographic, and political forces that 
both induce and constrain the nationalization processes in Kazakstan and 
Uzbekistan. Specific nation-building practices as well as their consequent 
implications for the diasporas in the region will be explored and analyzed. This 
chapter will attempt to illustrate the disjunction between the formal expression of 
equality in Central Asian constitutions and the actual impacts of the nationalizing 
actions of the elites in the titular nations. 
Chapter five will focus on the existence of the diaspora nationalism in the 
Korean and Ahıska Turkish communities and the revitalization movements of these 
communities in their nationalizing host-states. It will systematically analyze the 
interactive relationship between the ethnic homelands and the respective diasporas 
as well as the generational aspect of this process. It will try to show how the 
deportation of Koreans and Ahıska Turks to Central Asia is being translated into 
symbolic or moral capital by the nationalizing elites.  It will try to illustrate that 
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the history of the deportation increased the sense of group or communal identity.  
In fact, the potential mythologizing of the deportation may very well support the 
notion that the revival movement involves the creation of an identity involving the 
“invention of traditions,” as Hobsbawn calls it.25 Within this framework, the 
cultural revitalization movements of the Ahıska Turks and Koreans will be 
examined in terms of the extent to which their cultural heritage has played a role in 
their lives. While doing so, the author will attempt to reveal that they are more 
responsive to language/cultural activities when they perceive the economic benefits 
of pursuing them. Finally, in chapter six characteristics of the two groups and their 
integration into the host society are studied, with specific emphasis on the role of 
the Homelands (the Turkish and Korean governments, South Korean multinationals, 
Turkish businesses and entrepreneurs and other homeland engagements.) 
 
Methodology  
This inquiry approaches the collapse of the Soviet empire and the rise of 
nationalism in Central Asia among titular nationals and the impact of these 
developments on the Korean and Ahıska Turkish diasporas within the framework of 
the historical and social sciences. Investigating ideas of homeland and diasporic 
                                                 
25 Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.), The Invention of Traditions (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1983), pp. 1-15, 263-283, 298-307. 
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identity demands scholarly engagement with several disciplines. The field data in 
this dissertation is gathered through ethnographic research. In a nutshell, the present 
study is based on field research, the core of which is based on semi-structured 
interviews with members of the Korean and Ahıska Turkish diasporas in the 
nationalizing Central Asian states.  Accordingly, the study utilizes a considerable 
amount of ethnographic material as it weaves together narrative and analysis. The 
main goal of the study is to elaborate on the dynamics which potentially lead to the 
construction of diasporic identities. In order to acquire information and data dealing 
with nationalizing Kazakistan and Uzbekistan regimes the study will make use of 
various government periodicals, documents and publications along with recent 
journals and magazines. A special endeavor was made to use a wide variety of 
Western, Russian, Turkish, Korean, and titular (Kazak and Uzbek) sources in this 
study. Furthermore, archival materials (GARF, GAKhK, GAPK, GAKO, GAAO, 
GADO, GAChO)26 will also be utilized dealing with the backgrounds of the Ahıska 
Turkish and Korean diaspora. 
This inquiry seeks to provide empirical data which will illustrate how 
diasporas have positioned themselves in the nationalizing states as well as to bring 
                                                 
26  Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii(GARF), Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Khabarovskogo 
Kraia(GAKhK), Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Primorskogo Kraia(GAPK) Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Kzyl-Ordinskoi 
Oblasti(GAKO), Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Akmolinskoi Oblasti(GAAO), Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv 
Chimkentskoi Oblasti(GAChO). 
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new narratives which may disrupt dominant narratives of “nation” in post-Soviet 
Central Asia. In the mean time, it attempts to surmount the methodological 
difficulties which arise from treating ethnic groups as organic homogenous 
communities but composed of individuals with different interests. Using the 
testimonies of its respondents, the study attempts both to recreate the narratives of 
nation articulated by deported ethnic minorities, Korean and Ahıska Turk, in 
Central Asia and also to provide some tentative suggestions as to how these 
narratives might be interpreted in the context of the wider debates regarding 
diaspora nationalism. The empirical data will be presented in two sections: first, in 
establishing the existence of a collective identity among deported diasporas in 
nationalizing Central Asia and presenting this as evidence of ‘diaspora nationalism’; 
and second, in arguing that the substance of diaspora identity is in fact different 
among different diasporas but common in their cultural hybridity.  
The author relied on snowball sampling and sought out individuals in 
likely gathering places (i.e., outdoor markets, restaurants or coffee houses, villages, 
churches). While the majority of contacts were made through acquaintances who 
were either directly or indirectly involved in various aspects of the Korean and 
Ahiska Turkish revitalization movements, the respondents also included some 
 25
individuals who could be described as clearly being outside the nationalizing 
movement. Thus, though going access to respondents initially depended on 
snowball sampling, individuals regarded by the researcher as “non-participants” in 
diaspora activities were also located.  In short, the individuals from whom the 
researcher obtained data fall into three categories: 1) members of Korean and 
Ahiska Turkish intelligentsias from Kazakstan and Uzbekistan; 2) participants in 
cultural revitalization activities organized by official cultural organization in 
Uzbekistan and Kazakstan; 3) ordinary non-participatory Koreans and Ahiska Turks 
whom the researcher met through acquaintances and by chance in Kazakstan and 
Uzbekistan.  
During fieldwork in Kazakstan in 2003, the researcher encountered some 
Korean disapora members who described themselves to be Soviet, in words like, 
“By nationality I am Korean, but I consider myself Soviet.”  Soviet identity 
continues to be used by some among the deported diasporas (especially Koreans, 
Germans, and Jews) since it allows for resolution of the disjuncture between ethnos 
and territory experienced upon displacement. Diasporas experience their uprooting 
differently, but always painfully. For some, the awareness of the split between 
blood and earth leads to a challenging of their sense of national belonging and a 
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recognition of their “hybridity.” For others, however, displacement leads to a bitter 
sense of loss and a feeling of not belonging anywhere. For instance, some of the 
interviewed Korean and Ahıska Turk stated that they hade no homeland. They said, 
“We are aliens there and here, we are aliens…the children were born there in 
Uzbekistan and Kazakstan. We haven’t got a native land!”  Truly, deportation, 
Sovietization and the establishment of nationalizing titular states presented a serious 
challenge to primordial notions of nationality. 
Generally, respondents were in a state of physical and mental dislocation, 
unsettled and often unstable, which presented significant empirical problems. This, 
combined with the fact that the focus of the study is on beliefs, perceptions, and 
feelings rather than merely social facts, means that purely quantitative research 
methods are unsuitable. Thus, in the research, empirical data was gathered during 
the course of the fieldwork conducted among deported diaspora communities using 
a combination of qualitative research methods. Four complementary methods of 
qualitative data gathering were used in conjunction: survey; semi-structured 
interviews; questionnaires, which included open and closed questions and covered 
the same areas as the interviews (socio-demographic data, motivation for leaving, 
evaluation of treatment by the host-states, national identification, etc.); and field 
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observations, recorded throughout the period and analyzed together with the 
transcribed interviews.  
 
Literature Review 
As mentioned above, the diaspora movements of the ethnic Koreans and 
Ahıska Turks in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan are an ongoing process. What is more, 
there are few studies in either the Western literature, or in other languages, dealing 
with their degree of diasporaness or diasporacity after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. Thus, regarding the two cases, this study will effectively use three other 
complementary methods in conjunction: interview, field observation, and 
questionnaires. There are some book chapters and journal articles related to the 
issue. Including these sources, all other accessible ethnographic materials will be 
consulted. Special attention will be given to the current local diaspora scholars’ 
works in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan. 
There is, however, a fair amount of literature dealing with nationalizing 
Central Asian states and the field of diaspora studies in general.  Nation Building 
in the post-Soviet Borderlands: The politics of National Identities, edited by 
Graham Smith and others, Nation Abroad Diapora, Politics and International 
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Relations in the Former Soviet Union, edited by Charles King and Neil Melvin, The 
Nationalities Question in the Post-Soviet States by Graham Smith, and New Nations 
Rising. The fall of the Soviets and the Challenge of Independence by Nadia Diuk 
and Andrian Karantnysky are some good examples of works in English which deal 
with the study of nationalism and ethnic politics in the-post Soviet’s non-Russian 
borderlands. These books, which were based on fieldwork, offer insight into how 
national identities have been reformulated and revitalized in the recently established 
states.  
Some chapters directly relating to the Central Asia states were quite 
comprehensive. Shirin Akiner’s article “Melting Pot, Salad Bowl – Cauldron? 
Manipulation and Mobilization of Ethnic and Religious Identities in Central Asia” 
gives perhaps the best analysis of the ethnic relations among various peoples in the 
region after Soviet rule. Her argument that the Central Asia region, which used to be 
the ‘melting pot’ throughout history with no records of hostility among different 
peoples, has changed into the ‘salad bowl’ circumstances with institutionalized 
nationalities in the region due to Soviet influence, aptly describes situation in the 
region. She indicates that the post-Soviet nation-building process, maintaining the 
self-confidence of the titular peoples, has contributed to a heightening of interethnic 
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tensions within each state, creating a sense of “first” and “second-class” citizens. 
She notes that, “under such circumstances dormant hostilities could be activated 
suddenly, by some otherwise trivial incident,” as happened in 1989-91.27  Related 
with the issue, this study will also take a look at the government’s documents and 
papers to see the other side of the picture. 
In terms of general information in the field of diaspora studies, Garbriel 
Sheffer’s books, Modern Diaspora in International Politics, Diaspora Politics at 
Home Abroad, and his article “Ethno-National Diasporas and Security,” Robin 
Cohen’s, Global Diasporas: an Introduction, Milton Esman’s article, “Diasporas 
and International Relations,” William Safran’s articles, “Comparing Diaspora: A 
Review Essay” and “Diaspora in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and 
Return” give a good overview of diaspora issues, as well as broaden and deepen the 
scope of the field beyond its traditional focus. These books and articles are pretty 
well organized and methodically elaborate on the issue and they provide a good 
motivation or powerful reason for this specific study. Especially, Engin Isin and 
Patrick Wood’s book Citizenship and identity and Stuart Hall’s article “Cultural 
identity and Diaspora” in particular served as an important referents for the central 
                                                 
27 Shrin Akiner, “Metling pot, salad bowl – cauldron? Manipulation and mobilization of ethnic and religious 
identities in Central Asia” Ethnic and Racial Studies (April, 1997), p. 392. 
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diaspora concept utilized in the dissertation: “a diaspora’s hybrid diasporic 
identities.”  Their proposed argument regarding the “hybrid and hyphenated 
diaspora identity” captures the complexity of cultural configuration and identity 
formation of groups and individuals in this study.  As aforementioned, diaspora 
nationalism is based on a triadic relationship between the homeland, host 
state/society and the diaspora community, which creates its transnational and hybrid 
structure. Beside, as German Kim pointed out, in order to avoid lopsided imposition 
of the homeland culture (i.e., South Korean to Korean diaspora and Turkey to 
Ahıska Turk) upon local diasporas during their cultural and, to some extent, 
language recovery processes, the notion of hybrid and hyphenated identities take 
important place.28 It is logical to assume that since their dissimilation was a process 
that occurred over decades, their assimilation will also take time. Therefore, we 
have to acknowledge that the Korean diaspora in Kazakstan or Uzbekistan are 
Koreans and at the same time full-fledged Kazakstani citizens or those Ahıska 
Turks in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan were Turkish at the same time full-fledged 
Kazakstani or Uzbekistani citizens. 
There is a large literature, which comprises many conflicting ideas, in the 
                                                 
28 Interview with German Kim, cited in Chong Jin Oh, “Diaspora Nationalism: the case of ethnic Korean 
minority in Kazakhstan and its lessons from the Crimean Tatars in Turkey,” Nationalities Paper, vol. 34, no.2 
(May, 2006), p.120. 
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area of ethnicity, formation of identity, identity shift or change, and nationalism. 
Among various writings, the author has referred to works of Anthony Smith, 
Fredrik Barth, Eric Hobsbawm, Ernest Gellner, Stephean Cornell and Douglas 
Hartman, Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan, and Anthony Cohen.  Anthony 
Smith’s argument in his book National Identity has particular importance for the 
purpose of this dissertation. Starting from the premise that the content of both 
nationalism and ethnicity differ in each country according to specific historic 
conditions and internal dynamics, Smith argument that ethnic groups should be 
analyzed through examination of their histories, which possess various different 
characteristics and have different historical experiences, gives considerable insight 
into the issue.29 Indeed, historical culture, historical territory, memories, and myth 
have played a crucial role in shaping Ahıska Turk and Korean diasporic identity.30 
Additionally, it should be stressed that Smith’s analysis of pre-modern ethnic ties to 
modern nations provides another explanation for the persistence and strength of 
ethnic attachments to the “nation” and the power of nationalist ideologies and 
sentiments to spark nationalist movements. That is to say, Smith has shown how the 
roots of nationalism were to be found in pre-modern ethnicity and that it should be 
                                                 
29 Anthony Smith, National Identity (London: Penguin Books, 1991), p. 200. 
30 Ibid, p. 14. 
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understood as continuation of ethnicity. 
Another approach useful for this dissertation is Cornell and Hartman’s 
instrumental perspective as set forth in their book Ethnicity and Race-Making 
Identities in a Changing World.  In their view, individuals and groups emphasize 
their own ethnic identities when such identities are in some way advantageous to 
them.31 In the same vein, Glazer and Moynihan also add that “Ethnicity serves as a 
means of advancing group interest” thus, “Ethnicity has become more salient 
because it can combine interest with an affective tie.”32 Given the responses from 
many interviewees in this study, it would appear that ethnic factors, while not 
insignificant, are increasingly less influential than economic ones in terms of the 
ways in which they choose to go about raising their families and seeking 
employment. Even many interviewees who did not profess an interest in 
nationalizing diaspora projects per se, showed instrumental reasons for learning 
Korean language and culture (i.e., to study or work in Korea or to find employment, 
possibly with a Korean firm).  Although Ahıska Turks have lower degree 
considering the issue this also does happen to them as well.  Paul Henze also 
supports this idea by saying, “Ethnic awareness is a powerful emotion, but it does 
                                                 
31 Stephan Cornell and Douglas Hartman, Ethnicity and Race-Making Identities in a Changing World 
(California: Pine Forge Press, 1998), p. 58. 
32 Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan, “Why Ethnicity,” Commentary (October, 1974), p.37. 
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not act in vacuum. It is closely connected to economic considerations and 
expectations.”33  
Lastly, some ethnographic works by important regional and local scholars 
(Korean, Korean diaspora, Turkish, and Ahıska Turkish diaspora) were used and 
consulted for the dissertation.  In the case of the Ahıska Turks, books and articles 
by Ayşegül Aydıngün, Zakir Avşar, Feyzullah Budak, Yunus Zeyrek and Elipaşa 
Ensarov were of particular value, while works by, German Kim, Valeriy Han, 
Sergei Han, Georgii Kan, Ko song Mu, and many other South Korean scholars gave 
important insight into the situation of the Korean diaspora.  
                                                 
33 Henze Paul, “Russia and China: Managing Regional Relations in the Face of Ethnic Aspiration,” The 
International Research & Exchanges Board’s Huang Hsing Foundation Hsueh Chun-tu Lecture Series (21 June, 
1999)  
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CHAPTER II 
 
THEORETICAL ORIENTATION 
 
 
Recently there is a large literature in the area of ethnicity, formation of 
identity, identity shift or change, and nationalism. Particularly with the breakup of 
the Soviet Union, the study of identity politics has exploded with conflicting views. 
Hence, there is no consensus on what identities, ethnicity, and nationalism are, or 
on how they are formed.  However, the lack of agreement does not disqualify them 
as useful concepts in social science. We cannot dismiss their conceptual importance 
in explaining recent phenomena. The explosion of nationalism in the former Soviet 
Union and the search for a post-Soviet identity testify to the importance of ethnicity 
and identity politics.   
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the rise of nationalist 
movements placed the nationalities issue at the forefront of the governmental 
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agenda in many of the newly born Central Asian states.  Within this environment, 
the Central Asian states have been attempting to join the international community 
on many levels and are at the same time dealing with internal conflicts resulting 
from rising nationalist sentiments among different nationality groups.  Accordingly, 
research into the ethnic minorities in Central Asia’s newly independent republics is 
crucial, because the way they handle the nationalities factor will have an impact 
both within and beyond their borders. In particular, research into the Korean and 
Ahiska Turkish diasporas in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan could provide insight into 
the potential complexities of a future nationalities policy in other Central Asian 
republics where the nationalities factor must be adequately and appropriately 
addressed in order to ensure regional stability. To be sure, ethnicity is an important 
variable in explaining identities in the post-Soviet space. There are distinct 
differences of custom, religion, and language among the many peoples. To clarify 
the general concepts that will be used to explore the specific subject matter of this 
study, this chapter will give background about the ideas of nation and nationalism, 
ethnicity and identity, and acculturation.  
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II.1.  Nation and Nationalism and Ethnicity: A Historical and Contemporary 
Perspective 
In the study of nationalism it is important to recognize that the concept of 
“nation” and the phenomenon of nationalism are fluid and polymorphous, as it is 
commonly misconceived and often presented in social science literature. Therefore, 
“nation” cannot be defined as any kind of bounded or homogeneous entity. In this 
respect, question of what constitutes a nation and how are we to understand of the 
phenomenon of nationalism remains crucial. Much of the literature on the subject 
recognizes the break between the modern and pre-modern as a significant point in 
the development of the nation-state and the rise of nationalism. This is thus an 
appropriate point at which to begin the discussion. 
The argument that the concept of “nation” is a modern one finds much 
support in the literature. Many authors trace the emergence of nation and 
nationalisms to the rise of the modern state. The proponents of this view, such as 
Gellner34 and Breuilly35, write that the nation is a modern phenomenon which came 
into being in the late eighteenth century with the nation-state-building projects that 
emerged in the wake of the Industrial Revolution, the rise of capitalism, and the 
                                                 
34 Ernest Gellner, Thought and Change (London: Weidenfeld & Nichoson, 1964), pp. 147-178. 
35 John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), pp. 366-403. 
 37
accompanying development of centralized mass education systems, conscription, 
and extensive communications and transportation networks. Prior to the French 
Revolution, the contemporary notion of “nation” did not exist because pre-modern 
political forms did not demarcate clear boundaries or foster internal integration and 
homogenization as did the nation-state.  Therefore, in pre-modern times specific 
cultural elements were not significant because cultural homogeneity was not 
necessary for empires to collect tribute.36 However, in the modern era, cultural 
markers have taken on a significance that did not exist in the pre-modern era.  
Consequently, Gellner states that the concept of nation is a modern phenomenon 
because now nations have become mobilized around these cultural traditions for 
political ends.37 
In fact, state-building was nation-building. With the emergence of the 
modern state it became important to inculcate in citizens a sense of loyalty to the 
state so as to be able to mobilize the citizenry (in order to defend the newly formed 
state’s territorial integrity). And in fact, this is what has been happening in Central 
Asia since titular nations became independent in 1991.  In cases where there was 
an ethnic core upon which to build the nation-state, this facilitated the nation-
                                                 
36 Craig Calhoun, “Nationalism and Ethnicity,” Annual Review of Sociology, vol.19, 1993, pp. 212-215. 
37 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1983) 
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building project because the state could invoke the salient pre-existing cultural 
traditions of the dominant ethnicity to establish a sense of nation-ness among the 
citizenry. For instance, in most of the titular Central Asian states (e.g., Kazakstan 
and Uzbekistan) we see that the dominant ethnic group coincided roughly with the 
territorial boundaries of the nation-state, allowing the state to mobilize its citizens 
based on the dominant ethnic group and to promote its language and other 
significant aspects of culture. Hence, emotional loyalty to the nation-state could be 
achieved by calling forth the myths and symbols and shared historical memories of 
the dominant ethic group.  
And even when an ethnic core (or dominant ethnic group) is lacking, 
“nation-ness” can also be promoted through the invention of traditions, or through 
the re-invention of various myth and histories (such as a myth of origins, a heroic 
and golden past) which usually do contain some historical basis, as Anthony Smith 
argues.38     In other words, “Nations are not so much invented as composed and 
developed out of pre-existing historical materials,” as Hobsbawm states.39 And it is 
in this context of the modern state that we see the phenomenon of nationalist 
                                                 
38 We can clearly see such cases in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan after their independence. (i.e., Altın Adam from 
Kazakhstan and Timur and Timurade legacy from Uzbekistan); Anthony Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations 
(Cambridge: Blackwell, 1986), p.212. 
39 Eric Hobsbawm, “Some Reflections on Nationalism” in T.J. Nossiter and A.H.Hanson Stein Rokkau (eds.), 
Imagination and Precision in the Social Science (London: Faber & Faber LTD, 1972), p.393. 
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politics emerge. This argument fits in well with the direction of this study, since the 
latter brings ethnicity into the discussion of nationalism in the way that Smith 
asserts. To repeat the gist of Smith’ argument, there exists a historical link between 
ethnicity and nationalism. That is to say, all nationalistic struggles are historically 
based on ethnic struggles. 
However, in the case of Korean and Ahiska Turkish diasporas in Kazakstan 
and Uzbekistan, they are national minorities with citizenship in their respective 
Soviet successor states, but they do not share an ethno-national identity with fellow 
citizens in their states. Conversely, they do share nationality (i.e., ethnicity) with the 
external national homeland (Korea and Turkey), although they do not have 
citizenship. 
In addition to the state-generated nation-building discussed above, there are 
also ethnic intelligentsias that take up the project of defining ethnic identity to 
promote their nations.  In post-colonial states in particular, indigenous elites are 
often the leaders who promote their county’s nationhood and lead nationalist 
movements. These intelligentsias engage in re-creating and re-interpreting their past 
in such a way that their national identity, and specifically the particular elements 
that they are trying to resuscitate, will resonate with members for political ends. 
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Because the idea of nations seems to imply some kind of internal homogeneity, 
there are some characteristics upon which a nation is said to exist, such as shared 
common descent, territory, and a common language. There is an intangible 
psychological dimension to the phenomenon of nationalism because nationalism 
becomes prominent when people consider themselves to constitute a nation. After 
all, a nation exists where members of a particular ethnic community define 
themselves as such, and it is through this act of self-naming that its existence is 
asserted.40 As Benedict Anderson has so famously phrased it, “a nation is an 
imagined community.”41 
While the rise of the nation-state and the concept of nation coincide with 
modernization (dating roughly to the French Revolution), Anthony Smith finds that 
continuities between pre-modern ethnic and modern nations illustrate that the break 
between the modern and the pre-modern eras is not as clear-cut as modernists 
contend.42 This is the argument that Smith develops in his book in which he 
attempts to trace the ethnic origins of nations. His basic argument, that “a pre-
existing framework of collective loyalties and identities” underlies modern nations, 
                                                 
40 We cans see such developments from the Ahiska Turk case in Central Asia. How they have developed their 
ethnic identity (or makers) after the deportation. This will be elaborated on later chapter. 
41 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: 
Verso, 1991), pp. 5-7. 
42 Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nation (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986) 
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is compelling because it attempts to explain why identification with the nation and 
nationalist movements can have such a powerful hold over members of ethnic 
groups. Smith claims that the core of ethnicity is to be found in the more enduring 
cultural forms which are embodied in the “myth-symbol complex” of ethnic groups, 
through which values, beliefs, myths, memories, and symbols are passed down to 
succeeding generations.43  
Smith emphasizes that nationalism cannot be analyzed without considering 
the role played by ethnicity, which also effects the formation of nation-state. To him 
ethnicity is the forerunner of the modern national unit, and ethnic identity has the 
potential of being transformed into a nationalist sentiment when the necessary 
conditions are fulfilled.44 While not discounting the validity of modernist claims, 
Smith’s analysis of pre-modern ethnic ties to modern nations provides another 
explanation for the persistence and strength of ethnic attachments to the nation and 
the power of nationalist ideologies and sentiments to spark nationalist movements. 
Accordingly, it seems that Smith’s position is a powerful model for explaining 
current developments with regard to ethnicity, nation, and nationalism. 
Another major approach that should be considered is the instrumental 
                                                 
43 Ibid., pp. 15-16, 58, 60-68. 
44 Ibid., 11. 
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perspective of ethnicity, which views ethnicity as a social construction. 45 
Proponents of this approach treat ethnicity as a social, political and cultural resource 
used by different interest and status groups. Thus, the instrumental perspective 
focuses on how ethnic boundaries, identities and cultures are transacted and defined 
through social interaction in ethnic communities. In the view of these scholars, 
individuals and group emphasize their own ethnic identities when such identities are 
in some way advantageous to them. The basis of the persistence of ethnic identity is 
the practical use to which it is put, rather than its deep roots.46 Paul Henze supports 
this argument by saying, “Ethnic awareness is a powerful emotion, but it does not 
act in vacuum. It is closely connected to economic consideration and 
expectations.”47  The significance of this argument is that it shows there are other 
factors that work simultaneously along with ethnicity in establishing networks 
among diaspora or in forwarding their revitalization activities. In other words, it 
underlines that ethnicity is only one part of the catalyst. As evidenced in interviews 
with some individuals who did not profess an interest in the nationalizing projects 
per se, there were certainly instrumental reasons for their wanting to pursue, say, 
                                                 
45 Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan, “Why Ethnicity,” Commentary (October, 1974), p.32. 
46 Ibid., pp.33-35. 
47 Paul Henze, “Russia and China: Managing Regional Relations in the Face of Ethnic Aspiration,” The 
International Research & Exchanges Board’s Huang Hsing Foundation Hsueh Chun-tu Lecture Series (21 June, 
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Korean language studies (i.e., to study or work in Korea or to find employment, 
possibly with a Korean firm). Almost all non-participant interviewees revealed their 
instrumental reasons for learning Korean. It was not a question of participating in a 
symbolic movement with the goal of regaining some kind of link to a mythic and 
glorious past in their people’s history. On the contrary, their systematic and 
concerted efforts to learn Korean had the goal of employment with a Korean 
company. Thus, we can presume that like local native people (Uzbek or Kazak) who 
learn Korean for instrumental reasons, there are ethnic Koreans who have 
instrumental rather than symbolic or primordial reasons for seeking language and 
cultural education.48  
However, we should bear in mind deeply that this instrumental perspective 
should be employed in conjunction with primordial reasons when assessing the 
motivation of a diaspora or a particular ethnic group.  In other words, we should 
synthesize the primordial and instrumental approaches to ethnicity when examining 
ethnic groups. In fact, the sense of sharedness based on a general sense of ethnic 
homogeneity may be sufficient as the common base upon which to establish various 
economic, cultural, and political ties. It is a kind of cultural capital based on shared 
                                                 
48 Even though most Ahıska Turks have good command of their native language, many youngsters are revising 
their Turkish for instrumental reasons as well (i.e., to work or study in Turkish firms or institutions). 
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ethnicity, which enables diasporas to proceed with the initial steps in establishing 
networks among scattered diasporas and with the homeland. We may not ignore the 
instrumental perspective, as it helps us to see the economic and psychological 
dimensions of ethnic identity (or, we may say the rational dimension of ethnic 
behavior).  However, Glazer and Moynihan stress the importance of the 
sentimental component in assessing the instrumental perspective. They note that 
“ethnicity serves as a means of advancing groups interest –which it does – by 
insisting that it is not only a means of advancing interests. Indeed, on reason that 
ethnicity has become so effective means of advancing interests is that it involves 
more than interests.”49 
Nationalism takes various forms.  There is bureaucratic nationalism, 
which is promoted by the state; anti-colonial nationalism, in which cultural forms 
may take on heightened significance when threatened by colonial encroachment or 
oppression; and lastly vicarious nationalism, or what Anderson terms “long-distance 
nationalism,”50 which this dissertation will focus in analyzing the case of the 
Ahıska Turks and Koreans. In other words, nationalism can arise among 
                                                 
49 Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan, p.37. 
50 The use of the term “long-distance nationalism” here is based on Benedict Anderson’s writings, “The New 
World Disorder,” New Left Review, no.193 (1992), pp 3-13. ; “Long-Distance Nationalism: World Capitalism 
and the Rise of Identity Politics,” Wertheim Lecture (Amsterdam: Center for Asian Studies in Amsterdam, 
1992), pp. 1-14.; “Exodus”, Critical Inquiry, no.20 (1994), pp.314-327. 
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populations that do not constitute a “nation,” such as among diaspora or émigré 
people who lack a territory. In order to protect and articulate their social, cultural, 
and economic interests, grievances, claims, anxieties, and aspirations, ethnic groups 
enter into the political arena, as Rothschild states.51  It is in this context that people 
band together as members of an ethnic group, invoking the ideology of nationalism 
and engaging in nationalist movements to achieve certain political or economical 
ends. As Gellner states, “Men do not in general become nationalists from sentiment 
or sentimentality, they become nationalists through genuine, objective, practical 
necessity, however obscurely recognized.”52 Like many other nationalisms, “long-
distance nationalism” (or we can call it diaspora nationalism) is also a group-based 
phenomenon, which pervades both public and private spheres of life. One needs to 
consider the multifaceted nature of nationalism and the sense in which it is always 
part of a broader and heavily symbolic discursive field.  Especially in a diaspora 
context, nationalism often assumes a variety of forms, but it is precisely this 
variation and multilayeredness that this dissertation endeavors to analyze.  
Now that we have entered what is often referred to as the Postmodern Age, 
with the globalization of culture and the existence of increasingly advanced 
                                                 
51 Joseph Rothschild, Ethnopolitics: A conceptual Framework (New York: Columbia University press, 1981), 
PP. 227-245. 
52 Ernest Gellner, Thought and Change (London: Weidenfeld & Nichoson, 1964), p. 160. 
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information technologies, one can be skeptical about the status of the modern 
nation-state or speak of the obsolescence of the nation (i.e., the supersession of 
nationalism).  Eventually, one can conclude that the globalization trend and the 
increased contacts between diverse ethnic groups attenuate ethnic ties and 
nationalist sentiments. In fact, this is not the case. As Barth has cited, “Cultural 
differences can persist despite inter-ethnic contact and interdependence,” and 
increased cultural contact may even heighten awareness and appreciation of these 
differences.53  
Since the nation-state that contains within it multiple ethnic groups is the 
norm rather than the exception, it likely to see the continued phenomenon and even 
an increase in nationalism for several reasons.  As Beetham asserts, national 
sentiments will be mobilized among ethnic groups when they feel oppressed or 
discriminated against by the dominant ethnic group, when there is a strong 
centralizing or assimilationist effort by the state, and where regional disparities 
arise.54 Thus, contrary to many expectations, nationalism is far from waning. In 
fact, there will continue to be struggles by ethnic groups to (re)assert their political, 
social, and economic rights and to make claims for some degree of autonomy. 
                                                 
53 Fredrick Barth (ed.), Ethnic Groups and Boundaries (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1969), p.10. 
54 David Beetham, “The Future of the Nation-State,” in Gregor McLenna, David Held, and Stuart Hall (eds.), 
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 II.2.  Defining Identity 
An identity is a social and psychological concept that is either achieved or 
ascribed to by individual and groups.  In basic terms, an identity is a cognitive tool 
“for managing and organizing information about oneself and the self’s relationship 
to the environment.” 55  Identities are cognitive tools, but they also contain 
emotional and evaluative aspects that provide actors with the behavioral cues that 
are necessary for them to respond to their environments. Thus, identity is a “mental 
construct that describes and prescribes how the actor should think, feel, evaluate, 
and ultimately, behave in group-relevant situations.”56 In short, identities inform 
individuals and groups who they are in relation to other individuals and groups.  
In defining who we are, what we want, and how we should act as 
individuals, we compare and contrast ourselves to other individuals. Therefore, 
identities are inherently social. To wit, identities are socially constructed, and 
through this process arises a set of potential interests. Although the objective 
markers that differentiate actors are often indispensable elements of an identity, the 
meaning of such makers is itself a product of historically contingent processes of 
                                                 
55 Glenn Chafetz, Michael Spirtas, and Benjamin Frankel, “Introduction: Tracing the influence of Identity,” in 
Glenn Chafetz, Michael Spirtas, and Benjamin Frankel (eds.), In the Origin of National Interests (London: 
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56 Ibid. 
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social interaction. 57  A cultural and social system is the result of cumulated 
historical experiences; individual behavior is shaped within this context. 58 
Consequently, we can say that an identity is more than just a mere named category. 
The meaning of an identity and the corresponding set of interests do not naturally 
flow out of the formal existence of the identity. 
Identities acquire meaning through interaction.  Through interaction 
objective markers that may distinguish individuals and groups acquire meaning for 
a group identity. As stressed earlier, the meanings of any such markers ascribed to 
any group identity are socially constructed. Through interaction with other actors, 
historical myths and memories also provide meaning for an actor. The meaning of 
identities and interests that people embrace most often are the ones created in the 
home, school, workplace, and other places where people meet and interact. Also, 
identities and interests are influenced by events, ideas, values, and norms that 
surround us in our daily interactions. However, prior socialization does not prevent 
an individual from embracing new conceptions of self and other; thus, socialization 
can also alter pre-existing identities and interests. For example, members of the 
Korean diaspora, the so called Soviet Koreans, started to embrace a new conception 
                                                 
57 Frederick Barth, “Introduction,” in Frederick Barth (eds.), Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social 
Organization of Culture Difference (Boston: Brown, 1969), pp.9-38. 
58 Leo Driedger, The Ethnic Factor. Identity in Diversity (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1989), 
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of self (one which puts more emphasis on Koreanness) and change their pre-
existing (Soviet period) identities and interest after they made a contact with the 
homeland and other Korean diasporas around the world. Consequently, we can 
conclude that identities and accompanying interests are potentially malleable, since 
socialization is a continuous process.  
In this circumstance, an important factor impacting the stability of 
identities is social density, or interaction capacity.59 Social density, which refers to 
the intensity of transactions and communication between actors, affects interactions 
within societies and between individuals and groups from different states. As long 
as the quality and intensity of these interactions remain relatively stable, then the 
identities on both sides of the self and other relations will also remain stable. This is 
reason why the role of the homeland and continuous contact (or interaction) with 
the diasporas (Korean and Ahıska Turk) and the homeland is important for the 
continuation of their stable identity. Since diaspora nationalism (or ethnic identity 
among diasporas) is “like a handful of water,” a continuous supply of fresh water 
from the source (i.e., interaction with homeland) is needed in order for it to be 
                                                 
59 Ronald Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National 
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maintained.60 Fortunately, unlike the situation during the Soviet period, many 
individuals and groups in Central Asia now have the creativity and resources to 
combat current alienation and maintain their ethnic Gemeinschaft.  
Today, we live in a world of ever-increasing technological advances, which 
allow for more and faster communication and transportation between countries. 
This means that there are increased contacts, which lead to gather cultural sympathy 
with other compatriots. Increased knowledge of the homeland means an increase in 
empathy toward them. In particular, the modern mass media plays an important role 
in the development of identities and interest.   
In reference to this issue, Teheranian argues that the mass media can create 
a national identity and culture.61 Daniel Lerner, one of the most ardent advocates of 
the idea that the mass media have a crucial role in development and modernization, 
argues that mass media serves as the primary agent of social change.62 The mass 
media are expected to accomplish a transition to new customs and practices, by 
bringing about behavioral changes, which also include changes in attitudes, beliefs 
and social norms. What is more, mass communication functions as an agent of 
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gradual change through existing structures rather than directly modifying the 
structural constraints of development.63 Consequently, there is no doubt that the 
mass media (especially television) serve an irreplaceable cultural function in 
motivating groups to accumulate their cultural heritage, heightening peoples’ 
awareness and contributing to their ethnic development.  In other words, in the 
case of diasporas, the more they watch homeland broadcasting, the stronger their 
ethnic identity. Thus, the role of homeland mass media (i.e., Korean and Turkish 
broadcasting) in relation to the diasporas in question will be examined in a later 
chapter. Detailed cases and examples will be discussed with theoretical references.  
 
II.3.  Creating Ethnic Identity 
A review of the literature clearly shows that ethnic identity and 
identification varies considerably by region, ethnic group, community size, 
generation, and time period.  Gordon defines an ethnic group as a group of 
individuals with a shared sense of peoplehood based on presumed shared 
sociocultural experiences and similar physical characteristics.64 Therefore, ethnic 
identification takes place when the group in question is one with whom the 
                                                 
63 Everett Rogers, “Communication and development: The passing of the dominant paradigm,” in Everett M. 
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individual believes he has a common ancestry based on shared individual 
characteristics and shared sociocultural experiences. 65  As noted above, an 
important aspect of belonging to an ethnocultural group is the sense of attachment 
to or identification with the group on the part of its individual members.  In plural 
(multi-ethnic) societies one’s ethnic identity serves to signal who one is. However, 
this identity can also sometimes be confused or even lost.66 In order to maintain it, 
it is important that groups of individuals share symbols and their meanings and 
values in what we call group identification. Religious institutions, newspapers, and 
schools (e.g., cultural education centers) can all symbolically reinforce ethnic 
identification. 
Thus, in our discussion on creating ethnic identification, we shall dwell on 
five factors: the myth of the homeland, ethnic culture, ethnic institutions, historical 
symbols and ideology. The author suggests that these factors are some of the basic 
and crucial components which constitute an ethnic community, which Gordon 
referred to as a group of individuals having a shared sense of peoplehood including 
both structural and symbolic dimensions. 67  These concepts will be briefly 
explicated here, and applied to the Ahıska Turkish and Korean diaspora cases at 
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length in later chapters.  The fieldwork conducted in the course of this study 
showed that a given ethnic group will identify more with some of these dimensions 
than others, and that some groups are more successful at maintaining a distinct 
community. 
 
The Myth of the Homeland 
The relationship between ethnic homelands and their dispersed populations 
is in many ways crucial to our understanding of the creation of ethnic or disapora 
identity. Homelands are spatial representations which are influenced by political 
and cultural factors, rather than a simple fact of geography.68 The question of a 
territorial definition of homeland is of critical importance in this study, as it is in 
direct relevance to our understanding of Ahıska Turkish and Korean diaspora 
settings 
The very idea of homeland has the power to evoke memories and intense 
emotions and to put into action more or less deeply learned attitudes.69 The 
intensity of attachment between diaspora individuals and their homelands varies and 
depends upon their temporal and spatial proximity. The idea of homeland may 
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therefore have different meanings to different individuals and could range from a 
romantically defined goal towards which almost every single aspect of an 
individual’s life is directed to a simple geographical reference point. Nonetheless, 
there is no doubt that the homeland can serve as a “mental shelter” for members of a 
diaspora, in other words as a teleological concept. We can readily observe from real 
cases how the mythologized concept of the homeland can effectively support the 
creation of an ethnic identity and the revitalization of traditions. 
 
Ethnic Institution and Creating Ethnic Identification 
The rationale for an ethnic community to establish its own institutions is 
that when a minority can develop a social system on its own with control over its 
institutions, the social action patterns of the group will take place largely within the 
system.70 Breton suggests that religious, educational, and welfare institutions are 
crucial, while Joy (1972) notes the importance of political and economic 
institutions.71 
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Ethnic Culture and Creating Ethnic Identification 
Kurt Lewin has proposed that the individual needs to achieve a firm sense 
of identification with the cultural heritage of the ingroup to find secure ground for a 
sense of well-being.72  We assume that a minority culture can be better developed 
when an ethnic group can build its own institutions. Driedger found six cultural 
factors which tended to differentiate group adherence to culture: language use, 
endogamy, choice of friends, and participation in religion, parochial schools, and 
voluntary organizations.73 
The Ahıska Turks, who were generally residentially segregated and 
maintained their ethnic institutions to a great degree, ranked high in attendance at 
parochial schools, endogamy, and choice of ingroup friends (all more than 95 
percent).  This would seem to support use of the Turkish language at home and 
attendance in mosque more than 95 percent for the Ahıska Turks.  However, this 
was not case for the Korean diaspora. They demonstrated their ingroup culture less 
actively. 
Examination of the myth of the homeland as well as the institutional and 
cultural identity suggests that these three dimensions tend to reinforce each other. 
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When individuals of a given ethnic group identify with their ingroup according to 
these factors, they tend to remain more distinctive, which obstructs tendencies 
toward assimilation. 
 
Historical Symbols and Creating Ethnic Identification 
Minority rural villagers may be able to perpetuate their social structures 
and communities as ends in themselves. However, among ethnic urbanites 
knowledge of their origins and pride in their heritage would seem to be essential for 
a sense of purpose and direction. Without such knowledge and pride, the desire to 
perpetuate tradition rapidly diminishes. Accordingly, historical symbols, which can 
ritualize one’s history, can create a sense of belonging, sense of purpose, and a 
sense of continuing tradition that is important and worth perpetuating. 
 
Ideology and Creating Ethnic Identification 
Religious or political ideology can rally followers to a goal beyond cultural 
and institutional values.74 As urban ethnic groups become more sophisticated, it is 
doubtful that ethnic enclaves can be sufficiently attractive to hold them within the 
                                                 
74 Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan, Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italian, 
and Irish of New York City (Cambridge Mass.: The MIT Press, 1963) 
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orbit their ethnic ingroup. However, a political or religious ideology can provide a 
purpose and impetus that could be considered more important than cultural and 
institutional means.75 In other words, identification with a religious belief or a 
political philosophy provides a more compelling reason to perpetuate one’s ethnic 
identity and culture. 
 
II.4.  Acculturation in Multicultural Assessment 
Most societies do not contain a single cultural tradition, but are made up of 
a number of cultural groups interacting in various ways within a larger national 
framework. It is difficult to find a nation-state at present that is culturally 
homogeneous. Likewise, many Central Asian societies are multi-ethnic and multi-
cultural. Thus, ethnic minorities or diasporas have become a prominent and 
presumably permanent feature of many countries in the region.  
The first scientists to study acculturation were sociologists and 
anthropologists interested in group-level changes following migration, in our case 
forced migration (i.e., deportation). Robert Redfield, Ralph Linton, and Melville 
Herskovits offered the first definition of acculturation. They defined acculturation 
as culture change that results from continuous, first-hand contact between two 
                                                 
75 Leo Driedger, The ethnic factor: Identity and diversity (Toronto: McGrow-Hill Ryerson, 1989), p. 146. 
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distinct cultural groups.76 That is, the acculturation is a process which involves 
changes and experiences within the immigrant’s (in our case deportee’s) daily life 
that the result of contact with new cultural groups, the formation of new 
relationships, and the loss of old ones.  Such experiences involve questions of self-
identity and changes in values, attitudes, and behaviors.77 
The notion of continuous first-hand intercultural contact implicitly seems 
to refer to contact between groups with equal resources. This aspect of the 
definition is not suitable in the context of this study. In cases where deportation into 
Central Asian societies has occurred, the encounter that takes place is not one 
between two equally powerful groups. The mainstream population (during Soviet 
times Russian and in post-Soviet times, titular culture) in the country of settlement 
is almost always more powerful than the deported groups.  As John Berry argues, 
“most changes occur in the non-dominant groups as a result of influence from the 
dominant group” (in this case, the society of settlement).78 Gordon termed this 
model as “unidimensional model,” which assumes that acculturation is a process of 
                                                 
76 Robert Redfield, Ralph Linton, and Melville Herskovits, “Memorandum for the Study of Acculturation,” 
American Anthropologist, vol.38, no.1 (1936), p.149. 
77 Saba Safdar, Clarry Lay, and Ward Struthers, “The Process of Acculturation and Basic Goals: Testing an 
Multidimensional Individual Difference Acculturation Model with Iranian immigrants in Canada,” Applied 
Psychology: An International Review, vol.52, no.4 (2003), p. 556. 
78 John Berry, “Acculturation and Psychological Adaptation: An Overview,” in Anne-Marie Bouvy, Fons van 
de Vijver, Pawel Boski, and Paul Schmitz (eds.), Journeys into Cross-Culture Psychology (Amsterdam: Swets 
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change in the direction of the mainstream culture.79 Accordingly, ethnic minority 
groups are often in the position of struggling to sustain cultural values and traditions 
that may be different from the dominant values of the majority group.  This may 
be achieved through the maintenance of ingroup behavior by involving with 
members of their own cultural group and with cultural traditions. This also leads 
ethnic minority group members to seek contact with a wider community (e.g., the 
homeland). 
The model currently most popular was proposed by Berry.80 There are 
several advantages to his model. Firstly, it allows for the analysis of the 
acculturation process at different levels, namely at the society, group, and individual 
levels.  Secondly, it serves as an excellent basis for categorizing and describing 
different types of acculturation attitudes and behavior-strategies on the part of 
individuals belonging to minority group.81 Berry proposed that there are different 
strategies of adaptation that lead to different outcomes. This model is based upon 
the observation that in multi-ethnic and multi-cultural societies, individuals and 
groups (such as diasporas) must confront two important questions. The first 
                                                 
79 Milton Gordon, Assimilation in American life: the role of race, religion, and national origins (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 24-27. 
80 See John Berry and David Sam, “Acculturation and adaptation,” in John Berry, Marshall Segall, Çidem 
Kağıtçıbaşı (eds.), Handbook of cross-cultural Psychology (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1997), pp.291-326. 
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question involves adaptation dimension: Do I want to establish a good relationship 
with the host culture? The second question involves cultural maintenance: Do I 
want to maintain and develop ethnic distinctiveness (i.e., hold on to my own 
group’s cultural identity and customs) within the host societies?82  For simplicity 
of presentation, the answers to the two questions are taken to be dichotomous, 
thereby creating the scheme set forth in Table I. 
 
Table I 
Berry’s Four Acculturation Strategies 
Do I want to establish a good relationship with 
the host culture? 
 
Yes No 
Yes Integration Separation Do I want to maintain and 
develop ethnic distinctiveness 
in host-societies? No Assimilation Marginalization 
Source: John Berry, “Acculturation and Adaptation in a New Society,” International 
Migration, vol.30 (1992), p. 82. 
 
In the first strategy, integration implies some maintenance of the group’s 
cultural integrity (that is some reaction or resistance to change) as well as some 
movement to become an integral part of the host-society (that is some adjustment).  
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82 John Berry, “Acculturation and Psychological Adaptation: An Overview,” in Anne-Marie Bouvy, Fons van 
de Vijver, Pawel Boski, and Paul Schmitz (eds.), Journeys into Cross-Culture Psychology (Amsterdam: Swets 
& Zeitlinger, 1994), p. 132. 
The second strategy, called separation implies that the original culture (e.g., ethnic 
identity and traditions) is maintained and that relationships with the host-society are 
not considered important.  The opposite of this strategy is assimilation, which aims 
at complete absorption into the host-society and implies the loss of the original 
culture. Finally, there is an option which is characterized by striking out against the 
host-society and by a feeling of alienation and loss of identity. This option is called 
marginalization, in which groups lose cultural and psychological contact with both 
their traditional culture and the host-society.  In the case of this study, the latter 
phenomenon was observed particularly in second and third generation during 
fieldwork. This group does not feel related to the parental culture at the same time 
they do not want to establish strong ties with the host culture (e.g. because of 
factors like perceived societal discrimination or exclusion).83 
Although the terms integration and assimilation may appear as synonyms 
in some literature, it should be stressed that the term integration as used here is 
clearly distinct from the term assimilation; maintenance of cultural and ethnic 
identity is sought in the former case, while in later there is little or no interest in 
such continuity. Moreover, it should be noted that acculturation might be uneven 
across domains of behavior and social life.  For instance, one may seek economic 
                                                 
83 The author has often encountered such case during the fieldwork.  
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assimilation through work, linguistic integration through bilingualism, and marital 
separation through endogamy.  In this study, even the Ahıska Turks, who 
attributed greater overall importance to their own cultural heritage and identity, 
attached more importance to maintenance in private than in public contexts.  In 
general, the author observed that most members of the Korean and Ahıska Turkish 
diasporas in today’s Kazakstan and Uzbekistan adopted a separation strategy in the 
private domain along with an integration strategy in the public domain.84  If we 
consider the long-term outcome of the four acculturation modes, we may assume 
that integration can be considered as effective strategies in themselves for the 
Ahıska Turkish and Korean diaspora in Kazakistan and Uzbekistan for their own 
sake.85 They are the basis for an arrangement with the mainstream society and 
clarify the relationship with the own ethnic group. If separation is chosen, the 
conflict that may occur between the needs and expectations of the mainstream host 
societies and those of an individual’s own ethnic group often remains unresolved 
for a long time, and this situation may be experienced as continuous stress. 
                                                 
84 The author would like to emphasize “today’s diasporas in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan”. It has been more than 
fifteen years since the independence of titular nations in Central Asia. Thus when the author took the fieldwork 
(in 2003 and 2005) most of the Ahıska Turk and Korean diaspora who remained were the ones who had no 
option other than residing in their host-states. Those who intended to leave the countries (Uzbekistan and 
Kazakstan) had left already through various means and gone to other places. This made some change in their 
attitude toward their host-states. Although there is still a myth of return, many remaining Ahıska Turk and 
Korean diasporas are resigned to settle down in their current host-state due to various practical reasons. 
85 As mentioned earlier, both diasporas do not have an option to return to their homelands. 
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Each of these four alternatives will be assessed with individuals in the 
Ahıska Turkish and Korean diaspora that are experiencing acculturation. 
Empirically collected data and evidence will be used to show a general coping 
system which can be related to Berry’s acculturation strategies. In other words 
categorizing of the acculturation strategies into integration, assimilation, separation, 
and marginalization will indicate a specific form of the individual’s general coping 
system among the Ahıska Turkish and Korean diasporas.   
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 CHAPTER III 
 
A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE AHISKA TURKISH AND 
KOREAN DIASPORAS IN CENTRAL ASIA 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to give an account of the historical review of 
the Ahıska Turkish and Korean diasporas until the end of the Soviet period to lay a 
foundation for understanding the present situation. Thus, the main discussion of the 
chapter will be how did it lead to the deportation and ethnic terror against the 
Ahıska Turks and Koreans, which eventually forced them to reside in Central Asia 
as diasporas.   
While explaining the development of the deportation, I will try to illustrate 
the Soviet transition from class-based deportations to ethnic deportation. In other 
words, the mass deportations in the Soviet Union were a continuation of Stalin’s 
Great Terror. The Great Terror of 1936-1938 witnessed the culmination of a gradual 
shift from a predominantly class-based terror to a terror that targeted entire nations 
and communities. It was the culminative experience of the first two decades of 
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Communist rule that made the mass deportations possible. The collectivization of 
agriculture, dekulakization and the annihilation of the national cultures and cadres 
in the late twenties and thirties opened a virtual war between regime and populace 
that boded future trouble.86 Dekulakization itself gave the Stalinist regime its first 
experience at uprooting and transporting millions.87 
Prior to the case of ethnic deportations en masse (i.e., Korean, Ahıska Turk, 
German, Crimean Tatar, etc after 1938) there were partial deportations of 
stigmatized ethnic groups from the Soviet’s western border regions (e.g., Poles, 
Germans, and Finns) until the mid-1930s.  However, by August 1937 it had 
escalated into total removal, which would remain the typical pattern until the death 
of Stalin in 1953.  Once the Soviet leadership became convinced that cross-border 
ethnic ties were being used to their disadvantage, in particular, once western 
national minorities rejected collectivization and attempted to emigrate in large 
numbers (i.e., Germans in particular), it became tempting to blame these entire 
nations and their national cultures.   Moreover, once the Soviet Union had 
persecuted and deported some members of its diaspora nationalities, it assumed the 
rest of those nations would sympathize with their co-nationals and hate the Soviet 
                                                 
86 Michael Gelb, “An early Soviet ethnic deportation: The Far-Eastern Koreans,” The Russian Review, vol.54 
(1995), pp.389-390. 
87 Ibid. 
 66
regime.  This led to the deportation of entire nations. Once the deportation of 
entire nations had begun, the category of “enemy nation” then naturally emerged.  
Once the concept of “enemy nations” had evolved, this in turn made the spread of 
ethnic persecution from deportations of select groups from the border regions to 
mass arrests and execution throughout the Soviet Union.  As the first total 
nationality deportation, the Koreans’ story represents a milestone on the path from 
the “liquidation” of a class (i.e., the kulaks) to the “liquidation” of entire peoples 
during World War II.  As ethnic deportation spread outward to all of the Soviet 
border regions, terror against diaspora nationalities also spread inward to embrace 
the entire Soviet Union. The use of ethnic deportation and mass terror against 
diaspora nationalities was accompanied by important revisions to the Soviet 
nationalities policy. The Soviets started to think that certain ethnic groups, 
especially on the borderlands, or diaspora nationalities could be exploited by 
foreign governments as weapons against them. No doubt, this mood resulted in the 
Soviet government’s deportation of 1.2 million citizens of German origin from 
European Russia to Central Asia and its entire Crimean Tatar, Kalmyk, Chechen, 
Ingush, Balkar, Karacahay and Ahıska Turkish populations to Central Asia on the 
charges of collective treason during World War II.88 The World War II ethnic 
                                                 
88 After 1937, Soviet rhetoric increasingly emphasized the danger of mass treason.; Aleksandr Nekrich, The 
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deportations were a continuation of the pre-war ethnic deportations (e.g. Koreans, 
Poles, Finns, etc.) and were fueled by the same motivation: “Soviet xenophobia.”89 
World War II served only to accelerate this phenomenon. 
On the basis of documents belonging to the various departments in charge 
of deportation, Nikolai Bugai has classified the Koreans, along with the Germans, 
Kurds, Turks, Ahıska Turks, Khemshins and Greeks into the same category 
according to the reasons given for the government’s decision.90  According to 
Bugai all of them were forcibly deported as a preventive measure associated with 
fears of foreign intervention.91 For the Soviet Union, the foreign intervention 
during the Civil War confirmed this premise and exacerbated the “Soviet 
xenophobia.”  Terry Martin supports this argument by saying that the Soviet 
xenophobia based on paranoia manifested itself in the hard-line policy of 
deportation.92  Growing Soviet xenophobia manifested itself in an increasing 
hostility towards the Soviet Union’s diaspora population and made the Soviets 
conclude that they were more susceptible to foreign influence. This cycle of 
                                                                                                                                        
Punished Peoples: The Deportation and Fate of Soviet Minorities at the end of the Second World War (New 
York: Norton, 1978), pp.98-99. 
89 Terry Martin, “An Affirmative Action Empire: Ethnicity and the Soviet State, 1923-1938,” Unpublished 
Ph.D Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1996, pp. 788-789. 
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91 Ibid. 
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suspicion and resentment towards diaspora populations led to the wider scale 
application of deportations.93  As a result, Bugai’s understanding of the Korean 
and Ahıska Turkish deportations as primarily preventive measures seems sound and 
all the more so in the light of the plans to remove diaspora populations from the 
border regions.  
An other important basic motivation to consider was the high-level 
domestic and foreign policies of Stalin’s totalitarian regime. To a certain extent, the 
Stalinist regime tried to transform itself into a kind of nation-state. As Morgenthau 
argues, the traditional goals of Russian expansionism were Stalin’s guiding light 
rather than the communist ideology.94 For Stalin, the communist orthodoxy was a 
means to an end and the end was marked by a powerful Russian state.95 Stalin’s 
priority was not world revolution per se but the security of Soviet Russia. Thus, the 
phenomenon of mass deportations should be also understood in this context. 
As many writers on deportations argued, (e.g., Aleksandr Nekrich, Michael 
Gelb, Robert Conquest, Terry Martin, Nikolai Bugai, etc.) the Soviet ethnic 
deportations were professionalized to an unprecedented degree. The deportations 
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were carried out with an amazing speed and efficiency by a well-trained enormous 
number of army corps and security police in close cooperation with officials in 
transport, housing, and other bureaucracies.  Accordingly, we can conclude that 
the Soviet ethnic deportations were distinctive in the degree of their 
professionalization and the extent of its commitment to total ethnic removal.96 
Certainly, as with the most of the cases of ethnic deportations, the Soviet practice 
included substantial levels of intentional murder. The Soviet ethnic deportations 
were always concomitant with large number of arrests that resulted in summary 
executions and imprisonments in high-mortality prison camp. The deported 
diaspora nationalities were singled out for unjust arrests and executions during the 
deportation. In addition, the deportations were carried out incredibly promptly and 
with very little, if any, concern for the basic needs for the deportees, leading to large 
numbers of individuals succumbing to starvation, disease, and harsh treatment both 
during and after the deportations. Arguably, it verged on genocide. However, it is 
unlikely that Stalin intended for death of virtually all the deportees.97 
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III.1.  Historical Review of the Korean diaspora 
III.1.1.  Koreans in the Russian Far East 
 
With the signing of the Treaty of Peking in 1860, Russia absorbed the 
Primorskii region which resulted in Russia and Korea sharing a 15-kilometer border 
along the Tumen River. (see Map I)  This lead to the development of relations 
between Korea and Russia.  Exploiting the weakness of the Chinese Empire, 
Imperial Russia seized the opportunity to extend its domination on the east of the 
Ussuri River. The vast and uninhabited Ussuri region of the Russian Far East, 
located between the Ussuri and Amur Rivers and Pacific Ocean, was 350,000 
square miles which included a population of only 15,000.98 For Russia, the desire 
to absorb the Korean Peninsula logically followed on the heels of this annexation.  
Initially it intensified commercial penetration of Korea as prelude to its expansion 
to Korea. Thus, Russia, like Japan after the victory over China in 1895, openly 
espoused rival ambitions for Korea for much the same imperial reasons (e.g., 
commercial rights, colonial ambitions and strategic considerations). 
To increase the population of this new land, Imperial Russia promoted the 
settlement of Russians or other slavs in the area.  By 1869, 5,310 settlers from 761 
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families were living in twenty-eight Russian villages. 99  Since the area was 
strategically important, the Russian government granted special privileges and 
incentives to migrants to the Far East.100 According to several imperial decrees in 
1861, migrants to the Far East were to be granted free land allotments and would 
not be taxed for the first twenty years.101 Despite these privileges, migrants were 
few in numbers since the government did not provide assistance for their journey to 
the Far East from their native region.102 As a result, in the 1870s, the migration of 
Russian peasant-colonists to the Far East regions slowed noticeably.103 Wada states 
that in the first eleven years following the 1860 Treaty of Peking, 4,444 Russian 
peasants arrived in the Ussuri area, but during the following twelve years only 742 
settled in the region.104 
Since the migration of these Russian peasant-colonists did not increase 
substantially, Russia was faced with labor shortages after the incorporation of the 
Priamurskii and Primorskii regions.  During this period a considerable number of 
Koreans crossed the Tumen (Duman) River from the northeastern province of 
                                                 
99 Haruki Wada, “Koreans in the Soviet Far East, 1917-1937,” in Dae-Sook Suh (ed.), Koreans in the Soviet 
Union (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), p. 25. 
100 Gary Hausladen, “ Settling the Far East: Russain Conquest and Consoliation,” in Allan Rodgers (ed.), The 
Soviet Far East: Geographical Perspective on Development (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 16. 
101 V.M. Kabuzan, “The Settlement of Siberia and the Far East from the Late Eighteenth to Early Twentieth 
Century (1795-1917),” Soviet Geography, vol.32 (1991), p. 624. 
102 Ibid., p. 625. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Haruki Wada, p. 25. 
 72
Korea to the Russian Far East.105 Initially, Koreans crossed the Tumen River to 
Russia, but later, as their numbers increased, they began to use the Russian-
Manchurian border. There is no exact data showing when the first Koreans moved 
to the Russian Far East.  However, according to one Russian source, by 1862 there 
were already some Koreans settled in the Primorskii region.106 The illegal border 
crossings of Koreans during this period were believed to be common but irregular 
occurrences, making it difficult to have accurate data.107   
It was a time when many Koreans were suffering from severe drought in 
Korea. These new settlers of the bordering regions of Russia were fleeing from 
severe exploitation by the feudal Korean monarchy as well as abuse at the hands of 
Korean landowners and bureaucrats.108 During the mid-1860s, Korean families in 
the region numbered close to 100.109 A large influx of Koreans to the Russian Far 
East continued after another big famine and drought took place in northern Korea in 
1869-70.110  Undoubtedly, the majority of them came to the Russian Far East 
illegally via the Tumen River.  Most of these immigrants settled in the outskirts of 
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Valdivostok along the shores of the Amurskii and Ussuriikii bays.  In 1872, the 
first Korean village Blagoslovennoe was established alongside the Samarki River 
near Blagoveshchensk.111 Accordingly, even though Imperial Russia tried to boost 
Russian settlements in the Far Eastern territories, the Ussuri region in particular, 
where the population of Russians was more sparse than others, Koreans came to 
outnumber Russian peasants in the region. 
To cope with this situation, at the beginning of the 1880s, the Russian 
government devoted considerable energy to settle Russians in the Ussuri region.  
As a first step, the government gave extraordinary privileges and other incentives to 
promote Russian settlements.  For example, in 1882, the Russian government 
decreed that it would send 250 families annually over a three years period from the 
southern regions of Russia to the Russian Far East by sea at state expense.112 The 
Russian settlers were granted loans of 600 rubles per family over a 33-year period, 
and fifteen desiatinas113 of land per male adult up to a maximum of 100 desiatinas 
per family. Moreover, these Russian settlers were exempt from any land fees for 
                                                 
111 See Map I in pg.76; A.H. Petrov, “Koreitsy I ikh znachenie v ekonomike Dalnego Bostoka,” Srednaiia Aziia, 
vol.1, no.25 (1929), p. 41. cited in Kho songmo, Soryeon Chungang Asia-iu Hanindul (Seoul: Hankuk Kukje 
Munwha Hyup Heo, 1984), p. 22. 
112 A.I. Alekseev and B. N. Morozov, Osvoenie russkogo dalnego vostoka [Konets XIX v.- 1917 g] (Moscow: 
Nauka, 1989), pp. 7-10.  
113 1 desiatina is approximately 2.75 acres. 
 74
three years and from all state taxes and payments for twenty years.114 Such 
measures helped to increase Russian population in the Primorskii region from 8, 
385 in 1882 to 66,320 by 1902.  Thus the effective Russian colonization of the 
Primorskii region began only in 1883. Meanwhile, the Korean population of the 
region increased during the same period from 10,137 to 32,380.115 According to 
Kabuzan’s research into government archival data, the population of the Russian 
Far East increased tremendously to 1.1 million before the Revolution.116 
Control over Korean immigration to the Russian Far East was first 
imposed by the signing of two agreements between the two countries: the Treaty 
of Seoul in 1884 and the Russian-Korean Convention on Border Relations in 
1888.  Paragraph 4 of Article II of the Regulations stipulated as such:117 
Should a Korean subject attempts to cross the frontier without a passport, 
the Russian Authorities, after due investigation of the circumstances, will not 
permit him to proceed further and will arrest him and send him back beyond 
the frontier. In like manner, the Korean authorities will deal with Russian 
subjects who attempt to cross the frontier without passports.  
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Map I 
Russian Far East and Korean Settlement 
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In 1866, the Second Congress of Governors of the local authorities of 
Priamurskii and Primorskii regions met in Khabarovsk. The Congress drafted a 
resolution forbidding any further immigration by Koreans and proposed to resettle 
the earlier immigrants to deep inside the territory of the region.118 In the Russian-
Korean Convention on Border Relations in 1888, Priamur governor-general A. N. 
Korf issued a directive that all Koreans in Russia were to be classified into three 
categories and dealt with accordingly. The first category included Koreans who had 
settled in Russia before the Russian-Korean agreement of 1884. They were allowed 
to stay in Russia and were eligible for Russian citizenship. They were granted 
fifteen desiatinas of land per household.  The second category consisted of 
Koreans who had settled in Russia after 1884. They were to leave Russia after a 
maximum stay of two years. Finally, the third category consisted of Koreans living 
temporarily in the region. They were generally temporary workers residing in 
Russia with the permission of the Russian government. This third group of Koreans 
was forbidden to settle on state lands and was allowed to remain in Russia only 
after obtaining a residence permit.119 To be sure, they had no legal rights.  In 
addition, beyond these three categories, there were also illegal aliens without 
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passports residing in Russian territory which adds to the difficulty in identifying 
exact numbers.  
According to this classification of Korean immigrants by the Russian 
authorities, only 20-30% of Korean immigrants fell under the first categories and 
were    treated as Russian citizens.  No doubt, this restrictive policy toward 
Koreans in Russia was established because of a growing sentiment against Koreans. 
By employing this measure, the Russian government hoped to control the influx of 
Koreans who were immigrating not only from the nearby provinces of northern 
Korea but were also coming from southern parts of Korea.120  However, in the 
coming years, the immigration policy towards Koreans would be changed numerous 
times, depending on the prevailing mood of the regional administration towards 
Koreans.  Similar to the Soviet period, Imperial Russian policy toward Koreans 
was always ambivalent. Its policy frequently changed back and forth between 
exclusion and accommodation.  
Liberalization of this policy toward Korean settlers came under a 
new regional administrator, Governor General Dukhovskii, in 1896.121 He 
simplified the procedure for granting Russian nationality to Koreans in the 
                                                 
120 Kho Songmoo, Koreans in Soviet Central Asia, p.70. 
121 Kim Syn Khva, Ocherki po istoriia sovetskikh koreitsev (Almaty: Nauka, 1965), p. 31. 
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first category and increased the duration to remain in Russia for the second 
category group.  In 1898 Dukhovskii’s successor, Governor General 
Grodekov, further liberalized the process by instituting a policy whereby 
Koreans who had lived in Russia for at least five years were granted 
citizenship. 122  Likewise in 1898, he even permitted those Koreans who 
belonged to the third category to settle down along the bank of the Iman, 
Khor, Kii, and Amur Rivers.  Both Russian Governor-Generals, Dukhovskii 
and Grodekov, were of the opinion that Korean immigrants could be used as 
laborers in the development of the region. These policy changes reflect the 
more favorable mood of the times towards Koreans in the Russian Far East.  
As a result of these new policies, the Korean population in the region 
increased substantially. During this period antagonism toward Japanese 
imperialism led some Russian officials see Koreans as natural allies. 
Evidence of this was thousands of Koreans served in the Russian Army. 
Finally, there was even a Russian warship named, “Koreets”123 which means 
“the Korean” in the Far East Fleet.124  
 
                                                 
122 Ibid., pp.31-33. 
123 This warship was destroyed by Japanese Navy during the Russo-Japanese war near southern coast of Korea. 
124 Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (hereafter GARF) fond 120, 00, 1914g, delo 288b.f.ch.1, list 
61 (1914).; GARF fond 818, opis 1, delo 185, list 1-2 (1809). 
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Table II 
Koreans in Imperial Russia 1869-1914 
Year Total 
Citizens of Empire
(1st Category) 
Non-Citizens 
(2nd Category) 
1869 1,800   
1870 8,300   
1895 16,250   
1897 20,000   
1898 23,000   
1902 32,410   
1906 34,399   
1907 45,915   
1908 45,497 16,965 17,434 
1909 51,544 14,799 36,755 
1910 54,076 17,080 36,996 
1911 57,289 17,476 39,813 
1912 59,715 16,263 43,452 
1913 57,440 19,277 38,163 
1914 64,309 20,109 44,200 
* This table does not include illegal migrants. 
Source: C.D. Anocov, Koreitsy v Ussuriiskom Krae (Vladivostok: 1928), p.12. 
 
After the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), when Korea became a 
Japanese protectorate, a huge influx of Koreans fled to the Russian Far East. This 
influx increased further when Japan annexed Korea in 1910. Prior to this period, 
Korean immigration to Russia was mainly caused by economic factors, hunger and 
unstable national conditions.125 They came as farmers or workers attracted by 
                                                 
125 As mentioned earlier concisely the imposition of arbitrary and oppressive rules by royal authorities was 
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construction projects stimulated by Russia’s accelerating expansion in the 
Primorskii and Priamurskii regions since 1860.  However, after the loss of their 
homeland’s independence in 1910 (or 1905 after the protectorate period), Korean 
immigration to Russia took on a political character.  Many of the activists in the 
anti-Japanese national liberation movement joined the migration across the Tumen 
River. They sought to fight for the liberation of Korea in the Russian Far East.126  
They viewed the Russian Far East as a sanctuary. Since Koreans historically had 
certain antagonistic feelings toward the Chinese and Manchus, they preferred 
fleeing to Russia to meet their first Western neighbors, whom they viewed with 
curiosity rather than with animosity.127 Thus in their mind, they not only found 
sanctuary in the Russian Empire, but hoped to obtain political support, even though 
Russia harbored the same, though momentarily frustrated, colonial ambitions for 
Korea as the Japanese. In brief, at the beginning of the twentieth century for the 
Koreans, the Russians represented the best sponsor to expel the Japanese; for the 
Russians, the Koreans meant a potential vanguard for future Russian (later Soviet) 
anti-Japanese policies on behalf of Korea. 
                                                                                                                                        
prevalent: taxes for cultivation of land, military conscription, and forced collection of grain were common. 
126 From 1905 to 1917 Korean refugees formed the Hanin Minhoe (The Korean People’s Association), 
officially a community organization, but in fact, a political club aimed at restoring Korean independence. As 
many newcomers join, it tended to radicalized and to show its true colors as a center for anti-Japanese activities. 
127 Kyu Hwan Hyun, “Jaesso Hankukinui Sajeok Kochal,” Kyopo Jungchek Jaryo, vol. 13 (1972), p. 43-44. 
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Despite the policy changes to more favorable conditions for Korean 
immigrants to Russia under Dukhovskii and Grodekov, with the appointment of a 
new governor general in 1905, another policy shift occurred. After Russia’s defeat 
by Japan in the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-1905, the size of the Korean influx 
provoked a chauvinistic reaction on the Tsarist government. Governor General P.F. 
Unterberger was an active supporter of this measure. He launched a repressive 
policy against Koreans in the Russian Far East according to which they were no 
longer granted Russian nationality. Without citizenship they could not receive land 
allotments.128 Unterberger considered the long-term Korean settlers in the Russian 
Far East to be unreliable aliens since they were an ideal source of recruits for 
foreign espionage even after forty years of residence.129 His mistrust and antipathy 
were apparent in his words, “I prefer a Russian wasteland to cultivated land which 
is Korean.”130 Consequently, he put all Koreans under a strict system of political 
control, mainly because he suspected them of being Japanese spies on general 
principle. This notion became ingrained in Tsarist policy toward Korean migrants 
and even continued later on in the Soviet period. Eventually, three decades later this 
belief lead to the total deportation of Koreans in the region. 
                                                 
128 B.D. Pesotskii, “Koreiskii vopros v Priamure,” Trudy komandirovannoi po vysochaishchemu poveleniia 
amurskoi expeditsii , vol. 11 (1913), p.172 cited in Boris Pak, Rossia i Koreia (Moscow: Nauka, 1979), p.19. 
129 Ibid., p.176. 
130 Ibid., p.172. 
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Unterberger’s replacement in 1911 by General Gondatti once again 
brought about a liberalization of policy towards Koreans. Despite xenophobia and 
mistrust among nationalist political circles and some local authorities, Tsarist policy 
makers were still determined to use Korean immigrants as a source of cheap labor 
for Russia’s economic reinforcement along its Far Eastern borders. Subsequently 
many Koreans who did not own land were allowed to be naturalized.  As shown in 
the Table II, the number of Koreans grew rapidly, nearly doubling from a total of 
34,399 Koreans to 64,309 by 1914. 
As illustrated up to this point, the Tsarist government had a utilitarian 
approach to the problem of Korean immigration and settlement in Russia. In the 
first instance, Russian colonization of the Far East was favored, but this was 
confounded by slack rates of migration from the western and central parts of the 
empire. In addition, the need to hasten economic and military development of the 
region eventually forced the choice of the perceived lesser of the two evils of 
yellow colonization: Korean and Chinese. During the Amur expedition in 1911 by 
the imperial order, Pesotskii recorded favorable opinions regarding the Korean 
population. Pesotskii longed for the benefits of Korean settlements of the 
Priamurskii and Primorskii regions: growth of agriculture in the region, the placing 
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of cheap Korean labor at the disposal of Russian employer, and the steadying effect 
of the presence of industrious, unpretentious and law-abiding citizens in the 
region.131 Likewise, Nedachin holds the view that: “in order to make Korean 
colonization go the right way and give the expected results, it is necessary to create 
for the Koreans the conditions which will stimulate them to become attached to the 
new motherland.”132 Such an opinion led to favor Korean settlement in the Far East, 
which was seen to furthering the interests of the Tsarist Russia. 
 
III.1.2.  Establishment of the Soviet Union and the Koreans in the Russian Far 
East 
There were approximately 100,000 Koreans in Russia on the eve of the 
October revolution in 1917. Of these Koreans, 81,825 lived in the Primorskii region, 
where they accounted for nearly one third of the total population.133  However, 
84.3% of Korean households were landless and only 32.4% possessed Russian 
citizenship.134 The average Korean household possessed less than one-third the 
                                                 
131 B.D. Pesotskii, “Koreiskii vopros v Priamure,” Trudy komandirovannoi po vysochaishchemu poveleniia 
amurskoi expeditsii , vol. 11 (1913), pp.1-15 cited in Boris Pak, Rossia i Koreia (Moscow: Nauka, 1979), pp.19-
20 
132 Nedachin is known for his work on the history of the orthodox mission in Korea and the conversion of the 
Maritime Koreans to Christianity. He considers the Koreans a God-fearing people and able to Christian teaching, 
and see the potential for the Orthodox Church to attract into its fold new believers. ; C. Nedachin, 
“Pravoclavnaia tserkov’ v Koree, k 10-letiiu sushestvovaniia; istoricheskii ocherk,” Missionerskoe obozrenie, 
vol.16, no.9 (1911), pp. 28-32. For further information see C. Nedachin, Koreitsy-Kolonisty. K voprosu o 
sblizhenii koreitsev s Rossiei, Vostochnyi sbornik (Izdanie obshestva russkikh orientalistov, 1913)  
133 GARF fond 1235, opis 140, delo 141 (1925). 
134 Ibid. 
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amount of land compared with local Russians. Thus, many Koreans regarded the 
Soviets as defenders of the rights and freedom of all oppressed peoples, since the 
Soviet policy called for transferring land to those who cultivated it.  Besides, the 
provisional government tended to be more pro-Japanese, while the Bolsheviks in 
the region showed an anti-imperialist tendency.  Kolchak’s government in Siberia 
was very much dependent on Japanese assistance, thus it forbade any form of 
Korean collective activity, and dismantled Korean schools and the Korean National 
council.135 Consequently, the most patriotic and revolutionary segments of the 
Korean population rose up in arms to defend the Soviet power during the civil war. 
Above all, many Korean participants in the civil war were motivated by their desire 
to liberate their occupied homeland.136 Most Koreans assumed that a victory over 
the Japanese in the Russian Far East would serve the eventual restoration of Korean 
independence.137 Many Korean nationalists were engaged in military activities, 
siding with the Red Army. Especially after Japan landed troops in Valdivostok, the 
dispersed Russian Koreans were united into a common front in response to their 
collective fear of a Japanese takeover of the Primorskii region.  Under these 
                                                 
135 Henry Huttenbach, “The Soviet Koreans: product of Russo-Japanese imperial rivalry,” Central Asian 
Survey, vol.12, no.1 (1993), p. 63. 
136 Boris Pak, “Kukkwon pital chonhu sigi chaeso manmoyong hanin tul ui hangil tujaeng chamga,” in 
Hanminjok Tonip Undongsa Nonchong (Seoul: Tamgudang, 1992), p. 1064-1065. 
137 According to Pak Hwan many Koreans largely supported the Soviet Cause believing this would help lead to 
the liberation of Korea.  For more information see Pak Hwan, Rosia Hanin Minjok Undongsa [History of the 
nationalist movement among Russian Koreans] (Seoul: Tamgudang, 1995) 
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conditions, the Koreans and the Bolsheviks became natural allies.138  
As the civil war shifted in favor of the Bolsheviks, Bolsheviks’ many 
attractive policies gave Koreans hope of forming an autonomous Korean territory. 
Mass Korean immigration had eloquently demonstrated the attractiveness of the 
Soviet Union for the Koreans of Japanese occupied Korea.  For the Soviets, the 
formation of an autonomous Korean territory would further put pressure on the 
Japanese colonial regime. As a result, the measure was seriously considered in the 
Comintern’s Eastern Department in May 1924. Later, it petitioned the TsIK139 to 
form a Korean autonomous oblast.140 (See Table III)  The OGPU141 reported that 
Korean autonomy was extremely popular among Soviet Koreans, especially 
communist and Komsomol.142 The proposal was fiercely debated in TsIK, but by 
1925 it had been rejected.143 
The main reason to close down such a proposal was that the Soviet 
leadership felt politically and militarily weak in the Far East. They were more 
concerned with the potential Japanese influence on the Soviet Korean population 
                                                 
138 Ivan Babichev, Uchastie kitasiskikh I koreeskikh trudiashchikhsia v grazhdanskoi voine na dal’nem vostoke 
(Tashkent, 1959), p. 30. 
139 TsIK (Tsentralnyi ispolnitelnyi Komitet): Central Executive Committee 
140 GARF fond 1235, opis 140, delo 141 (1924). 
141 OGPU (Ob'edinennoe Gosudarstvennoe Politicheskoe Upravlenie): Name of Soviet Political Police from 
1922 to 1934 
142 GARF fond 1235, opis 140, delo 141 (1924) ; Komsomol (Kommunisticheskiy Soyuz Molodiozhi): 
Communist Youth League or its members. 
143 Ibid. 
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than with projecting Soviet influence into Japanese occupied Korea.  Additionally, 
the Far Eastern Communist leadership supported the popular Russian view of 
Koreans in the region as potentially disloyal and economically illegal aliens, who 
should be resettled away from the sensitive border regions.144 
 
Table III 
Proposed Korean Autonomous Territories 
Actual Territory 
Population of 
Korean 
Total Population 
Korean as Percent 
of Total 
Korean ASSR 
(Vladivostok Okrug) 
152,424 680,011 22.4 
Korean AO 
(5 Border Raiony) 
85,299 157,438 54.2 
Source: Vsesoiuznaia perepis 1926 goda, vol.XI, p.36. 
 
The consolidation of the Soviet power did not improve the situation of the 
Koreans in the Far East. Even though they fought alongside the Bolsheviks and the 
civil war ended with a Bolshevik victory, the situation in the region returned to pre-
revolution status quo under the Russian empire. The international border remained 
the same, the Japanese were still occupying Korea, and the Russians (this time the 
Soviet) were reluctant to host Korean freedom fighters. In the early 1920s, two-
                                                 
144 GARF fond 1235, opis 140, delo 141 (1925). 
 87
thirds of the Russian Korean population still lacked citizenship. As a result, these 
Koreans could not own land. Instead they had to rent it from Russians.  What is 
more, the Korean guerrilla detachments, which fought together with the Bolsheviks, 
were also disbanded. 
Nevertheless, many Koreans in the Far East emerged from the civil war 
overwhelmingly pro-communist.  Thus, they succeeded in making up 20% of the 
candidates of the Primorskii region’s Russian communist party.145 To a certain 
extent, the civil war had expanded their political education and focused their 
orientation on socialism. Many talented young and middle-aged Koreans favored 
communism as a means of recapturing Korea, and assuring national independence 
from all other foreigners.146 
By 1923, Koreans made up 17% of the total population of the Primorskii 
region and constituted a high profile segment of the communist leadership.147 For 
the Soviets to resolve the Korean question, it established the Institute of Authorized 
Persons for Korean Affairs148 under the Dalrevkom in 1923.149 One of the main 
                                                 
145 Henry Huttenbach, “The Soviet Koreans: product of Russo-Japanese imperial rivalry,” Central Asian 
Survey, vol.12, no.1 (1993), p. 63. 
146 Unfortunately, due to South Korea’s strong stance against communism until recently, their works or 
activities were ignored . 
147 Dae sook Suh, The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1967), p. 45. 
148 Institut Upolnomochennykh po Koreiskim Voprosam 
149 U Khe Li and Enun Kim, Belaia Kniga. O deportatsii Koreiskogo naseleniia rossii v 30-40kh godakh 
(Moscow: Interpraks, 1992), pp.37-39. ; Dalrevkom: Far eastern Revolutionary Committee 
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tasks of the Institute of Authorized Persons was to keep records on the Korean 
population, to set a uniform agricultural tax, to clarify land disposition, etc.  
National Soviets were formed below the autonomous oblast level: one Korean 
national district (Posetskii raion in Ussuriiskii Krai) and 171 Korean village 
soviets.150 
 
Table IV 
Demography of the Soviet Far East during 1926-1927 
 Ethnic group Population 
1 Russian 1,174,915 
2 Ukrainian 315,203 
3 Korean 162,366 
4 Chinese 80,137 
Total 1,881,3351 
Source: GARF fond 1253, opis 120, delo 60, list 13-18. 
 
From the mid-1920s to the period of Great Terror, the Koreans in the 
Primorskii region enjoyed a degree of political participation as members of the 
Party and a fair amount of state-condoned cultural life. 151  Whatever doubts 
                                                 
150 GARF fond 374, opis 27s, delo 1706 (1929) 
151 Terry Martin explains this soft-line policy very well, calling it “the Piedmont Principle.” He uses the 
Piedmont Principle and the Soviet xenophobia to explain the Soviet Policy change from the soft-line to hard-
line policy. I also subscribe to this analysis in explaining the Soviet’s initial period. For further information see, 
Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire, Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939 (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2001) 
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suggested themselves to chauvinist minds, a rather more friendly policy came to 
dominate. The legal basis for solving the citizenship problem was prepared by the 
Dalrevkom on December, 1922. The resolution was adopted after the VtsIk and 
Sovnarkom 152  granted Russian citizenship to foreigners in the Far Eastern 
region.153 Due to this measure the Korean population increased significantly during 
the 1920s. In addtion, many Koreans were systematically promoted to the Soviet 
Far Eastern bureaucracy. By 1926, nearly all Koreans had accepted Soviet 
citizenship in the primary areas of settlement. Not only did the size of the 
population increase, but they also developed a strong social group with their own 
traditions that had economic, political, social and cultural potential. The Soviet 
government’s concession of cultural autonomy during the 1920s and early 1930s 
made possible a half dozen journals in Korean and even more newspapers. Three 
hundred and eighty schools and two technical colleges taught students in the Korean 
language in the Primorskii and Khabarovsk regions alone with instructors arriving 
regularly from two teacher’s training colleges and the Korean Pedagogical Institute.  
Fifteen Korean party schools served nearly one thousand communists and over six 
thousand Komsomols. Three Korean hospitals served the community and numerous 
                                                 
152 Sovnarkom: Council of People’s Commissariats, highest ranking non-party body. 
153 U Khe Li and Enun Kim, Belaia Kniga. O deportatsii Koreiskogo naseleniia rossii v 30-40kh godakh 
(Moscow: Interpraks, 1992), pp.10-11. 
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Korean clubs, Korean theaters and libraries served the adult and juvenile clientele in 
the Korean language. During this period a strong group of Korean intellectuals was 
formed. Also in the same period, the Korean community had created an energetic 
and variegated agricultural economy; Korean agricultural and fishing Kolkhozes 
were formed.  These Kolkhozes’ productivity was two or even three times higher 
than that of neighboring Russians. One of the interesting facts is that the Koreans 
were less hostile to collectivization than other nationalities, since the formation of 
kolkhozes represented, for many, the chance to gain access to land or facilitate 
acquisition of citizenship.154 
 
Table V 
Korean population in the Soviet Far East before the deportation 
Year Population Year Population 
1917 53,000 1926 168,000 
1923 106,000 1929 180,000 
1925 120,000 1937 199,500 
Source: GAKhK П-2/11/233/6-11 (1937); GARF 123/140/141 (1925); GARF 
374/27s/1706 (1929); Walter Kolarz, The Peoples of the Soviet Far East (New 
York: Praeger, 1954); Kho songmo, Soryeon Chungang Asia-iu Hanindul (Seoul: 
Hankuk Kukje Munwha Hyup Heo, 1984); Haruki Wada, “Koreans in the Soviet 
Far East, 1917-1937,” in ed. Dae-Sook Suh, Koreans in the Soviet Union 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987) 
                                                 
154 Syn Khva Kim, Ocherk po istorii sovetskikh koreitsev (Almaty: 1965), pp.137-140. 
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By the mid-1930s, the Korean in the Soviet Far East numbered nearly 
200,000.  They had been quite successful in eliminating illiteracy, and in 
promoting Korean education as well as promoting the development of Korean 
culture. But these successes were short lived with the deportation coming in 1937. 
Needless to say, with the deportation in 1937, most Korean institutions and centers 
would be shut down. 
 
III.1.3.  Mass Deportation and settlement in Central Asia 
Although some relieving measures left the Koreans in a better situation, 
there was still mistrust and xenophobia from the Russians. Still many Soviet 
bureaucrats regarded the Koreans as “politically unreliabile.” The Soviet authority 
assumed that “even Koreans, long-term enemies of the Japanese and were forced 
out of their own land by Japanese, can someday turn into a tool of intrigue for some 
imperialist state against the Soviet Union.155 In the public sphere, due to a massive 
influx of Koreans, there was ethnic tension between the Koreans and the Russians. 
Particularly, the land issue was the most pressing question since it determined the 
territorial distribution of the Korean population.156 As mentioned, one of the first 
                                                 
155 GARF fond 374, opis 27s, delo 1706 (1929) 
156 Terry Martin also suggests the land issue as the crucial reason for the deportations (or in his words, ethnic 
cleansing) of ethnic minorities in the Soviet Union. For more information see Terry Martin, The Affirmative 
Action Empire, Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
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slogans had been “Land to the People.” However, the Soviet authority had not 
solved the land problem. As a result, the Russians and the Koreans in the Far East 
were at each other’s throats. Needles to say, the Koreans turned out to be the guilty 
parties, as the victims and the accused. The first aim of the Russian peasants (or 
people) was to force the Koreans out of Russian territory. In other words, the Soviet 
government had a good reason to acknowledge its return to, or continuation of, the 
Tsarist policy regarding settlement of the Far East. Its mainline policy on the 
Korean population was the prohibition of Korean immigration combined with 
encouragement of migration and resettlement by ethnic Russians.157 
At the end of the 1920s, the Far Eastern authorities reopened the issue of 
forcing Koreans out of the border regions. On April 13, 1928, a decree was passed 
calling for the resettlement of Koreans from the Vladivostok okrug and the more 
strategically vulnerable points of Primor’ye to the Khabarovsk okrug.158 The plan 
was to settle demobilized Red Army soldiers into the Far Eastern border zones to 
form “Red Army collective farms,” while moving disloyal Koreans to the inner 
Soviet zone.159 Forming Red Army collective farms were a typical symbol of 
Soviet xenophobia. The Soviet planned to resettle 99,000 Koreans over a five-year 
                                                                                                                                        
Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1996. 
157 GAPK fond P-61, opis 1, delo 580 
158 GARF fond 3316, opis 16a, delo 384 (1928) 
159 GARF fond 5446, opis 15a, delo 258 (1933) 
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period in places far removed from the border regions; the Kurdarginsk and Sindinsk 
regions of the Khabarovsk and the Birobidzhan region of the Amur.160 However, in 
reality only 1,342 Koreans were resettled which illustrated the failure of this well-
planned campaign.161 The reasons for its failure were typical problems the Soviets 
faced during mass deportation: the lack of money, poor preparation of the lands in 
the aim destinations, and the unwillingness of the local authorities (the Khabarovsk 
and Amur regions) to admit Korean settlers. One difference from the 1937 
deportation, which made the Soviets call for an end to all resettlement, was its 
political instability and weakness. When the Far Eastern authority appealed for 
central funding of the Korean resettlement, the Politburo rejected and ordered them 
to end the program. It appears that the Foreign Affairs Commissariat was concerned 
that Japan could use the deportation of Japanese subjects (Koreans) from the Soviet 
border regions as a casus belli and thus led to the abandonment of Korean 
resettlement.162 The Soviet authority was unwilling to take any risk due to its 
military and political weakness. Thus, we can conclude that the first large-scale 
attempt at Soviet ethnic deportation failed due to the center’s ambivalence. Even 
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though it failed, this crisis was the first Soviet initiative to deport the Koreans from 
their original place. The law remained in effect formally and served to stigmatize 
the Soviet Koreans. In addition, the Red Army collective farms that emerged as part 
of this resettlement would consistently accompany Soviet deportation.  For the 
Koreans, it was the sign of their deportation to unknown lands. 
Another interesting resettlement was actualized during this period. At the 
mid of the 1920s a small group of Koreans were resettled in Kazakstan.163 As is 
well known, the Koreans in the Primorskii region had demonstrated great skill in 
rice cultivation. With every passing year they had increased both the acreage under 
cultivation as well as the size of the harvests. Thus, the Soviet government 
developed the plan to grow rice in Kazakstan by moving some Koreans to 
Kazakstan to assist in the organization of rice cultivation so as to share their 
experience.164 Due to discrepancies in the data, we do not know the exact number 
who have moved to Kazakstan under this measure.  However, the estimates range 
from 220 to as high as 52,000 Koreans moved to Kazakstan by 1926.165 More 
remarkably, as early as 1922 the Commissariat of Nationalities of the Turkestan 
                                                 
163 Georgii Kan, Istoriia Koreitsev Kazakhstana (Almaty: Gylym, 1995), p.5. 
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Republic created a Korean section.166  Regardless of the precise number, it is clear 
that several hundreds or thousands had migrated to Kazakstan as pioneers in rice 
cultivation. The Koreans who moved from the Far East to Kazakstan formed a 
“Korean agricultural labor artel” called Kazakhskii ris.167 Such an experimental 
resettlement gave the Soviet authority a good testing ground for its ethnic 
deportation later on. It gave the Soviet government an idea to solve a fear of non-
Soviet foreign influence by its cross-border ethnic ties. 
In addition, after the success of Kazakhskii ris by the Korean artel the 
Uzbekistan authorities offered the Korean artel to work on the rice farms in the 
republic, where they would be given sufficient assistance to organize a farm.168 
Even the Peoples’ Commissariat of Land Cultivation in Uzbekistan approached the 
Vladivostok okrug Land Department with a request to send three or four rice artels 
comprised of a total of 80-100 peoples to Uzbekistan.169 This Uzbekistan plan was 
never carried out. Still, it was an important hint to the Koreans of their future 
resettlement in the region. 
Until the mid-1930s, the Soviets believed in the prevalence and potency of 
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cross-border ethnic ties. Its positive evaluation to these ethnic ties served to 
reinforce the Soviet nationalities policy during the 1920s. However, after the 1930s 
a series of negative domestic and foreign policy developments with the growing 
Soviet xenophobia gradually undermined this mood.170 The Japanese presence in 
Manchuria and Korea and Soviet Koreans crossing the border on various errands 
disturbed the Soviet authorities and increased their apprehensions about Japanese 
espionage. Many NKVD officers could not distinguish by sight a Japanese spy from 
a Soviet Korean. The Soviets started to consider seriously that their diaspora 
nationalities could be used by foreign governments as weapons against them. This 
cycle of suspicion and resentment led to the spread of ethnic deportation. 
Another essential reason that led to the deportation of Koreans and other 
ethnic minorities lies in the nature of the totalitarian regime that had taken shape in 
the Soviet Union by the end of the 1920s and developed to its fullest extent in the 
1930s and 1940s.171 Stalin’s well-known thesis had intensified the class struggle 
both inside and outside the country, opening up a terrible era of mass terror in the 
huge Soviet lands. People were continuously brainwashed with the images of 
                                                 
170 In the context of growing Soviet xenophobia, this meant the Soviet nationalities policy might make diaspora 
populations more susceptible to foreign influence. 
171 This Stalin’s totalitarian regime factor for the Korean deportation has been strongly emphasized during the 
interview with German Kim. Furthermore, Georgii Kan also underlined this factor with high-level domestic and 
foreign policies factor as one of the basic reasons for the Korean deportation in all his writings. 
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dangerous and cunning enemies. And what is important after the mid-1930s is that 
there was a change of mood in the concept of enemies to the Soviets. These enemies 
were not discrete persons or social groups or classes anymore but entire nations and 
ethnic groups. As mentioned earlier, it was a time when the Soviets made the 
transition from the class-based terror to terror that targeted entire nations. And this 
shift in emphasis from class to ethnic groups (or diasporas) led to the concept of  
“enemies of the people.”   A moderate policy of national concession in the 1920s 
was about to end and a new era of a repressive policy featuring ethnic deportations, 
national terror, and Russification was about to begin. 
Under these circumstances, even though the Koreans had been fairly well 
integrated into the sociopolitical life in the Far Eastern region by 1937, the Soviets 
started to get seriously disturbed by their tendency to settle in compact areas where 
they compromised a majority or substantial minority of the population.172 As 
mentioned, the Soviet did not want the Koreans in the Far East to demand an 
autonomous region. Consequently, the forced deportation of the Koreans to Central 
Asia, a vast area a hundred times greater than that of the Far East, offered an 
automatic dispersion of the population. Also this gave a partial solution to the recent 
                                                 
172 German Kim, Koreitsy Kazakhstana i srednei azii v zarubezhnykh issledovaniiakh (Almaty: Daik, 1990), pp. 
40-45. 
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depopulation in Central Asia.173 The great losses of population created a severe 
labor shortage that could be partly filled with Korean settlers. Bringing Koreans 
into the southern regions of Kazakstan and Central Asia meant they could engage 
more easily in their traditional cultivation of rice and vegetables. As stated earlier, this 
experimental resettlement was realized with great success at the beginning of the 1920s 
by the Soviet authorities. Now they had a good experience in the department of 
deportation and resettlement. 
One more factor that should not be omitted is that the Soviets’ internal 
political aspects which played a crucial role in the deportation of Koreans. Stalin 
and the Soviet leadership were aware of the coming world war and their lack of 
preparation for it, thus they needed to make a new approach to imperial Japan. As a 
result, the Soviet Union used the Korean deportation as a bargaining chip with 
Japan. With the deportation of the whole population of anti-Japanese Koreans from 
the Far Eastern region, Japan could be relieved from nationalistic activities of 
Koreans in the region that was connected with the Korean peninsula.174 Kan argues 
that the Soviet Koreans were hostages to, or pawns in, the Far Eastern policy of the 
                                                 
173 Millions of titular peoples (generally Kazak) had died and hundreds of thousands had left their homeland as 
a result of Stalin’s forced collectivization. Besides, during the famine of 1931-1933 around 1,700,000 people in 
Kazakstan alone had been killed.  See Martha Brill Olcott, “The collectivization drive in Kazakhstan,” Russian 
Review, vol.40, no.2 (1981), pp. 122-142. 
174 Georgii Kan, “Koreitsy v Kazakhstane: Deportatsiia i obretenie novoi rodiny,” in Fond izucheniia naclediia 
repressirovannoi intelligentsii Kazakhstana ‘Arys’ (ed.), Deportirovannye v Kazakhstan Narody (Almaty: Arys, 
1998), pp.110-111. 
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Soviet Union as a whole.175 Considering the Soviet Union’s more unsecured and 
complicated western border region, the aim of the Soviet Union was to maintain 
stable relation with China and Japan and have a secure Eastern region at the dawn 
of the coming world war. 
In July 1936, the Far Eastern Regional Committee (Kraikom) first 
petitioned the Sovnarkom176 for permission to implement the new border regime in 
the Far East. They noted, “the aggressive tactics of the Japanese authorities in 
Manchuria and Korea are exploiting every border crossing from our side. They are 
either recruiting spies and saboteurs or making various accusations against the Soviet 
Union.”177 Throughout 1936 and 1937, such Soviet concern over Japan’s use of the 
Soviet Koreans for espionage escalated.  In this atmosphere, in 1936 the Japanese 
undertook a massive deportation of unreliable elements, generally Koreans, from the 
border regions of Manchuria and the northern border of their colony. In addition, the 
Japanese authorities confiscated their property as well.178 Needless to say, this 
incident heightened Stalin’s, nervousness and pushed them toward the radical 
deportation of 1937.  
Since the beginning of 1937, the fully-controlled Soviet press continuously 
                                                 
175 Ibid., Kan also indicates the signing of a Sino-Soviet mutual non-aggression treaty during this period.  
176 Council of People’s Commissariats, highest-ranking non-party body. 
177 GARF fond 5446, opis 29, delo 67, list 42-43. 
178 Nikolai Bugai, “Vyselenie Sovetskih koreitsev s Dal’nego Vostoka,” Voprosy istorii, no.5 (1994), p.142. 
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publicized the series of Japanese espionage in the Russia.179 On March 16th 1937, 
Pravda published an article on the system of Japanese espionage. On April 23rd it 
publicly accused the Soviet Koreans of espionage.180 No doubt, it was the highly 
calculated Soviet propaganda published to justify the deportation by creating an 
atmosphere of spy-mania. 
Finally in 29 July 1937, as the Great Terror was gathering momentum, a 
meeting of Ezov, Voroshilov and Litvinov approved the introduction of the new 
border region’s regime.181 The Sovnarkom ratified this decision the next day 
thereby clearing the way for ethnic deportation in the Far East.182 On 18 August 
1937, Stalin and Molotov sent a draft proposal for a Korean deportation to the Far 
Eastern leadership.183 This was the first proposal which targeted a single ethnic 
group, Koreans. Three days later, on 21 August 1937, the decision No.1428-326cc 
by the Sovnarkom and VKP(b)[All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)], which 
deals with the deportation of Korean population from the Far Eastern region, 
was accepted and signed by Molotov and Stalin. With the stroke of a pen all 
                                                 
179 Georgii Kan, “Koreitsy v Kazakhstane: Deportatsiia i obretenie novoi rodiny,” in Fond izucheniia naclediia 
repressirovannoi intelligentsii Kazakhstana ‘Arys’ (ed.), Deportirovannye v Kazakhstan Narody (Almaty: Arys, 
1998), p.109.; you can see number of articles in this book. 
180 Ibid., see I. Volodin, “Inostrannyi shpionazh na sovetskom dal’nem vostoke,” Pravda, no.112 (23.04.1937), 
p. 5. 
181 Georgii Kan, Istoriia Koreitsev Kazakhstana (Almaty: Gylym, 1995), p. 15. ; Georgii Kan, Koreitsy 
Kazakstana (Almaty: Kazakhstan, 1994), pp. 41-45. 
182 Ibid. 
183 Ibid. pp. 44-49. 
 101
Koreans who had fought against the Japanese colonizers were ironically 
accused of Japanese espionage and deported. As was the case in the 1928 
deportation plan, the Far Eastern leadership supported a more comprehensive 
deportation. All the Koreans’ properties were to be transfer to the Far Eastern 
NKVD border guard and Red Army leadership.184 Demobilized Red army 
soldiers were also to be settled in formerly Korean kolkhozes.185 Several waves 
of purges took place at all level of power, including the Party apparatus, the 
army, the intelligentsia and tens of thousands of ordinary workers. Not only 
Koreans, but also some Russians who had a history of collaboration with the 
Koreans, were executed or driven to commit suicide. Their places were replaced 
by new nomenklatura or bureaucratic elite that had no relationship with the 
Koreans. Thus, this new nomenklatura could easily fulfill its duties, deportation, 
in a tough and ruthless manner.  
On September 22nd 1937, the assistant head of the NKVD, Chernyshev, asked 
Ezhov for the right to deport every last Korean from the Far Eastern region. His 
reasoning highly revealed the Soviets mentality and purpose of entire ethnic 
                                                 
184 Michael Gelb, “An early Soviet ethnic deportation: The Far-Eastern Koreans,” The Russian Review, vol.54 
(1995), p.399. 
185 Ibid. 
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deportation:186 
To leave these few thousands Koreans in the Far Eastern krai, 
when the majority have been deported will be dangerous, since 
the family ties of all Koreans are very strong. The territorial 
restrictions on those remaining in the Far East will undoubtedly 
affect their mood and these groups will become rich soil for the 
Japanese to work on. 
 
                                                 
186 U Khe Li and Enun Kim, Belaia Kniga. O deportatsii Koreiskogo naseleniia rossii v 30-40kh godakh 
(Moscow: Interpraks, 1992), pp.109-110. 
 103
Table VI187 
RESOLUTION № 1428-326cc 
The Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR (Sovnarkom USSR) 
And the Central Committee of VKP(b) 
21 August 1937 
On deportation of the Korean population from the border regions of the Far Eastern district 
The Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party (VKP (b)) decree: 
With the purpose to oppose the infiltration of the Japanese spies in the Far Eastern district to fulfil the following measures: 
1. To propose to the Far Eastern regional committee of VKP (b), regional executive committee and the NKVD Office of the Far 
Eastern district to resettle all of the Korean population of the border areas of the Far Eastern district: Posietskii, Molotovskii, 
Grodekovskii, Khankaiskii, Khorolskii, Chernigovskii, Spasskii, Shmakovskii, Postyshevskii, Bikinskii, Viazemskii, 
Khabarovskii, Suifunskii, Kirovskii, Kalininskii, Lazo, Svobodnenskii, Blagoveshchenskii, Tambovskii, Mikhailovskii, 
Arkharinskii, Stalinskii and Bliukherovo regions and resettle to the South-Kazakhstan oblast, to the areas of Aral Sea and 
Balkhash, and to the Uzbek SSR. Deportation is to be started from Posietskii region and territories, close to Grodekovo. 
2. Deportation has to be started immediately and finished by January 1, 1938. 
3. To allow the subjected to deportation Koreans to take with them their property, working tools and animals. 
4. To pay to the resettled the value of the left movable and immovable property and the crops. 
5. Not oppose the departure of the resettled Koreans, if wished, to abroad, admitting the simplified procedure of crossing of the border. 
6. The People Commissar of Interior of the USSR has to take measures against the possible excesses and disorders from Koreans, concerning the resettlement. 
7. To compel the Sovnarkoms of the Kazakh SSR and the Uzbek SSR immediately to allot the areas and centres of settlement, and 
to elaborate the measures for accommodation of the settled people, carrying out the necessary aid. 
8. To oblige the NKPS (Narodnyi Commissariat Putei Soobscheniia, or Ministry of Transport) to provide a timely supply of 
railroad cars regarding the requests of Dal’krayispolkom (Far Eastern Regional Executive Committee) for transportation of the 
resettled Koreans and their property from the Far Eastern Region to the Kazakh SSR and the Uzbek SSR.  
9. To oblige the Far Eastern Regional Committee of VKP (b) and Far Eastern Regional Executive Committee in three days to 
inform the amount of resettled households and people.  
10. The process of resettlement, the amount of sent people from the resettled areas, the amount of peoples coming the areas of new 
settlements and amount of peoples who were let go abroad,- have to be informed about every ten days by telegrams. 
11. To increase the number of frontier guarding troops by three thousand men in order to consolidate the protection of borders in 
the areas wherefrom Koreans have been resettled. 
12. To allow the Ministry of Interior of the USSR to accommodate the frontier guarding troops in the freed houses of Koreans. 
 
The Head of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR                Secretary of the Central Committee of VKP(b) 
V. Molotov                                                            I. Stalin 
                                                 
187 Source: U Khe Li and Enun Kim, Belaia Kniga. O deportatsii Koreiskogo naseleniia rossii v 30-40kh 
godakh (Moscow: Interpraks, 1992), p.64.; For original source see Appendix. 
 104
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, this psychology played an important 
role not just for the spread of entire ethnic deportation, but also for the escalation of 
the Soviet Terror.  In other words, since the Soviets had injured some Koreans, the 
Soviets assumed all Koreans were their enemies. Even though all the Koreans were 
accused as Japanese spies, in the majority of secret internal correspondences the 
Soviet officials portrayed the Korean deportation as a purely preventive measure, 
with no punitive intent. 188  On the other hand, the majority of the Koreans 
considered the deportation as a violation of Stalin’s Constitution and the national 
policy of the Party.189 They openly asserted their objections to resettling. However, 
their most courageous actions were to make an appeal to leave the country, to kill 
their cattle and to destroy their cultivated fields to disobey.190 With indignation 
many Koreans argued, “I am being deported because my face has a different color,” 
or “because of two-three spies they deport everybody with only their suspicions.”191 
During the deportation the Koreans were crammed into overcrowded, 
underheated, broken down, and filthy freight cars that transported them across the 
                                                 
188 Ibid. p.100. 
189 Georgii Kan, “Koreitsy v Kazakhstane: Deportatsiia i obretenie novoi rodiny,” in Fond izucheniia naclediia 
repressirovannoi intelligentsii Kazakhstana ‘Arys’ (ed.), Deportirovannye v Kazakhstan Narody (Almaty: Arys, 
1998), p.112. 
190 U Khe Li and Enun Kim, p.134. 
191 Interview with deported Koreans and German Kim (Sept. 2003, Almaty Kazakstan). They said, those who 
asked for the permission to leave the country were arrested and were forced to confess that they were Japanese 
spies.  
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Asian continent. Each train convoy was given a special number and marked with 
the place of departure. Analysis of archival materials reveals the technical side of 
the transportation. Each convoy consisted of 50 wagons for people. The wagons 
were generally freight wagons for cargo and cattle, which were equipped with bunk 
beds. Each wagon accommodated 25-30 people, thus it was generally overloaded.192 
For instance, due to this overload one train was turned down near Khabarosk on 
September 13th 1937. Train number 505’s first seven wagons were completely 
destroyed which caused more than 30 casualties.193 Not only accidents, but also 
diseases during the journey, such as measles exacerbated by the hard conditions, 
increased the death toll up to 600.194 The exact figure is difficult to determine, 
however, the number of Koreans who died during the transportation in all 
probability amounted to several thousands.195 No doubt, the two age groups that 
suffered most were the very old and the very young.   Moreover, Genrikh 
Liushkov, the head of the NKVD in the Soviet Far East who had supervised the 
mass deportation of Soviet Koreans, later admitted that during the course of the 
deportation some 2,500 Koreans were arrested who were eventually executed by the 
                                                 
192 GAKhK fond P-2, opis 1, delo 1316, list 27, 336-338. 
193 GAKhK fond P-2, opis 1, delo 1316, list 33-34. 
194 Georgii Kan, “Koreitsy v Kazakhstane: Deportatsiia i obretenie novoi rodiny,” p. 113. 
195 Ibid.; U Khe Li and Enun Kim, pp.66,82,113. 
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NKVD.196 By October 29th, Ezhov could report to Molotov that 171,781 Koreans 
had been deported to Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, and only about 700 scattered 
Koreans still had to be rounded up.197 Also, the Soviet officials detained, arrested 
and deported Koreans who were living or studying in other parts of Russia on the 
basis of this decision. 
The deportees arrived in Central Asia very depressed and impoverished 
situation, bearing the label of “Japanese spies.”  They were destined primarily for 
Kazakstan (Almaty, Kızıl-Orda and elsewhere) and later Uzbekistan (generally in 
Tashkent Oblast) and a few were sent to Astrakhan and Stalingrad Oblasts.198 
However, the major and initial unloading and the temporary place of settlement for 
Koreans was Kazakstan’s Southern oblast, which is a part of Kızıl-Orda oblast now. 
It is a known fact that this oblast was the harshest region in the Soviet Union in 
terms of nature-climate and socio-economical conditions. 199  The region was 
economically and culturally underdeveloped. What was more, many had to live 
under open sky or temporary shelters made of reeds and mud.200 They were 
unprotected from the elements and denied even the most elementary sanitary 
                                                 
196 Alvin D. Coox, “L’a Faire Lyushkov: Anatomy of a Defector,” Soviet Studies, vol. 19, no.3 (1968), pp. 406-
408.; Liushkov defected to Japanese Empire on 13th June 1938 and wrote about the Korean deportation in 1937. 
197 GARF fond 5446, opis 29, delo 48, list 16-17. 
198 U Khe Li and Enun Kim, pp.114-115. 
199 Georgii Kan, “Koreitsy v Kazakhstane: Deportatsiia i obretenie novoi rodiny,” pp.115-116. 
200 U Khe Li and Enun Kim, p 113. 
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facilities. As a result, many of the deportees died due to the hardships after their 
arrival.201 According to 1938 data, after the arrival to Central Asia death rates 
reached forty-two per thousand and infant mortality was 20 percent.202  Regardless, 
the official Soviet reports state that 95,526 Koreas were settled in Kazakhstan, and 
76,525 arrived in Uzbekistan in the end.203  
 
Table VII 
Distribution of the Koreans in Kazakstan 
Oblast Population (unit: household) 
Alma-Atinskaia 4,774 
Aktiubinskaia 1,285 
Gur’evskaia 1,323 
Zapadno-Kazakhstanskaia (West) 500 
Karagandinskaia 2,255 
Kzyl-Ordinskaia 6,476 
Kustanaiskaia 720 
Severo-Kazakhstanskaia (North) 1,500 
Iuzhno-Kazakhstanskaia (South) 1,698 
Total 20530 
Source: GARF fond 5546, opis 22a, delo 50, list 1-116, also available at 
APRK(Arkhive Prezidenta Respubliki Kazakhstan) APRK fond 70, opis 1, delo 69, 
list 10-30. 
                                                 
201 Many of the deportees died of dysentery, malaria and typhus. See U Khe Li and Enun Kim, pp. 155-156. 
202 So En Khvan, “Ob istorii naroda bez kupiur,” Zhurnalist, vol.3 (1990), 29. 
203 GARF fond 5446, opis 22a, delo 50, list 1-116. 
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After their deportation to Kazakstan in mid-1938, the new stage of 
resettlement of Koreans in Kazakstan and other Central Asian republics began. 
Approximately 60% of Koreans were resettled again, and the transporation distance 
varied from 20 km to 4000 km.204 This time they were resettled permanently. Not 
to mention, the majority of the Koreans were settled on the virgin lands and some of 
them on the lands of bankrupted sovkhozes.205 All this work was done under strict 
NKVD control. 
Related to the arrivals of deportees and the local reaction during the first 
months of resettlement, the hospitality and kindness of the Kazak or Uzbek people 
who gave shelter to the Korean deportees has been mentioned and praised. Many 
local diaspora scholars and old Korean deportees generally deny any evidence of 
conflict or friction between local Kazakh and deported Korean population.206 For 
instance, Georgii Kan’s chapter in the book ‘Deported Nations to Kazakstan: Time 
and Destiny’ is an example of this discourse.207 In the article, he praises the Kazak 
(and Uzbek) people’s hospitalities toward the Koreans, saying “despite directives 
from the top, local Kazak people shared their bread and homes with the Koreans 
                                                 
204 Georgii Kan, Istoriia Koreitsev Kazakhstana (Almaty: Gylym, 1995), pp. 70-73. 
205 Ibid. 
206 Interview with local diaspora scholars German Kim, Dmitri Men and number of old Korean deportees (Sept. 
2003, Almaty, Kazakstan) 
207 Georgii Kan, “Koreitsy v Kazakhstane: Deportatsiia i obretenie novoi rodiny,” p. 112. 
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suffering from cold and starvation.”208 Many local Korean diasporas today tend to 
emphasize that the Kazaks shared their last piece of bread with them. Even though 
such statements are not absurd, at the very least, they demand new and more 
objective analysis. Perhaps, the Kazak historian Beimbet Irmukhanov provides an 
alternative historical account of this alleged discourse. He argues, “at the time when 
the Koreans were deported to Kazakstan the Kazaks were preoccupied with other 
things, and not with helping other peoples; they had recently survived a famine and 
needed a piece of bread themselves.”209 Also Professor Kerekhan Amanzholov 
from the Women’s pedagogical Institute gives a more criticed view in this discourse. 
He argues that the Koreans occupied the most fertile lands that had formerly 
belonged to Kazaks.210 Korean farms or kolkhozes were organized in the place of 
Kazak auls. Besides, the government assistance that might have gone to Kazak 
farms, schools, hospitals and housing were diverted to Korean settlement venues. 
And finally, he asserts that some members of the Kazak intelligentsia were executed 
because of their association with the Korean deportees under suspicion of harboring 
Japanese sympathies.211 Consequently, we should approach the issue in a more 
rational manner while explaining the initial arrival of the Koreans in region. 
                                                 
208 Ibid. p.114. 
209 Interview with Beimbet Irmukhanov (Sept. 2003, Almaty Kazakstan). 
210 Interview with Kerekhan Amanzholov (Sept. 2003, Almaty Kazakstan). 
211 Ibid. 
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However, regardless of the historical validity of the assertion of Kazak hospitality 
to the Koreans, the existence of such a theme among the Koreans is the indication 
of the re-territorialization of the Korean community in the region. (e.g. from the 
Soviet citizen to Kazakstan’s citizen) 
One of the most tragic consequences of the deportation was not only the 
physical casualties suffered by the Koreans but also that many Koreans were 
completely cut off from their historical motherland, Korea. This destroyed the root 
system which nurtured the soul of the ethnos. To make matters worse, on December 
1937, the politburo passed a resolution abolishing all national soviets and all 
national schools of the stigmatized diaspora nationalities.212 All of the Korean 
schools, institutions and libraries were closed. Under the strict control of the state 
Committee, tens of thousands of books brought by Koreans from the Far East were 
destroyed. 213  Accordingly, the Koreans suffered huge losses in the field of 
education, language and culture as well. As shown up to this point, being the first 
mass nationality deportation, the Koreans’ story represents the path from the 
liquidation of the kulaks to the liquidation of an entire people previous to, or during 
                                                 
212 Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire, Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), p.339. 
213 Georgii Kan, Istoriia Koreitsev Kazakhstana (Almaty: Gylym, 1995), pp. 96-100.; According to Kan’s 
calculations 120 thousands of textbooks, among them 17 thousands in Korean language, were destroyed. Many 
books were destroyed in the library of Korean pedagogical institute, however, many Koreans themselves were 
getting rid of their books since even keeping Korean books meant the threat of inevitable imprisonment.  
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the World War II. 
Despite the harsh conditions of exile, Koreans succeeded even in the early 
years in achieving relative prosperity.  The Koreans brought rice culture into the 
region and helped replace the 900,000 Kazaks who perished or fled during the 
1932/33 terror and famine.214  With their agricultural skills, they became the 
vanguard of the Soviet campaign to conquer the virgin territories.  Beginning with 
their specialty, rice, the Korean farmers branched out and pioneered other crops, 
such as cotton, onions, cabbage, beans and sugar beets, from Kazakstan to 
Uzbekistan.215  As a result, Korean collective farms gained fame throughout the 
Soviet Union.  Innumerable Koreans were decorated with medals and earned other 
distinctions for outstanding work in agriculture, industry, science, culture, and 
government service.  Their proportion among “Heroes of Socialist Labor” was 
higher than in any of the other nationalities.216 However, the ethnic Korean way of 
life in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan during the Soviet period was bound to assimilate 
into the Soviet (Russophone) society. Especially after the 1970s, when the new 
generation of youths showed greater inclination to assimilate into the mainstream of 
Russified Soviet culture, their assimilation process into Soviet society accelerated.  
                                                 
214 Martha Brill Olcott, The Kazakhs (Standford, 1987), pp.184-186. 
215 Kim, G.N. i D.V. Men. Istoriia i kul'tura koreitsev Kazakhstana (Almaty: Gylym, 1995), pp.55-63. 
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They became a typical Soviet ethnic minority. 
Due to their high level of education, industriousness, and organizational 
skill, the Koreans joined the ranks of the leaders of industry, government, and 
educational institutions. 217  They played the role of middlemen between the 
Russians and the local people. Today celebrities such as the folk balladeer Iulii Kim 
and the rock star Viktor Tsoi, who died in a traffic accident and became an 
underground cult figure, symbolize the Koreans’ success and their assimilation into 
the Russian culture. In reality, for their survival, they had little choice but to 
assimilate into the environment where they had any connection. However, their 
Russification raises the question of the long-term survivability of their culture in 
spite of the ethnic Koreans’ remarkable economic and educational advancement. 
                                                 
217 By the 1970s, the number of university graduates was about twice that of general population. See (Michael 
Gelb 1995, 409; Helsinki Watch Report 1991, 28.; Kan, G.V., Istoriia koreitsev Kazakhstana (Almaty: Gylym, 
1995); Kim, G.N. i D.V. Men. Istoriia i kul'tura koreitsev Kazakhstana (Almaty: Gylym, 1995) 
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 Table VIII 
Dynamics of Korean diasporas in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan during the Soviet Period 
(1939~1999) 
Year 1939 1959 1970 1979 1989 
Uzbekistan 
Population 73000 138000 148000 163000 183100 
Year 1939 1959 1969 1979 1989 
Kazakstan 
Population 97000 74000 82000 92000 103000 
Source: Agentsvo republiki Kazakhstan po statistike, Naselenie Kazakhstana: ezhe 
godnyi spravochnik (Almaty: 1996); Material supplied by the Uzbekistan Korean 
Association. 
 
Table IX 
Distribution of the Koreans in the Soviet Union and their ratio 
Year
Section 
1959 1970 1989 
The name of 
republics 
population ratio Population ratio population ratio 
All USSR 313,700 100 * * 439,000 100 
Russia 91,400 29.2 * * 107,100 24.4 
Uzbekistan 138,500 44.1 147,538 * 183,100 41.7 
Kazakstan 74,000 23.6 81,598 * 103,100 24.4 
Kyrgyzstan 3,600 1.1 9,404 * 18,400 4.1 
Tajikistan 2,400 0.8 8,490 * 13,400 3.1 
Turkmenistan 1,900 0.6 3,493 * 2,800 0.6 
Source: For 1959 and 1989 data, German Kim and Eng Sob Sim, Isotriia 
Prosveshchennia Koreitsev Rossii I Kazakhstana. Vtoraia Polovina 19 v.-2000 g. 
(Almaty: Kazak Universiteti, 2000), p.192.; For 1970 data, Tsentral'noe 
statisticheskoe upravlenie, Naselenie SSSR (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1973) 
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III.2.  A Historical Review of the Ahıska Turkish diaspora 
III.2.1.  Origin of the Ahıska Turks 
 
Like Korean diasporas, the Ahıska Turks are one of the national groups of 
the Soviet Union which does not have the option of returning to their homeland218 
and have to struggle in their residing states. The Ahıska/Meskhetian Turks are 
known as Ahıska Turks in Turkey and “Meskhetian” Turks in the West and Russia.  
Ahıska (or Akhaliskihe in Georgian) is the name of the place located in the 
Southwestern corner of present day Georgia, and is very close to the Posof district 
of the Turkish province of Ardahan. It is only 10 km away from the present Turkish 
border. Although on origins of the ethnic Ahıska Turks, some Georgians claim that 
Ahıska Turks were ethnic Georgians who at some stage in history, adopted or were 
converted to Islam, and Turkified, the Ahıska Turks themselves strictly deny being 
Georgian and never dispute their Turkishness. During the fieldwork the author 
observed that although the Ahıska Turks “belonged to the territory of Georgian 
national space,” they never considered themselves as Georgians.219 Most do not 
identify themselves with Georgia let alone being Georgian at all, though their 
homeland fell under the rule of Russia from the Ottoman empire in 1829 and they 
were deported from there while it belonged to the Georgian SSR in 1944. Many 
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interviews with the elder generation indicate that they were not much concerned 
with the changes of regime, and until the World War I they could freely cross the 
border to the Turkish side.220 In addition many Ahıska Turkish interviewees made a 
retort that “why were we deported and had to live in Central Asia if we were 
Georgians? We were deported because we were Turks and not Georgians.”221  
  The Ahıska Turks are an ethnically heterogeonous group. But they all 
have in common being either Turkish or Turkified and they all used to inhabit the 
Ahıska (Meskhetia) region. Additionally, they all had little consciousness of having 
a separate ethnic identity. Before the deportation, ethnic peculiarities were of minor 
importance and very often, religious differentiation was more fundamental than ethnic or 
national difference. Like else where in other Turkic-Islamic society, including Central 
Asia, most of the time, local identities of kin, village, class, and religion were very 
important.222 As Khazanov notes, they all speak the Eastern dialect of the Anatolian 
Turkish language and belong to the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam.223 
Until the late 1930s when they were living in their homeland, the Ahıska 
Turks did not pay much attention to niceties of their official name and ethnic 
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affiliation.224 They often called themselves “yerli” (the locals, the natives) which 
did not have any explicit ethnic connotations though their Turkishness was taken for 
granted and never disputed.225 In the mean time, their neighbors continued to call 
them Turks. However, since the deportation various labels have been used by Soviet 
officials and outsiders, including ‘Meskhetian Muslims’, ‘Ottoman Turks’ and 
‘Turks.’ In the end, the Soviet State and the Georgian authorities labeled them as 
‘Meskhetians’ or ‘Meskhetian Turks’ in reference to the region in Meskhetia.  
Irrespective of the official title, during the fieldwork in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, 
the author noticed the adamant refusal to be called ‘Meskhetian Turks’ among 
Ahıska Turks in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan. They think of themselves simply as 
Ahıska Turks.226 For instance, one elderly Ahıska Turk in Chimkent (Kazakstan) 
confessed in palin Turkish, “I knew myself as a Turk from Ahıska – namely, an 
Ahıska Turk.”  This clearly shows how important the Turkishness is to them. 
Parallel to this argument, the author heard numerous elder and mid-aged Ahıska 
Turkish interviewees make it clear that even there is no need to call them as ‘Ahıska 
Turk’ but calling simply ‘Turk’ could be enough since Ahıska merely used to be the 
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name of a Turkish (Ottoman Turkey) province. They asserted that it is enough to 
call them Turks, since Turks from different regions are not referred to as ‘Izmir 
Turks,’ ‘Ankara Turks,’ or ‘Ardahan Turks.’  Such a view is also held by Hakan 
Kırımlı, an expert on the Turkic people’s issues. He asserts that Ahıska (or 
Meskhetia) used to be an Ottoman province (the Çıldır Vilâyet) whose people were 
linguistically, culturally or ethnically identical to the Turks of Eastern Anatolia.227 
And even when the border was created they could hear and see their neighbors on 
the Turkish side singing as they worked in the field.228 In addition, although the 
Treaty of Edirne in 1829 formally ceded the Ahıska region to Russia, it was not 
until after the Soviet period that Russia had established its real control over the 
region.229 Thus, even after the Russian annexation, the local Turks (Ahıska Turks) 
remained loyal to Turkey rather than to Russia.230 To conclude with a quotation 
from Ibrahim Mecitoğlu, one of the leaders of the Ahıska Turks: “Although the 
whole world know us as Meskhetians, we are only Turks from Anatolian Turkey 
who found themselves within the boundaries of the Soviet Union as result of a bad 
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luck.”231 
Consequently, a number of Muslim Turks and maybe some Turkified 
elements people, mainly Turks, Kurds who happened to inhabit the region around 
Ahıska came to be unified under the name of ‘Ahıska Turks.’ These ethnic groups 
experienced the same tragedy of deportation and were treated similarly by the 
Soviet authorities.  As Turkophone minorities, they were all considered ‘Turks’ by 
the Soviet authorities.  As Aydıngün argues, the Ahıska Turkish ethnic identity was 
born and reinforced in the context of the 1944 deportation and their interaction with 
the other ethnic groups in Central Asia.232  Moreover, the Soviet’s wholesale 
discrimination against them all through the Soviet period strengthened their group 
identity as ‘Ahıska Turks.’ This attitude played a significant role in the development 
of a Turkish ethnic sentiment among the Ahıska Turks and helped to strengthen 
their feeling of Turkishness. The Soviet policy and system contributed to the round-
up of the heterogeneous Turkish-Muslim people into a single ethnic group. 
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Map II 
Ahıska Region 
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 III.2.2.  Establishment of the Soviet Union and the Mass Deportation of 
Ahıska Turks 
Before the deportation, the Ahıska Turks lived in 212 villages in Southern 
and Southwestern Georgia (Adigenskii, Akhaltsikhskii, Aspinskii, Akhalkalakhskii 
and Bogdanovskii districts) along the Turkish border. These regions where many 
Ahıska Turkish families originate have been an area of contention between Russia 
and Turkey (especially Ottoman Turkey) for at least 200 years. In 1812 the 
Ottoman-Russian Treaty of Bucharest left the control of the all the basin west of 
Suram and Abkhazia to Russia. On the eastern Black Sea coast, Turkey controlled 
the port of Poti, the fortress of Anapa, Ahıska (Akhalsikhe) and Atskhur. In 1828, 
the Persian-Russian Treaty of Turkmençay ceded the control of Nakhchevan and 
Yerevan to the Russians and eliminated Persia as a ruler in Transcaucasia which had 
been dominant in Caucasus for almost 2000 years. In 1829, the Treaty of Edirne 
resulted in the annexation of the Ahıska region from Turkey. However, even after 
the Russian annexation, many Muslim Turks in the region, that is, the Ahıska Turks, 
remained loyal to Turkey rather than to Russia. 233  As a result, after the 
establishment of the Soviet Union, the Ahıska Turks were suspected as traitors who 
might jeopardize the security of Tiblisi in the eyes of Soviet authorities. This may 
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have been especially sensitive for Stalin who was born in Gori, near Ahıska. 
During the early years of the Soviet Union, Ahıska Turks were officially 
called ‘Turks.’ However, after the 1950s, the Stalinist regime began to designate 
them as ‘Azerbaijani’ instead of ‘Turk,’ in an effort to break off their relations and 
kinships with Turkey, which was seen as a security threat to the Soviet Union. The 
Soviet Union’s sensitivity was due to strained relations with Turkey. The Ahıska 
Turks were no longer allowed to register their nationality as Turkish. In other words, 
the Soviet Union denied the existence of a Turkish population in their territory. 
Further evidence is found in census data. Unlike the census of 1926, Ahıska Turks 
were referred to as ‘Azerbaijani’ in the census of 1939.234 In the early years of the 
Soviet Union, schools in the region taught Turkish (Anatolian dialect), but during 
1935-36 language was switched to Azerbaijani dialect and Russian.235 Nevertheless, 
paradoxically they were all again called as ‘Turks’ during the deportation in 1944, 
but had to register as Azerbaijani during their settlement in Central Asia.  
Consequently, today there are many Ahıska Turks who remain registered as 
Azerbaijani. During the fieldwork the author could easily observe that the members 
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of family were registered differently: some were registered as Turks while others 
were registered as Azerbaijani. One could come across without difficulty in 
Uzbekistan and Kazakstan, a family where the nationality of the children was 
different from that of the parents. Needless to say, such conditions has made it very 
complicated to estimate the statistics of the Ahıska Turkish population in Central 
Asia.   
During the Second World War, Stalin planned an invasion of Turkey and 
wished to clear Transcaucasia of those ethnic elements who did not enjoy his 
confidence.236 To support this idea, Khazanov indicates that, “it is no coincidence 
that the deportation of Meskhetian Turks was followed in 1949 by the deportation 
of Greeks, Lakhlukhs (Armenian speaking Jews) and some others.”237 Under these 
circumstances, like the Koreans in the Russian Far East, Ahıska Turks seemed to the 
Soviet authorities particularly suspicious because of their linguistic, religious and 
territorial proximity to the Turks of Turkey. Besides, before the deportation, there 
were various reports on the Ahıska Turkish and other Muslim populations to Stalin 
that they had been connected with the population in the border areas of Turkey and 
were involved in espionage activities.238 As a result, the Soviet Committee of State 
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made a decision to deport the Ahıska Turks and other Muslim populations in the 
name of ‘frontier security.’239 Like the case of Koreans in the Far East, it was the 
practical case for the Soviet authorities to evacuate unreliable elements from the 
border area, which might easily be reached by the enemy. It must be noted that 
during the World War II, the territory of Georgia was never occupied by the German 
troops. Thus, Soviet regime could not accuse the Ahıska Turks of collaborating with 
Germany. Also, the time when they were deported the anti-Hitlerite coalition was 
already victorious and Turkey was about to declare war on Germany. This meant 
that the pretext of Turkey’s military threat to the Soviet Union was not valid at all. 
Therefore, the reason for the Ahıska Turks’ deportation lied much deeper than its 
subsequent official explanation. In addition, we shouldn’t omit that fact that it must 
have been associated with the chauvinistic mood of certain Soviet-Georgian 
populations who tried to clean the most fertile lands of Georgia from Turks and 
enlarge “the vital area” for the indigenous population of the republic.240  
In November 1944, the Ahıska Turks, along with some other smaller ethnic 
groups of Southerin Georgia, like Khemshins (Turkified Armenians) and Kurds 
were deported to Kazakstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. They were told by the 
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Soviet authorities that for their own protection they were being moved away from 
the threat of German invasion through Turkey. It is interesting that some Ahıska 
Turkish elders in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan still explained their deportation in such 
a way.241 Thus, during the deportation every Ahıska Turk believed that they were 
temporarily displaced to a safe place in order to defend them from enemies. Such 
was the case that many Ahıska Turks told me during the interviews that they even 
buried their valuable belongings, such as gold, near their house to retrieve them 
upon their return.242 Many Ahıska Turks were told that they would return in a week, 
or month. As elderly Ahıska Turkish informants note, enough fodder for cattle was 
left behind so that the animals could survive for one or two weeks while they were 
gone. The memories that many elder people, who experienced the deportation, 
recounted was how they were rounded up and deported within a matter of hours. 
In 1944, a whole region of southwest Georgia (around Ahıska) was 
descended upon within a few hours. Turkish residents of the region were herded 
into cattle trains and deported. Many elderly Ahıska Turks were told that they began 
to be afraid after being forced onto the cattle trains. These cattle trains were not 
designed for human travel.243 There were no provisions for food or water. Luckily 
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some had brought food, but many others died of starvation or cold during the 
journey. Especially, many weak elderly and children perished in the deportation. An 
elderly man who was thirteen years old at the time of the 1944 deportation told me 
that he was an orphan and alone, and had only some bread to see himself through 
Central Asia. He said, “In retrospect, it is a miracle that I have survived the harsh 
journey. I am always rendering thanks to God.”244 The casualty figure during the 
deportation varies in different sources from about 15,000 to 30,000 or 50,000.245 
Even the minimum casualties contended by Tolz, 14,895 people represent 15.7 
percent of the number of Ahıska Turkish deportees.246 Moreover, if we combine the 
death rate during the settlement the death toll rises very high. 
Some sources estimate that approximately 200,000 persons were 
deported. 247  However, according to the Soviet archives 81,324 persons were 
deported in 50 wagons from Georgia.248 Also a report prepared in 1949 for Beria, 
Commissar of Nationalities, by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of 
Justice, reports the number of deported Ahıska Turks standing at 94,955, including 
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17,000 who died during the journey.249 Other data presented in the Soviet Ministry 
for Internal Affairs in the same year reports that there were 81,575 deportees from 
Georgia.250 Thus it seems that at least 80,000-90,000 Ahıska Turks were deported. 
Beyond these figures, there were also approximately 40,000 Ahıska Turkish men 
who were serving in the Soviet army at the front. There were even Ahıska Turkish 
soldiers who were entitled to the highest Soviet order, namely the Hero of the 
Soviet Union, during the fight against Nazi Germany.251 Among them 26,000 
became martyrs for the Soviet Union in the War.252 However, after the end of the 
war the surviving soldiers returned to Ahıska only to find that their families had 
been deported and their property stolen. They were not allowed to reside in Ahıska 
and were forced to undertake searches in Central Asia on their own to find their 
families and relatives. 
The deportees were resettled in small groups on the territory of Kazakstan, 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. According to the Soviet archival data, 36,313 deportees 
in 20 wagons arrived in Uzbekistan, 20,634 deportees in 11 wagons arrived in 
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Kazakstan, and 2,744 in 2 wagons arrived in Kyrgyzstan.253 Thus, Ahıska Turks 
were mainly relocated to Uzbekistan. They were resettled in the region as the so-
called special settlers, who were deprived of elementary civil rights. The special 
settlement (spetsposelenie) regime to which Ahıska Turks were relegated put them 
under the same regulations as those who were named as traitors, which Ahıska 
Turks were never officially accused of being. Upon arrival in Central Asia, Ahıska 
Turk were subject to the same deprivations as many other deportees. Shortages from 
World War II meant that food and clothing were scarce. Many Ahıska Turks 
reported that they lived in cattle barns for many years.254 The local republic’s 
institutions were supposed to provide special-settlers with homes, food and land. 
However, there were already too many deported special-settlers settled within the 
borders of the republic. Thus, it was impossible to provide all the special-settlers 
with homestead lands. Much time was needed to solve all these problems, since all 
the instructions about the house holding and provision of special-contingent with 
working places were coming from Moscow.255 The table shown below is the data 
about the Ahıska Turkish special-settlers in Kazakstan according to oblast’, which 
was presented it to the NKVD Kaz SSR. 
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Table X 
Ahıska Turk Special Settlers in Kazakstan according to Oblast 
Kazakstan 
Oblast Family People 
Alma-Atinskaia oblast 2544 families 11,004 
Jambulskaia oblast 822 fmamiles 3415 
Kzyl-Ordinskaia oblast 373 families 1826 
Taldy-Kurganskaia oblast 337 families 1441 
Iuzhno-Kazakhstanskaia oblast 2233 families 10,147 
Total 6309 families 27,833 
Source: Tsentral'nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Respubliki Kazakhstan (TsGA PK)  
TsGA PK fond 1987 opis 1, delo20, list 10. 
 
For twelve years, until Stalin’s death, free movement by Turks was strictly 
prohibited.256 Relatives, who had been resettled in other camps, in regions inside 
and outside republics could not communicate or meet. Every night the head of the 
family had to check in with the camp manager. Yet, overtime, especially after 
Stalin’s death, conditions improved due to the increased prosperity and relaxation of 
the confinement of Ahıska Turks. Many Ahıska Turks worked on collective farms 
and harvested cotton and tobacco.  
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 III.2.3.  The Ahıska Turks after the deportation  
The Ahıska Turks were deported due to their Turkish identity from Georgia, 
but once they arrived in Central Asia they could not register themselves as Turks. 
As Khazanov noted, by 1988, only one third of the Ahıska Turks living in 
Kazakstan were registered as Turks.257 The Ahıska Turks were put among the 
unrecognized nationalities, which were deprived of all civil rights. As an 
unrecognized ethnic group, the large majority of the Ahıska Turks were excluded 
not only from the political arena but also from all of the important positions that 
involved decision-making. They lacked all rights given to the recognized 
nationalities, such as preference in employment, promotion, acceptance by 
universities and funds to encourage cultural development. For instance, according 
Dr. Ömer Salman, the chairman of Ahıska Turkish Association in Uzbekistan and 
the coordinator of the Cultural Center for Ethnic Minorities for Uzbekistan 
government, during the Soviet period Ahıska Turks had much discrimination to 
receive higher education. Ahıska Turks had to report their nationality as Uzbek 
upon graduating from higher education to increase Uzbeks’ educational statistics for 
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Moscow.258 Those who refused were denied diplomas and those who were about to 
enter the institute or university were blocked from doing so.259 Thus, throughout 
the Soviet period the Ahıska Turks perceived their identity to be under threat. Hence 
they developed informal channels of resistance against the Soviet’s official 
pressures, such as keeping their language, religion and culture alive in private 
spheres. During the fieldwork the author found out that compared with the Koreans 
and other more Russified ethnic minorities (e.g., Germans, Tatars, Jews, etc.) the 
preservation level of language, religion and ethnic celebration among Ahıska Turks 
was overwhelmingly high. In almost every village that the author visited, locals 
were fluent in their mother tongue, Turkish. Halil, who is in his 40s and driving a 
taxi in Chimkent Kazakstan, boasted to the author how they have managed to 
preserve their language.260 He showed how his teenage children were proficient in 
their mother language. He said, in private spheres of life they were all encouraged 
to speak Turkish rather than Russian or the titular language. He even punished his 
children if they dared to speak Russian in his house. He said that he himself had 
been raised in such a way.  
As is obvious from this case, as reaction to discrimination and assimilation 
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processes, the Ahıska Turks have used their language both to identify themselves 
and also as a tool against assimilation. During the interviews the author could easily 
observe their ethnic pride and identity which were intermingled with speaking 
mother language.   Although they were deported and lived humbly in Central Asia, 
every Ahıska Turk took strong pride in knowing that they used to be the part of the 
Ottoman Empire. They considered themselves as descendents of a civilized, 
powerful nation. Considering the related religion and language to Kazak and Uzbek 
and titulars’ sympathy to their plight in the begging of the settlement, the Ahıska 
Turks would be easily assimilated by the titulars (Uzbek and Kazak), however, due 
to their feeling of superiority and pride in comparison with the local population of 
Central Asia the opposite happened. In particular, forced attempts to assimilate them 
into other nationalities by the Soviets furthered the conception of a separate and 
distinct identity, as Ahıska Turks. 
During the soviet period, Ahıska Turks lived closely with their community 
and kept their relations with other ethnic groups within limits. Interaction with other 
nationalities was mostly limited to the public sphere, whereas the private life was 
dominated by relations within their own ethnic community. Ahıska Turks have 
strong endogamous practices in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan. Many village headmen, 
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whom the author has met in Kazakstan (Chimkent, Jambul, Almaty) and Uzbekistan 
(Tashkent, Sirdarya, Buhara), often proudly remarked that they have never given 
their bride to other nationalities, even to other Turkic-Muslim communities such as 
Uzbeks or Kazaks.  Therefore, traditional values were revived and preserved 
through the rule of ethnic endogamy. Consequently, throughout the Soviet period 
when Korean diasporas were busy with integrating to the so-called Russified 
mainstream society, Ahıska Turks made a big effort to preserve their separate ethnic 
self-identification instead by political mobilization and an effort to return to the 
homeland. Rather than being good social climbers, they tried to preserve their self-
ethnic identity more than the Korean diaspora. Like other deported diasporas, 
Ahıska Turks pushed themselves to work hard in order to obtain a relatively 
wealthy life but they held back from the Russified mainstream society. Many 
Ahıska Turks concentrated their efforts on the economic sphere, and soon became 
more prosperous than their Uzbek or Kazak neighbors, but their socio-political 
advancement remained low compared with other deported nationalities. 
In Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, Ahıska Turks primarily dealt with agriculture 
since their settlement in Central Asia. Recently, however, they have diversified their 
professions and now work in construction, oil, or their own business in Kazakstan. 
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In Uzbekistan, they have grafted their agriculture skills with external capital and 
developed vegetable plantation. 261  Thus, in Kazakstan, Ahıska Turks’ living 
standard are pretty good while in Uzbekistan, their living standards are no worse 
than Uzbeks themselves. So, many Ahıska Turks in Uzbekistan, especially in 
Tashkent and Sirdarya region which is near Kazakstan, see Kazakstan as an 
attractive alternative place for opportunities.262 Almost all Ahıska Turks spoke the 
titular language (Kazak or Uzbek) well and are thus fairly well integrated and have 
a good relationship with the majority community. However their relatively low level 
of representation in government and other public sectors makes them disadvantaged 
in the society. 
Very few members of the community, mostly elderly, want to go to Ahıska, 
Georgia. Whether they want to or not, it seems that to return to Ahıska, Georgia is 
now only a symbolic homeland that they should be allowed to go back to. It has 
become their hypothetical homeland these days. Many middle aged and young 
Ahıska Turks think of their current residing country as their homeland but they 
associate them with Turkey due to certain cultural kinships. Many believe that 
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Turkey should assume a role as a kin-state. However, even with Turkey they are 
skeptical, as some of those who went to Turkey in the 1990s have since returned to 
Kazakstan and Uzbekistan. Especially economically well-being Ahıska Turks or the 
intelligentsia are not attracted to Turkey, since they are aware that many will face 
downward social mobility if they resettle in Turkey. Nonetheless, they all prefer to 
be called ‘Turks’ rather than ‘Ahıska Turks’ or ‘Meskhetian Turks’.  Lastly, it is 
important to consider the impact of the 1944 deportation on the Ahıska Turk 
collectivity. Narrating the experiences of deportation was something the author 
explored because such memories and accounts explain how Ahıska Turkish 
collective identity was formed. Such narratives operated in the formation of their 
nationalism. The identity of the Ahıska Turks, which was based on an emphasis on 
Turkishness and the belief of belonging to the Ottoman Empire (and Turkey), was 
developed by the deportation and preserved throughout the Soviet era due to 
numerous socio-political factors. 
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 Table XI 
Estimated Statistics of the Ahıska Turks in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan263 
Kazakstan Uzbekistan 
Some Major Region Population Some Major Region Population 
Almaty 
Approx. 
45,000 
Tashkent, Sirdarya,  
Jizak, Kashkadaria 
Approx. 
15,000-20,000
South Kazakstan 
Approx. 
40,000 
Buhara 
Approx.  
3,000 
Jambul 
Approx. 
36,000 
Samarkand 
Approx. 
4,000 
Kızıl Orda 
Apporx. 
10,000 
Navai 
Approx. 
2,000 
Total 
Appox. 
150,000 
Total 
Approx. 
50,000 
Source: Estimated data were provide by the Ahıska Turk Association in Kazakstan 
(Tevfik Kurdaev), 2003 and the Ahıska Turk Association in Uzbekistan (Ömer Salman), 
2005 
                                                 
263 Below data include Ahıska Turks who were not registered as Turks (Ahıska Turk). Thus these figures 
embrace all Ahıska Turk who were even registered as Uzbeks, Azeri, or Kazak. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
THE AHISKA TURKISH AND KOREAN DIASPORAS IN 
NATIONALIZING CENTRAL ASIA: KAZAKSTAN AND UZBEKISTAN 
 
 
 
Following the break-up of the Soviet Union, one of the most urgent 
questions to emerge from the critical confusion was how the newly emerging 
polities would set about creating convincing identities for themselves and their 
citizens (ethnic minorities). Having secured sovereign spaces following the collapse 
of the world’s largest multiethnic federation, Kazakstan and Uzbekistan were busy 
during the last decade embarking upon nation building. It has allowed political 
entrepreneurs in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan to link the cultures of the titular nations 
even more closely to state structures and to further secure their political pre-
eminence within the new citizen polities.  However, the state is a recent advent in 
the political discourses of the post-Soviet Kazakstan and Uzbekistan. This is 
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because statehood came unexpectedly and without asking, and in the case of the 
Central Asians, it was thrust upon them. Kazakstan and Uzbekistan can be said to 
have created nations. Accordingly, its been more than a decade since their 
independence, Kazakstan and Uzbekistan are still struggling to define their national 
and state identity. Since these nationalizing states do not have effective ways of 
harmonizing the relationships of citizenship, ethnic affiliation and religious and 
national identity, the problems of diasporas, cultural rights and state protection of 
national minorities are growing throughout the post-Soviet Kazakstan and 
Uzbekistan. 
Historical experiences play a significant role in shaping identity. Although 
history matters, it is important to emphasize that the collective experience of a 
nation does not mean that there is a universally shared meaning of history within 
states. This is particularly so for the countries under study here, Kazakstan and 
Uzbekistan. In many ways, the historical experiences of Uzbekistan and Kazakstan 
are similar. All these countries were subjected to Tsarist and Soviet rule and the 
hardships and repression that came with those periods. Each country witnessed a 
massive influx of ethnic Russians and endured the concomitant Russification 
process in all aspects of life. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, ethnic 
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Russians comprised at least 20% of the population of each country. Yet, despite 
these commonalities, there was not a universal response during their state building 
and nationalizing process in the aftermath of the Soviet Union. In other words, even 
though citizens in each republic faced similar experiences, the consequences of 
those experiences with regard to the construction of a national identity in Kazakstan 
and Uzbekistan were not the same.264  Forced Russification, purges, denial of 
human rights, and complete subservience to Moscow in practically all spheres of 
life mark the histories of Uzbekistan and Kazakstan. However, not everyone 
developed a completely negative view of Soviet life or Russians as a result of the 
Soviet experience. For instance, Soviet development practices did little to influence 
the identity of Uzbeks or their language and culture. On the other hand, in 
Kazakstan, Soviet development had substantial influences on the language and 
lifestyle of the Kazaks. As a result, considerable numbers of Kazaks, especially in 
urban areas, do not have negative view of Soviet life or Russian.265 Naturally, such 
differences between Uzbekistan and Kazakstan had an impact on the Korean and 
Ahıska Turkish diasporas’ life and attitude, as well. Particularly, such different 
identity formation by the two titulars was more critical to the Korean diasporas, 
                                                 
264 In general, demographic, cultural and developmental (i.e. agricultural or industrial) differences have made 
dissimilar patterns in forging national identity amongst titular republics.  
265 Also, the sizeable number of Russian as a dominant ethnic group in northern Kazakstan should be 
considered. 
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since their identity and lifestyle were heavily Russified. 
Virtually, all post-Soviet states are nationalizing states, institutionally 
geared to function as the states of and for the particular ethno-cultural nations, 
based on claims of an exclusive ownership of their land, but incomplete and 
insufficiently national in a substantive sense.266 And many Kazak and Uzbek 
leaders see their nations not as vibrant, prosperous, and cohesive ethno-cultural 
communities, capable of integrating and assimilating their various national 
minorities, but as threatened cultures and languages, which had been marginalized 
in their own historical homelands by the demographic and economic might of the 
dominant nations (Russians and the Russophone population). Thus, the recently 
acquired sovereign statehood offers them a legal framework and an organizational 
tool for executing remedial political actions and erecting safe havens for their 
indigenous cultures and languages as well as redressing their historical injustices.267  
After independence, neither Kazakstan nor Uzbekistan sought to emulate the West 
European assimilationist nation-state models, or replicate the ‘unity in diversity’ 
experience of numerous postcolonial countries of Asia and Africa. Instead they have 
inherited a deeply institutionalized national conception, awaiting its fruition by 
                                                 
266 Rogers Brubaker, “Nationalizing States in the Old and the New,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol.19, no.2 
(1996), pp. 411-412. 
267 Ibid. p. 410. 
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forging de facto hegemony of the titular nation within its domain. National 
statehood was seen primarily as an apotheosis of national idea, as a legitimate 
means of countering the political and cultural hegemony of the formerly dominant 
nation (e.g. Russian).268 In this sense, the Korean diaspora felt that their status and 
life were more threatened in the titular states. They were not the formerly dominant 
nation but they were embedded inside the dominant culture and society, 
participating more actively than any other ethnic diasporas.  
The process of ethnic identity revival in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan or 
‘Kazakization’ and ‘Uzbekization’, as I intend to examine here, encompasses 
elements of ethnic, ethno-social, racial, and national consciousness renewal and 
their relationship to nationalism. As a result, Kazakization and Uzbekization may be 
defined as an ethnic revival of nationalism; a forceful movement towards 
reestablishing communal ties. Another point to be underlined is that Kazakization or 
Uzbekization are not just a matter of purging Russianness but also about replacing 
certain aspects with reinvented (or retrieved) Kazakness or Uzbekness. In this 
context, such nationalizing processes of the titulars (namely Kazakization and 
Uzbekization) are not irrelevant issues for the Korean and Ahıska Turkish diasporas.  
                                                 
268 Rogers Brubaker, “Nationhood and the National Question in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Eurasia: An 
Institutionalist Account,” Theory and Society, vol.23. no.1 (1994), p.63. 
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To understand the current socio-political environments of the Korean and Ahıska 
Turkish diaspora, better comprehension of the nationalizing tendency of Kazakstan 
and Uzbekistan is necessary. Accordingly, this chapter will discuss the titulars’ 
(Uzbeks’ and Kazaks’) social, demographic and political forces both inducing and 
constraining the nationalization process. Indeed, it will also examine specific 
nation-building practices as well as the implications that follow for the Korean and 
Ahıska Turkish diasporas in the region.  In order to understand the current 
nationalizing state-building process better this chapter will take an overview of the 
historical indigenization process in Kazaktan and Uzbekitan, initially. By doing so, I 
will present the post-Soviet nationalism in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan not as a break 
with Soviet tradition, but more or less as an unconscious continuation of Soviet 
habits towards the national question. 
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IV.1. A Historical overview of the indigenization process in Kazakstan and 
Uzbekistan 
 
 
Central Asia, which includes Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, was a complicated 
web of overlapping cultural, clan, regional and linguistic affiliations during the 20th 
century. A sense of national identity was rather shifting and contingent. 
Emphasizing the multiple and layered nature of identities among inhabitants of 
Central Asia, the Russian-German historian Barthold noted: “When you ask a 
Turkestani (Central Asian) what is his identity, he will answer that he is, first of all a 
Muslim, then inhabitant of such and such a city or village; or if he is nomad, a 
member of such and such a tribe….a Mangyt, Yomud or a Nayman.”269 Bennigsen 
formulated his well-known three-layered classification of identities among the 
Central Asian Muslims on the basis of Barthold’s observations on the layers of 
identities. Bennigsen identified these three layers as: supranational (Islam), national, 
and clan-based local identities. He believed that the Islamic identity, defined 
through membership in the Umma, was the most powerful one and formed a 
cementing force in cooping the various local and regional affiliations.270 However, 
he did not see ‘national’ identities as capable of gaining a precedence over the supra 
                                                 
269 Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, “From Tribe to Umma,” Central Asian Survey, vol.3, no.3 (1984), p.19. 
270 Alexandre Bennigsen, “Several Nations or One People? Ethnic Consciousness among Central Asians,” 
Survey, vol.24. no.3 (1979), pp.52-53. 
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ethnic unity symbolized by Islam. Bennigsen’s classification is a static scheme, 
guided by assumptions that national identities among Central Asians will remain 
subordinated to the competing claims of memberships into local communities and 
the Umma. In fact Islam was far from a homogeneous cultural force. Islam was 
more widespread among Kazaks in the southern regions who embraced a settled 
agrarian mode of life over the course of eighteenth-nineteenth centuries. The 
religious practices of southern Kazaks do not significantly differ from the Uzbeks, 
as they both differ from the Kazaks in the northern and eastern regions.   
Rakowska-Harmstone claims that “Islam was an integral component in the 
process of formation of national identity,” thus suggesting that a sense of 
belongingness to the Islamic communities was the dominant affiliation for the 
people in the region.271 Karpat subscribes to a similar view by claiming that “the 
Central Asian Muslims had acquired a broad and dynamic new identity that was 
Turkic in its tribal-ethnic-linguistic dimensions and Muslim in its political and 
cultural-religious aspects.” 272  Although such explanations were not mistaken, 
however, these representations of homogenized Islamic tradition have similarly 
undermined the hold of other religious traditions, such as animist, shamanist and 
                                                 
271 Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, “Islam and Nationalism in Central Asia,” Central Asian Survey, vol.2. no.2 
(1983), pp.10-13. 
272 Kemal Karpat, “Elites and Transmission of Nationality and Identity,” Central Asian Survey, vol.5, no.3 
(1986), p.5. 
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Sufism on the steppes. Underneath its apparent cultural and religious homogeneity, 
Central Asia was an ethnically and culturally segmented entity that lacked a 
political or spiritual center.  Affiliation based on region, clan, and kinship ties 
often undercut the projected religious commonality. We shouldn’t subsume the 
histories and cultural practices of nomadic people such as Kazak and Kyrgyz under 
those of settled Muslim communities in Turkestan.  Although the Soviets created 
artificial and a historical national-territorial units by pitting one group against 
another in order to prevent the emergence of a Greater Turkestan, we shouldn’t 
ignore the significant internal, cultural and linguistic differences that had already 
existed among groups believed to be closely related. As Henze argued, the Soviets 
exaggerated the regional variations in spelling, grammar, and vocabularies of these 
Turkic languages in order to set them as far apart as possible and thwart the rise of a 
Turkic lingua franca.273 
At all events, Islam, though much denigrated during the Soviet period, 
remained a key attribute of group identity among Kazaks and Uzbeks as well as 
other Central Asians. Even for the Kazaks who lacked key elements of other Islamic 
societies such as an indigenous philosophical school or center of learning, the 
                                                 
273 Paul B. Henze, “Politics and Alphabets in Inner Asia,” in Joshua A. Fishman (ed.), Advances in the Creation 
and Revision of writing system (The Hague: Mouton, 1977), pp.371-420. 
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Islamic heritage had always remained as a reminder to Kazaks that they were 
different from the Slavs, and is currently being carefully tapped by the government 
of independent Kazakstan in its efforts to put together a viable Kazak national 
history and identity.  Accordingly, Crowe links efforts by Kazaks to explore their 
Islamic connections as a search for a significant heritage beyond the era of Russian 
domination.274 Although the Soviets drove many Muslims underground after the 
Russian revolution and destroyed Central Asia’s Jadidist modernizers,275 Islam, like 
nationalism, was eventually tolerated in closely regulated form in order to channel 
religious sentiment in harmless directions. The Soviets decided ‘popular Islam’ 
which involved both pagan and Islamic rituals of birth, coming of age, marriage and 
death, was not a direct political threat, and representatives of ‘official Islam’ (e.g. 
Mullahs and Mosques)276 were duly registered and closely watched by the central 
government.277 Today in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan, Islam continues to be divided 
between unofficial and official representatives of the religion. Even such limited 
                                                 
274 David M. Crowe, “The Kazakhs and the Kazakhstan: The Struggle for Ethnic Identity and Nationhood,” 
Nationalities Paper, vol.26, no.3 (1998), p.398. 
275 The Jadids, or Islamic modernists, became a powerful intellectual force in the southern part of Russian 
Empire during the waning days of Tsardom. Youthful and possessing European-style education, they hoped to 
meld Koranic law with Western know-how in order to strengthen the standing of their peoples in the Empire. 
The first Jadid schools were founded by wealthy Tatars of the Volga valley, and by the early 20th century such 
institutions activated in the Crimea, Azerbaijan, Turkestan and even the Kazak steppes. 
276 In the case of Kazakstan, according to Akiner the traditional Kazak way of life prevented the spread of 
mosque-based Islam. 
277 Geoffrey J. Jukes, Kirill Nourzhanov, Mikhail Alexandrov, “Race, Religion, Ethnicity and Economics in 
Central Asia,” in Kolchi Inoue and Tomohiko Uyama (eds.), Quest for Models of Coexistence: National and 
Ethnic dimensions of Changes in the Slavic Eurasian World (Sapporo, Japan: Slavic Research Center, 
Hokkaido University, 1998), pp. 264-266. 
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parameters of Soviet acceptance, however, helped Islam, like national sentiment, to 
survive until the Brezhnev era, when tacit agreement between the government and 
citizens divided the public and private realms, allowing religion to be recognized as 
an integral element of private life.278 As a result, an ethno-cultural mentality based 
on traditional partrimonialism, popular Islam and regionalism survived in 
Kazakstan and Uzbekistan. Islam represented a distinction between Russian and 
Central Asian (e.g. Kazak and Uzbek) and it is viewed as the central and most basic 
component of Kazak and Uzbek national identity. In other words, Islam has the 
potential to be the foremost identity factor for the Kazaks and Uzbeks. 
In addition, the Kazaks and Uzbeks were not simply passive recipients of 
Russian or Soviet culture, but were shaping it according to their own cultural 
predilections.279 Thus, even though many young urbanites in the Kazak SSR may 
have dressed and talked like Russians in order to fit into Soviet society and get 
ahead in life, they still viewed Russians through the prism of a distinctly Kazak 
mindset, retaining important elements of their native culture such as eating habits, 
burial practices, and an ingrained respect for elders. 280  Commenting on this 
                                                 
278 Ibid, 264. 
279 Perhaps this is the crucial factor that differentiates them from Korean diasporas. Their strong religious belief 
(Islam) and cultural heritage played as a barrier role for intervening Russian and Soviet culture and language to 
them. While the Korean diaspora did not have strong psychological or spiritual prop to protect their own 
language and culture. 
280 Shirin Akiner, The Formation of Kazakh Identity (Washington D.C.: Brooking Inst. Press, 1995), pp. 52-53. 
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phenomenon in the late 1980s, Edward Allworth observes: “The evidence shows 
that indigenous peoples of the Central Asia retain a strong sense of self,” and further 
notes that connections with Russian culture and Soviet Russian institutions “seem 
formal, accepted by habit or necessity, but relatively unintegrated into the group 
identity of Central Asians.”281 Perhaps, we can say that the Central Asians learnt 
Russian only for strategic gains and mobility purposes, preserving their ascribed 
ethnic identities by preventing Russians from assuming a dominant role in social 
networks and family settings. At the same time, speaking Russian as a first language 
did not mean a renunciation of their ethno-linguistic identity. 
Moreover, as potent as Russian culture was in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, it 
was largely limited by an urban-rural divide. Russian only predominated in the 
larger cities such as Almaty and Tashkent. Russians seldom settled outside the cities, 
did not bother to learn the local language, and were not well represented in the 
republican political apparatus. Thus, because Russian settlers behaved like 
transients, Kazak and Uzbek apparatchiks were able to consolidate their power in 
the kolkhozes and village soviets.282 Consequently, in the countryside the titular 
(Kazak and Uzbek) language and culture remained strong and perhaps, more pure. 
                                                 
281 Edward Allworth, “The New Central Asians,” in Edward Allworth (ed.), Central Asia: 130 years of Russian 
Dominance, A Historical Review (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), p. 571. 
282 Olivier Roy, The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations (New York: New York University Press, 2000), 
pp.105-107. 
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As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, the present-day nationalist 
governmental politics in ex-Soviet Kazakstan and Uzbekistan have not witnessed 
substantial changes in paradigms. They continue to follow the former Soviet 
nationalism structurally.283  Roger Brubaker sees the Soviet legacy in Kazakstan 
and Uzbekistan as providing infrastructure, by its very contradictory nature.284 The 
Soviet state not only passively tolerated, but also actively institutionalized, the 
existence of multiple nations and nationalities as constitutive elements of the sate 
and citizenry. It codified nationhood and nationality as fundamental social 
categories sharply distinct from statehood and citizenship. 285  This 
institutionalization of nationality by the Soviet state endorsed two conflicting, if not 
incompatible, notions of nationality: territorial-political (e.g. each nationality has its 
own republic), and ethno-cultural in which inscriptive ethnic affiliation (e.g. 
passport nationality) transcended the territorial one. For instance, a Georgian 
residing in Kazakstan remained national wise a Georgian, whether he had family 
ties with Georgia or not. Likewise, all Koreans remained as Koreans in Kazakstan 
and Uzbekistan. Consequently, nationality and nationhood were codified as 
                                                 
283 Berg Fragner, “Soviet Nationalism: An ideological legacy to the independent Republics of Central Asia,” in 
Willem van Shendel and Erik Zürcher (eds.), Identity Politics in Central Asia and the Muslim world (London: 
I.B. Tauris Publisher, 2001), p. 23. 
284 Rogers Brubaker, “Nationhood and the National Question in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Eurasia: An 
Institutionalist Account,” Theory and Society, vol.23. no.1 (1994), p.49. 
285 Ibid. 
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fundamental social categories, which prevailed at the sub-state (national republics), 
not at state level, as sharply distinct from statehood and citizenship. This dual and 
mutually conflicting institutionalization of territorial-political and ethno-cultural 
definitions of nation at the national republic level has generated conflicting 
expectations of belonging among national minorities residing in the incipient states. 
This explains why ‘ethnic’ rather than ‘civic’ elements prevail in state-building 
processes.  It has caused a pervasive tension in the post-Soviet sphere between the 
titular nation-state and national minorities belonging to the external homeland states. 
This tension has replicated itself in all the new states in a triangular relation among 
the titular nations (nominally state-bearing nation), the national minorities (or 
diasporas) and the external homelands of these minorities.286 To be sure, this kind 
of institutionalized pattern on inter-ethnic conflict is offering a comparative 
framework to the study of pattern of ethnic migration and problems of integration of 
minorities. 
Thus, so-called Soviet nationalism depended on nation-building through 
territorial demarcation by the center in Moscow.287  Soviet-style manipulative 
nationalism gave titular national leaders in the republics a whole range of 
                                                 
286 Ibid, p.64.  
287 Willem van Schendel and Erik Zürcher, “Opting out, opting in, exclusion and assimilation: States and 
nations in the Twentieth century,” in Willem van Shendel and Erik Zürcher (eds.), Identity Politics in Central 
Asia and the Muslim world (London: I.B. Tauris Publisher, 2001), p. 3. 
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opportunities to build national subsystems, as long as they remained loyal to the 
center. In Fragner’s view, this fact explains why the Soviet leaderships in Central 
Asia have been able to hang on to power and make such smooth transitions to 
national leaderships.288 
It is true that, from Stalin onwards, authentic expression of separate ethnic 
identities were suppressed, but at the same time, the Soviet regime promoted its 
own brand of nationalism through the manipulation of history, language and culture 
and through the strengthening of territorial national identities. The Soviet political 
leadership, starting with Stalin in his role as commissar for nationalities, developed 
a model of nationalism which owed little or nothing to Marxist thinking.289 Not 
only did the Soviets accept nationalism as a given entity in contemporary history, 
but they consciously promoted their own brand of nationalism, while at the same 
time fighting pre-existing or autonomous nationalisms. The greater breathing space 
granted to local party elites under Khruschev and Brezhnev gave the local leaders 
the opportunity to forge ties with their own populations through the use of ethnic 
symbols and patronage.290 Hence, we can argue that the Soviet regime created 
favorable circumstances for the growth of nationalism itself.  
                                                 
288 Berg Fragner, pp. 14, 23. 
289 Ibid, pp. 14-20.  
290 Willem van Schendel and Erik Zürcher, p.3. 
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Another reason why we should look at a historical overview of 
indigenization process in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan is that many characteristics of 
the Soviet system still exist in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan’s elite behavior. Political 
resources are still concentrated at top in the position of the president. Enhancing 
presidential powers through constitutional change and the avoidance of popular 
elections have secured the president’s position as the major power holder. There is 
no dispersal of political power from the central authorities to outside groups. And 
opposition, if not prohibited, is strictly monitored by the central authorities. It is 
then the president who is guiding the transition in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, and 
who will decide the outcome.  The socialist state’s monopoly over employment 
had assured a smooth implementation of korenizatsiia type of preferential measures 
in the post-Soviet era.  According to this measure, appointments were often made 
on criteria such as party membership, class background, political reliability, clan 
networks, and most importantly, blat 291  rather than merit or professional 
qualification alone. In the absence of an independent career civil service, or a 
formal separation between politicians and the administrators, the bureaucracy today 
continues to remain very much dependent on state patronage, which allows for 
                                                 
291 Blat (Russian: блат) is a term which appeared in the Soviet Union to denote the use of informal agreements, 
Party contacts, or black market deals to achieve results or get ahead. 
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sudden change in personnel when new groups come to dominate the state. Presently, 
the entire cadre system is in a state of flux. There are few institutional or legal 
obstacles to creating a titular-dominated bureaucracy, given the ease with which the 
nationalizing state can hire and fire. The post-Soviet states lack a career civil 
service, and the existing bureaucracy has little capacity for organized resistance. 
There is no longer a compelling external pressure to maintain an artificial ethnic 
balance under the guise of ‘internationalism’ as in the Soviet era, although the states 
continue to celebrate their multiethnicity in a ritualistic manner. As a result, right 
after the independence of the titular states, a bureaucracy with a titular face was 
regarded as a favorable step toward creating a nationalizing regime. 
Numerous works in the Post-Soviet literature on nationalities recognize 
how the administrative-territorial arrangements instituted by early the Soviet regime 
have subsequently reinforced exclusive claims of nationalities to their designated 
domains. Supported by Bolshevik cultural-linguistic policies of nation-building, this 
territorial demarcation for the first time, carved out distinct national territories in 
Central Asia. Despite their multi-ethnic composition, each Soviet republic was 
structured as a unit belonging to the titular nationality, containing within it the next 
lower level of ethnic hierarchy, placed in a segmented arrangement like the 
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matrioshka dolls.292 The organization of its diverse multi-ethnic domain into an 
exhaustive and mutually exclusive set of national groups, in which each group was 
endowed with its own distinct territory, language, intelligentsia, music, theater, 
press, schools, academies of science, flags, emblems and numerous other national-
cultural attributes, was to serve as the solution to the national question that has 
perennially afflicted multinational states. 
After the death of Stalin, the Central Asian natives began to occupy 
representative levels in the republican hierarchies. Under Khrushchev the policy of 
partially korenizatsiia was restored, and throughout the Soviet Union, local elites 
began to fill the ranks of party and state apparatus. Under Brezhnev, korenizatsiia 
was firmly established as the modus operandi of Soviet nationalities policy; where 
local elites were not sufficient in number to meet the needs of the state, there were 
affirmative action policies to move them up through higher education and 
training.293 Together with this korenizatsiia policy, the Soviets initiated a number of 
nation-building measures. In fact, nation-building was part of a dialectical policy 
towards the development of socialism.  It was argued that ultimately national 
distinctions would vanish, but the Soviet leadership also acknowledged that the 
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message of socialism would be better received through national channels. Thus 
began the policy of equality, wherein national sentiments would be ameliorated 
where they were inflamed.  Or, on the other hand, nations would be built up to a 
modern level from which they could then make the transition to national 
socialism.294 
The Soviet state assured preferential access to the titular nationality within 
its territories, while ensuring some form of proportional representation of other non-
titular groups. The structure of titular preferences, initially implemented through 
Korenizatsiia continued subsequently in less overt forms and coexisted with a 
formal maintenance of its multiethnic form, or ‘internationalism.’  However, it 
contributed to the indigenization of local political leadership and to the growth or 
consolidation of an indigenous intelligentsia through preferential access to higher 
education and to membership in the local communist party.  Under this sort of 
union republic status, each of the Central Asian ethno-republics was provided with a 
degree of institutional protection that enabled their native languages and cultures to 
flourish. By federalizing ethnic homelands into ethno-republics, the Soviet state 
actually created nations, like Kazakstan, whose sense of nation-ness had previously 
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barely existed.295 Moreover, this form of nation-building also encouraged ethno-
republic nation-builders to think of the ethno-republic as the identity-marker of their 
homeplace.296 On the other hand, the idea of the Russian Federation was not taken 
seriously by Russians or non-Russians as the Russian nation-state or the national 
homeland of the Russian people.297 Like other non-titular nationalities, they were 
encouraged to think of the Soviet State as their homeland (sovetskaia rodina) and to 
believe that what was central to their national sense was what Khrushchev, in the 
late 1950s, had first referred to as the emergence of a new Soviet community, that of 
the Soviet people (sovetskii narod).298  Titular preferences and a commitment to 
internationalism did not initially jeopardize the special, hegemonic status of 
Russians, however they laid the important groundwork for the indigenization 
process in titular republics and later for their independence.  In sum, as ethno-
national communities, the Soviet republics defied the notion that every nation 
strives to get its own state, and were in fact premised upon a denial of craving for 
statehood. Yet with the Soviet collapse, statehood was automatically conferred upon 
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these titular republics. 
During the 1960s and 1970s the indigenous peoples of Uzbekistan and 
Kazakstan made a resounding cultural and demographic comeback, and, in so doing, 
made a glaring mockery of Soviet nationalities policy. Due to revival of Muslim 
influence and more modern healthcare, the birthrate of the Uzbek and the Kazak 
populations began to outstrip that of Russians. Thus, after 1960 the Russian 
nationality’s share of the regional population began to decline.299 During the 1970s 
and 1980s, the Uzbek and Kazak population grew three to four times as fast as the 
ethnic Russian population, despite countermeasures by Moscow such as the 
introduction of sex education, a propaganda campaign to reduce family size, and 
wider availability of contraceptives.300  Moreover, beginning in the 1960s several 
strong republican leaders were able to circumvent the parallel Russian-dominated 
bureaucracy that had existed in the region since the days of Stalin, and build their 
own patronage networks.301 
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Table XII 
Native Occupancy of Leading positions by National Republics, 1955-1972 
(Percentage) 
Position Kazakstan Uzbekistan 
CC Secretariat 29.5 59.3 
First Secretary 33 100 
Organizational Secretary (=2nd Secretary) 0 0 
Party-State Control Secretary 0 100 
Chair Culture 100 100 
Chair Art & Science (Academy of 
Science) 
100 (100) 100 (100) 
Chair Trade Union council 100 100 
Komsomol 1st Secretary 67 100 
Presidium Council of Ministers 48.8 82.2 
Minister of Agriculture 25 83  
Minister of Education  100 100 
Minister of Foreign Affairs  100 80 
Minister of State Control  33 100 
Minister of Construction  0 80 
Chairman of Sovnarkhoz 50 33 
Source: Grey Hodnett, Leadership in the Soviet National Republics: A Quantitative 
Study of Recruitment Policy (Ontario: Mosaic Press, 1978), pp.101-103. 
* Native population as % of total Republic population in 1960 was: Kazaktan-30% 
and Uzbekistan 60.1% 
 
According to Allworth, it had been customary since the time of Stalin for 
Moscow to keep Slavs and the other non-Central Asians in Party positions that 
really counted, while relegating natives to “superficially prestigious token 
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positions.” 302  However, after the 1960s, Central Asian leaders were able to 
domesticate the party leadership in their respective republics by taking advantage of 
the “flexibility in human personalities” (as opposed to the more ideological rigid 
party control system).303 The non-natives cooperated because their “perks” allowed 
them to live much better than in the more ideologically restrictive RSFSR, thus 
allowing native leaders “unusual latitude” in unofficial decision making. 304 
Accordingly, as mentioned earlier, such indigenous leaders flourished during the 
corruption of the Brezhnev era, when the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
(CPSU) finally compromised with the nationalities by tolerating the entrenchment 
of local satrapies so long as republican leaders remained outwardly subservient to 
Moscow.305 This de facto political independence, coupled with the great increase in 
the native educated population that had taken place in recent years, helped to 
strengthen Kazak and Uzbek self-awareness, and promised enhanced career 
opportunities for young Uzbeks and Kazaks.306  
By the end of the Brezhnev era some titular nationalities were slightly 
over-represented in party membership. For instance, in the 1930s, Uzbeks made up 
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76 percent of the Party; by 1934 this number dropped to 64 percent.  By 1939 the 
total fell to 47 percent and reached a lowest point of 34 percent during World War II.  
After the war it rebounded, but remained at 47 percent until 1955. Thereafter the 
percentage of Uzbeks in the Party steadily increased; by 1960 Uzbeks made up 51 
percent, and in 1981 they comprised 61 percent of Communist Party members.307 
By the end of the 1980s, Uzbek reprsentation in the Party made up some 71.4 
percent of the total, while Russians accounted for only 8.3 percent.308 Consequently, 
by the 1980s, which means before the independence, Uzbek political elites occupied 
many high-profile positions in Party and state organs, though Slavs dominated 
certain strategic sectors.  The latter, however, did not rule their Uzbek comrades, 
rather they themselves had been absorbed into local networks of power and 
influence. 
During the beginning of the 1980s, when Yurii Andropov came to power, 
he tried to re-centralize the Soviet Union in the name of fighting corruption. Many 
Central Asians felt that although Andropov’s crusade was union-wide, they came to 
feel they were being unfairly singled out. Andropov’s policy directly threatened the 
Brezhnev-era republican leadership, or status quo. 309  According to Zemtsov, 
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Andropov tried to roll back the clock by replacing the term “national republic” with 
“union republic,” but either was unsuccessful in his attempt or simply did not live 
long enough to enforce his new policies.310 Unfortunately, for Andropov and his 
protégé Gorbachev, Central Asians viewed both the anticorruption drive and 
perestroika as a means by which the central government was attempting to re-
impose both Russian culture and political domination on their own republics.311 It 
was too late to roll back the clock and impose centralized authority to titular 
republics.  
Despite these common developments, Kazakstan and Uzbekistan did not 
act in the same way.  As mentioned earlier, there was not a universal response to 
relations with Russia in the aftermath of the Soviet Union.  Not everyone 
developed a totally negative view of Soviet life or Russians as a result of the Soviet 
experience.  National identity in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan were not developed in 
the same way.  In the case of Kazakstan, seventy plus years of Moscow’s policy of 
Russification did not turn everyone into anti-Russian nationalist. Many political 
elites and large segments of society in Kazakstan did not possess a clear-cut 
national identity in which Russia was a threat or an enemy. However, political 
                                                 
310 Ilya Zemtsov, “Andropov and the Non-Russian Nationalities: Attitudes and Policies,” Nationalities Paper, 
vol. 8, no.5 (1985), pp.5-23. 
311 Olivier Roy, The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations (New York: New York University Press, 2000), 
pp.128-129. 
 161
leaders in Uzbekistan did possess and aggrandize a national identity that viewed 
Russia as a significant threat to the Uzbek nation and state.  
One of the important reasons for this is that these Central Asian republics 
experienced very different regional relationships with Moscow. In Kazakstan, 
Moscow pursued, more or less, policies of industrialization and urbanization, while 
in Uzbekistan they developed a monocultural agriculture economy. These two 
patterns left the regions with different structural characteristics (demographic 
structures, elite organizations and institutions).  Under the direction of Moscow, 
Uzbekistan was essentially turned into a cotton colony. The vast majority of arable 
land had been devoted to the production of “white gold,” cotton. However, most of 
the cotton produced in the region was exported in raw form to Russia, mostly to the 
textile town of Ivanova, where it is manufactured into cloth.312  Many Uzbeks 
were left in rural areas employed with agriculture activities. There was only a small 
portion of Uzbek bureaucrats and industrial workers residing in cities. Only a small 
portion of the textile industries were opened in Central Asian cities, generally in 
Alma Ata, Tashkent, and Samarkand. Needless to say, these cities were occupied by 
Slavs, especially Russians. Central Asians, relatively more Uzbeks than Kazaks, did 
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not flock to the cities to work, and certainly not to the factories of Russia, nor even 
to the factories in Tashkent. The industrial labor force there continued to be 
predominantly Slavic (generally Russian). 313  Thus, the industrial northern 
Kazakstan region had to face a great influx of Russians who came to out-number 
natives in major cities. Unlike northern Kazakstan, where the entire region was 
inundated by Russians, large geographic regions in Uzbekistan, including bordering 
southern Kazakstan region, were not Russified. Instead, Russians migrating to 
Uzbekistan overwhelmingly settled in cities.314 These urbanized Russians never 
perceived Central Asia as their homeland. They were tied more closely to Russia 
and especially Moscow than to the Central Asian countryside which surrounded 
them. On the other hand, the Uzbeks remained primarily in rural areas. 
Such patterns of Soviet-era development and industrial progress have 
transformed the Kazak nomads into one of the most modernized and Russified 
people among the Soviet Muslims. Over 95 percent of all Kazaks are bilingual with 
reasonable proficiency in Russian.315 According to the 1989 census, about 65 
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percent Kazaks claimed fluency in Russian as a second language, which denotes the 
highest degree of proficiency in Russian claimed by a Turkic-speaking 
nationality.316 Table XIII indicates that rates of Russian fluency of the Kazaks are 
almost near with Slavic Ukrainian. 
 
Table XIII 
Russian Language Fluency Among the Titular Nationality in their own Republic, 
1989 
(Figures in parenthesis refer to 1979 levels) 
Nationality Total Urban Rural Capital 
Ukrainian 71.1 (59.6) 81.8 (62.8) 56.4 (54.4) 89.2 (67.9) 
Kazak 64.2 (62.8) 77.8 (75.3) 55.7 (51.1) 90.7 (86.3) 
Uzbek 22.7 (22.3) 43.2 (42.0) 13.7 (13.6) 64.3 (62.4) 
Azerbaijani 32.1 (31.7) 45.8 (45.1) 18.2 (18.1) 64.8 (62.9) 
Turkmen 28.2 (27.5) 43.2 (47.4) 13.7 (17.4) 60.2 (56.4) 
Kyrgyz 37.2 (36.9) 67.1 (66.1) 29.9 (28.8) 85.4 (83.4) 
Source: Mikhail N. Guboglo, “Demography and Language in the Capitals of the 
Union Republics,” Journal of Soviet Nationalities, vol.1, no.4 (1990), pp.5-6.  
 
First hand observation of the linguistic behavior in Almaty and Tashkent 
reveals a significantly higher native language use among Uzbeks and also sporadic 
efforts by Russians to converse in Uzbek through code-mixing, which is totally 
absent among Russians in Almaty. When a group of Kazak language activists 
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complained that very little was done to implement Kazak as state language, 
Nazarbayev claimed, “Almaty is not Tashkent, it is not Baku, or is it Ashgabat,” 
implying that the difference in native language use between these three cities and 
Almaty is too obvious to ignore.317 If I ask Kazaks, why Russian is more rampant 
in Kazakstan, especially in its urban areas, than in other Central Asian regions, 
despite the common Turkic linguistic roots of the Central Asian language, their 
initial responses to this question were: “We weren’t allowed to speak our own 
language,” “Russians ruled Kazakstan whereas the Uzbeks had their own rulers,” 
and so on. More detailed conversations with people revealed ethnic stereotypes, 
characterizations of self and other, which added a greater complexity to these 
assertions.318 According to a popular Uzbek saying, “If you want to become a 
Russian, first become a Kazak.” Kazaks refer to their inherent “national” traits such 
as “pliability” and “adaptation” to the surrounding environment. One frequently 
hears the following analogy used by Kazaks: “When you find one Russian in a 
company of ten Uzbeks, he will have to either speak Uzbek, or remain quiet. But as 
                                                 
317 Bhavna Dave, “National Revival in Kazakstan: Language Shift and Identity Change,” Post-Soviet Affairs, 
vol.12, no.1 (1996), p. 55.; It was estimated that over forty percent of Kazaks do not have an adequate 
command over their own language, and about three fourths of the Kazak urban dwellers do not actively use 
their native language in daily interactions. (see Kazakhstanskaia Pravda, 20.August, 1992) 
318 Even during the field visits in 2003, my attempt to converse with Kazaks in Almaty in Kazak almost 
invariably resulted in the conversation sliding into Russian. Resulting in a Russified identity, urban Kazaks were 
more likely to prefer a Russian-speaking environment to a Kazak-speaking one. On the other hand, Uzbeks 
favored a Uzbek-speaking environment over a Russian-speaking one. Even though my Uzbek was not 
sufficient I always could finish up my conversation in Uzbek with locals in Tashkent. 
 165
soon as one Russian enters a room full of Kazaks, they will switch to Russian 
instantaneously.” Statements such as “we learnt Russian so well that we forget our 
own language in turn,” “they exploited our traditional hospitality and openness to 
other cultures, pushing us out of our niche,” “as nomads, our genes have been 
geared toward adaptation to given ecology, rather than resisting or changing it,” 
abound in popular discourse. Nowadays, inducing many Kazaks to refrain from 
code-switching in favor of Russian seems to be intensifying a resistance to Russian 
(people, language, culture).  In contrast, few Russians found it surprising or 
anomalous that Uzbeks continue using native language in their presence. It is, 
perhaps, no surprise that Kazakstan was acclaimed as the most “international” 
Soviet republic and hailed by Khrushchev as “a planet of hundred nationalities and 
languages,” and a “laboratory of international friendship.” 
Such a different socio-cultural setting and historical development between 
Kazakstan and Uzbekistan has resulted in distinct nationalizing processes after their 
independence. In addition, this has affected the ethnic minorities or diasporas in 
each republic. We shouldn’t neglect the fact that the Korean and Ahıska Turkish 
diasporas’ status and life patterns were influenced by the different developments 
and settings.  
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IV.2.  States building and Nationalizing process in the Post-Soviet context and 
its implication to the Korean and Ahıska Turkish Diasporas 
 
As seen in the previous section, the nationalizing regimes that constitute 
Uzbekistan and Kazakstan have been informed and structured by the shared legacy 
of the Soviet rule. The Soviet past and its consequences raised questions for 
Kazakstan and Uzbekistan about identity, about identical and different culture and 
about the boundaries between peoples. Three perspectives on this discussion should 
be considered: de-Sovietization, the reinventing of boundaries and cultural 
standardization. De-Sovietization refers to the way in which nationalizing political 
elites have been keen on remove the symbols, political institutions, and 
representatives of Soviet power from the social and political landscape and to 
replace them with new national symbols, political institutions and social practices. 
It has served as an instrument for privileging certain members of the nationalizing 
state in which the utilization of ethnic codes provides an important resource for 
indigenous social mobility and political status and position.319  In Kazakstan and 
Uzbekistan, for those political elites who have survived, the only way to remain in 
power has been to distance themselves from the previous regime by switching to 
employing ethnic codes.  To secure power, the key has been to outbid other 
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political rivals by deploying ethnic codes in order to secure the electoral support of 
the titular nation. 
As a result, the titular nationalist elites have attempted to restructure the 
national stratification systems in their homelands to secure the hegemony of the 
titular nation, which they view as its rightful position in its homeland. The titular 
nation’s perception of its status was more important than its actual economic, political, 
and socio-cultural status. Most titular nationalists are pursuing the objective of unitary 
nation states, even though the territories they claim contain multi-national populations. 
They assume that the new states must belong to the indigenous nationality of the region. 
The multiethnic legacy is regarded as an arbitrary and artificial product of the Soviet 
policies, although it continues to be highlighted and celebrated as a self-evident 
emblem of non-discrimination in official pronouncements. These nation-builders are 
also engaged in reinventing, defining, clarifying and homogenizing boundaries. Lastly, 
linguistic, cultural and educational standardization is held up as commensurate with the 
running of a more efficient titular space with the loyal citizenry. Many Uzbek and 
Kazak nationalists argue that they cannot expect patriotism from Russian and 
Russophone community. Thus, they say that there is only one option: the creation of the 
ethnocratic state dominated by the titular (Kazak or Uzbek) within the framework of a 
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multi-ethnic society of equal social-economic opportunities.320 In this circumstances, it is 
not difficult to image the constraints that the Korean and the Ahıska Turkish diaspora 
experienced right after the titulars’ independence. 
 
Demographic Trends  
The process of creating titular states in Central Asia is still young. 
Particularly during this developmental stage, the evolving relationship between 
members of the titular nations and the Russophone population is having an 
important impact on both the states developing political institutions and the nature 
of political discussion. In these circumstances, the very first catalyst of 
Kazakhization and Uzbekization occurred through demographic indigenization, 
when a considerably higher Kazak birthrate and net Russophone (of course, 
including Russians) out migration occurred.321 Actually, Kazakstan and Uzbekistan 
experienced a demographic shift in favor of the natives since the mid-1960s.322  
And this demographic indigenization has increased since 1989, with relatively high 
birthrates as the most important causal factor. As Kolstoe argues, demographics 
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could be the ultimate factor in ethnic superiority. Being predominantly a younger 
nation than the Russian, or other ethnic minorities, even the Kazaks who are in 
numerical inferiority in their republic will “win out without engaging the Russians 
(or other ethnic minorities) in direct confrontation, simply by biding their time. The 
ethnic battle, as it were, will be fought out in the bedchamber, where the Kazaks 
will inevitably be victorious.”323 As an example, in the early 1990s more than 80 
percent of all teenagers in the country were Kazaks.324 By January 1st 1995, Kazaks 
were 44 percent of the republic’s total population while the Russian share had 
decreased to 36 percent. It is anticipated that by 2015 Kazaks will make up more 
than 65 percent of the republic’s population.325 On the other hand, Uzbeks were 
already the majority of the population in their republic, constituting more than 71 
percent of the population. Accordingly, the recent trends, high birthrate of titular 
and out-migration of the Russophone (including Russian) population, will 
accelerate the demographic indigenization in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan. 
 Various pronouncements by Nazarbaev and Karimov and other leaders 
have made unequivocal references to Kazakstan and Uzbekistan as the historical 
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homeland of Kazaks and Uzbeks, punctuating these claims with the demonstration 
of pride in its multi-ethnicity. However, these laudatory references to its multi-
ethnicity by emphasizing a presence of over a hundred nationalities in the republics 
do not compromise the claims that Kazaks or Uzbeks are the only rightful ancestors 
of the land.  All other non-titular ethnic groups in popular discourse are varyingly 
categorized as representatives of numerous other nations or diasporas, even as they 
are broadly referred to as ‘Kazakstanis’ or ‘Uzbekistanis.’  What is more, in the 
case of Kazak nationalists, who believe they are demographically in an inferior 
situation in their own republic, believe that Kazakstan can become a genuinely 
multiethnic state only if the injustice to the indigenous Kazaks, whose plight they 
consider to be similar to the native Indians in North America, is rectified.326 In their 
view, the rights and interests of the indigenous Kazaks can be safeguarded only by 
according them both legal and constitutional protection, and a favorable social 
climate against more privileged settlers and members of numerous other ethnic 
diasporas who are generally regarded as more upwardly mobile and better-placed to 
adapt to the new market condition than the titular nation.327 On the other hand, 
unlike northern Kazakstan, where the entire region was flooded by Russians, large 
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regions in Uzbekistan were not Russified. Instead, Russians migrating to 
Uzbekistan overwhelmingly settled in cities. Indigenes remained in rural areas. 
The current occupational structure is very much in a state of flux due to an 
ongoing Russophone emigration. The Recruitment of Kazaks to these positions has 
steadily narrowed the gap. However, Kazak scholars and bureaucrats cite these data 
and similar figures to demonstrate the subordinate and underprivileged position of 
the natives in their own homeland and to urge more intense measures to rectify this 
imbalance. By pointing at their disadvantaged position on their own land, they 
repudiate the recurring charges of a discrimination of the Russophone population. 
Titular (Kazak and Uzbek) over-representation in higher education and 
political representation, and the dramatic shift during the 1990s toward higher 
titular (Kazak and Uzbek) participation in all sectors provided an added incentive 
for Russophone emigration.328 For instance, in Kazakstan by January 1st 1998, 
some 2.2 million people had left the country since independence.329 Therefore, 
Boris Giller and Viktor Shatskikh questioned the prevalent official view that the 
growing emigration of the Russophone population was motivated by economic 
reasons, or by a natural desire to be reunited with their co-ethnics in their historical 
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homelands. Instead, they alleged that a growing invisibility and voicelessness of the 
Russian speaking population in all spheres of life and their marginalization from the 
country’s politics have contributed to the widespread “suitcase fever” among 
them. 330  Another compelling reason for the emigration of the Russophone 
population from Kazakstan and Uzbekistan is the anxiety about the future of their 
children in the climate of an ongoing nationalization of the polity, especially the 
educational structure. Most Russian speakers, which include the Korean diaspora, 
also fear that their children may be deprived of fair access to the country’s 
educational institutes or the various scholarships to study abroad, as the local 
institutions making such recommendations tend to be biased against the non-
titulars.331  The pervasiveness of titular preferences in day-to-day matters and an 
absence of any countervailing mechanism of ensuring equality of access dissuade 
the non-titulars from hoping to get admission in the state-controlled institutions for 
admissions. Fewer and fewer Russian speakers are applying to these institutions, 
especially the agricultural institutes, humanities and social science divisions in the 
Academy of sciences and universities, which are perceived as having a titular 
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(Kazak or Uzbek) profile. 
Demographic indigenization is also enhanced by the return of titulars from 
the former union republics and from foreign states. Kazakstan is especially actively 
in promoting such a policy to overcome its demographic inferiority. Since its 
independence in 1991, Kazakstan began to attract and support ethnic Kazak 
immigration to Kazakstan from abroad. Some 4.5 million ethnic Kazaks live outside 
the republic and are spread mainly across China, Uzbekistan, Russia, Mongolia, 
Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Turkey. The Repatriation of Kazaks living abroad 
has been regarded as vital for the strengthening of the Kazak presence and 
advancing Kazakization across the country. The government allotted special funds 
and provided housing and employment to attract Kazak immigration.332 Official 
statistics indicate that, between 1991 and 1996, 154,941 ethnic Kazaks immigrated to 
Kazakstan: 84,828 (55 percent) from Russia, 65,126 (40 percent) from Mongolia, 4,617 
from Iran, and the remainder from China, Afghanistan or other countries.333 According 
to a recent official estimate, the number of repatriated Kazaks who immigrated to 
Kazakstan for permanent residence between 1991 and 2001 reached 500,000.334 Most 
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of these immigrants are being settled in northern Kazakstan a practice which the 
Russians perceived as a deliberate effort by the Kazak government to ‘Kazakize’ the 
population in the north.335 Moreover, the repatriated Kazaks are believed to be more 
nationalistic than those living in Kazakstan. In particular, those who came from non-
USSR countries such as China, Mongolia and Turkey are strongly bound to the Kazak 
language and traditions.336 It is no wonder that they were generally distributed in big 
cities with large Russian populations. The Kazak government deliberately used these 
incoming Kazaks as a means of Kazak nation building and to balance out the heavy 
Russian population.   
Such measures, along with a profound state of flux with an ongoing 
migration of Russohopone and influx of natives, are nationalizing the ethnic 
composition of the country, especially its cities. After the titular nation’s 
independence, demographic indigenization occurred not only in rural areas where 
indigenes were already dominant, but also in the previously Russified cities.  As a 
result of the emigration of the non-titular population, and increased mobility among 
rural natives moving to the cities, the Russophone cities of Kazakstan and 
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Uzbekistan are rapidly acquiring a native face. The departure of Russian speakers is 
seen by certain native strata as freeing up more jobs and causing a glut in the 
housing market. By current estimates, about 40-50 percent of Kazaks and 65-70 
percent of Uzbeks are urban residents.337 Regardless, it is obvious to Kazaks or 
Uzbeks that time and demography are ultimately on their side. No doubt, the 
Korean diasporas were more uncomfortable with the situation compared with the 
Ahıska Turks, since the majority of the former used to be the urbanites in the 
Russian dominated cities. 
 
Socio-cultural Kazakization/ Uzbekization  
After independence, Kazak and Uzbek political and cultural elites began to 
reverse the socio-cultural, and particularly linguistic, Russification that occurred 
during the Soviet era. Non-titulars were told not only to hire indigenous over non-
indigenes, but to study the titular languages (Kazak and Uzbek) or face 
unemployment.338 Naturally, for the Korean diaspora, who used to enjoy high 
social mobility with Russian language, it was a big challenge. Not surprisingly, the 
titular elites created under these conditions tended to be more nationalistic and 
                                                 
337 Conclusive data on the exact figure are unavailable. These estimates mentioned here are based on 
information provided in the press and during conversation with scholars. (2003, Almaty; 2005, Tashkent) 
338 Jeff Chinn and Robert Kaiser, Russian as the New Minority: Ethnicity and Nationalism in the Soviet 
Successor States (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), p. 216. 
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exclusionary than in the past. However, there were some differences between 
Kazakstan and Uzbekistan due to their demographic and historical dissimilarity. 
Uzbekistan has been the most overtly anti-Russian of the Central Asian states in its 
toponymic overhaul, attempting to eliminate that language from public view as 
much as possible. Compared with Kazaks, Uzbeks were at the forefront of the 
struggle for independence because the depiction of Russia and Russians embedded 
in their identities were clear and negative. From their perspective, the Soviet Union 
was a new form of Russian imperialism. Thus, after independence, Uzbekistan 
selected a national security course that moved the country out of the Russian sphere 
of influence. However, in the case of Kazakstan, although the Soviet experience 
hardened the identities of some Kazak nationalists, most Kazaks did not embrace 
anti-Russian conceptions of national identity. The difference between Uzbekistan 
and Kazakstan is that the identities of many Kazaks were more Russified than those 
of Uzbeks. From the point of view of linguistic reform, Uzbekistan is unique in that 
neither its constitution nor its revised language law make any special provision for 
the Russian language, either as an official language or as the language of inter-
ethnic communication.339  By contrast, in Kazakstan, where non-titulars account 
                                                 
339 Uzbekistan’s language law, adopted in December 1995 removed Russian’s normative status as the language 
of inter-ethnic communication in the state. 
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for a greater share of the population, the trend since 1995 has been to upgrade the 
status of Russian by protecting it as an official language in the new constitution.340 
In Kazakstan, Russian is still the de facto lingua franca in all spheres of public life. 
Throughout the fieldwork (interviews, participation, observation etc.) we have 
witnessed little convincing evidence of an antipathy toward the Russian language 
and culture among Kazaks, especially in the urban stratum of Kazaks. This makes 
relatively comfortable circumstances for the Korean diaspora who used to be in the 
Russian mainstream society during the Soviet era. As a result, many Korean 
diasporas in Central Asia prefer Kazakstan for their resettlement. Many Korean 
diasporas in Uzbekistan showed their willingness to move to Kazakstan if they have 
sufficient means to move and settle.341 Yet, participation in some professions 
strictly requires knowledge of the Kazak language and, as consequence, excludes 
from these professions those who do not know it.342  Under the Kazak constitution, 
those who do not know Kazak language cannot serve in official posts after 2010.343 
Compared with the Ahıska Turks, the Korean diasporas, who used to be the good 
                                                 
340 Annette Bohr, “Language Policy and Ethnic Relations in Uzbekistan,” in Graham Smith, Edward Allworth, 
Vivien Law, Andrew Wilson, and Annette Bohr (eds.), Nation-building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands. The 
Politics of National Identities (Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp.200-201. 
341 Also, booming Kazakstan’s economy is the important reason. Compared with the stagnant Uzbekistan’s 
economy Kazakstan economy is developing very fast creating lots of job opportunity.  
342 Sagyndyk Mendibayev, “Russkiy vopros i Nazarbayev,” Tsentral’noaziatkiy Byulleten (29 May 2000)  
343 Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asia’s New State: Independence, Foreign Policy and Regional Security 
(Washington D.C.: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1996), p.62. 
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social climbers and who enjoyed certain social advancements during the previous 
regime, were more influenced directly by the nationalizing measures.  
Of all the nationalizing tendencies of cultural standardization, the goal of 
creating a national language within such a shared spatial frame is the most 
important for Kazakstan and Uzbekistan.   Thus the institutionalization and 
promotion of the titular language (in the state bureaucracy, politics, and education) 
is at one level bound up with reversing the one-time colonial policy of asymmetric 
bilingualism. If Russophones want to become part of the newly independent titular 
state, then they have little choice but to learn their titular language. For titulars, the 
titular language (Uzbek and Kazak) was viewed as an instrument to give their 
children an edge over others, Russians and other Russophone population (e.g., 
Korean diasporas), competing for elite position in their republic. For the non-titulars, 
titular language policy (i.e. Kazak or Uzbek language) presented a major problem 
for their social mobility. Such language policy was one of the key instruments of 
nation building, serving as powerful means of Kazakization or Uzbekization and a 
way to reduce the number of non-titulars in the state administrative structure.344 
As has already been noted, the indigenization of the public sector is often 
                                                 
344 As seen through out the history, one could also see the Korean diasporas’ rapid management to the issue. 
Almost all the Korean language centers in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan are offering the titular (Kazak or Uzbek) 
language courses together with the Korean language program. 
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carried out using covert nationalizing methods, such as the practice of issuing 
official instructions concerning the hiring, firing and promotion of personnel. And 
titular governments (the Uzbek and the Kazak) used the knowledge of the state 
language concerning the advancement and hiring of employees. The knowledge of 
the titular language (Kazak or Uzbek) was effectively employed to squeeze out non-
titular nationals from leading positions thus making room for members of the titular 
nationality. Certainly, it was the main device for the re-distributing political and 
socio-economic power to titulars. What is more, such preferential treatment to the 
titular nation was fully legitimatized in the eyes of most titular nationals.  In 
substance, the notorious “fifth article” in the Soviet internal passports, which was 
the most eminent manifestation of the institutionalization of nationality that would 
play a role in hindering a citizen’s chance of gaining employment or admission to 
institutes of higher learning, was to succeed in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan.  The 
“fifth article” was stealthily restored in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan in order to secure 
their political and cultural resurgence during their nation-building processes. The 
governments of Kazakstan and Uzbekistan have found innovative ways to keep the 
‘fifth article’ as an ethnic marker in the new passports by denoting ethnic nationality 
in native language or Russian on the first page for the internal consumption, but on 
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the second page, which is written in English for external consumption, omits all 
references to ethnicity. Instead, it only indicates citizenship. It is probable that by 
doing so, they could avoid potential accusation of ethnocratic behavior from abroad. 
Viktor, an ethnic Russian in Kazakstan, said that in order for a Russian (or 
Russian speakers in general) to be admitted to any major vuz345 in Almaty, he either 
had to be exceptionally brilliant, or take a recourse to blat346: only blat can overrule 
nationality, he asserted. These responses confirm that the mechanism through which 
native preferences are executed is an informal one, pervasive, yet difficult to 
document.347 On the other hand, most Kazaks believe that it is “natural” for the 
titular nationality to give a preferred access to jobs and education; in fact a large 
number of them deny that they enjoy special favors and instead highlight the 
“minority” status of Kazaks in their own country. In a survey on interethnic 
relations in Kazakstan, over 62 percent of the Russians and 64 percent of the other 
non-titular ethnic groups reported a large increase in the number of the natives in 
                                                 
345 Soviet institutions of higher learning (vysshie uchebnye zavedeniia--VUZy) included universities and 
institutes. 
346 Blat (Russian: блат) is a term which appeared in the Soviet Union to denote the use of informal agreements, 
Party contacts, or black market deals to achieve results or get ahead. 
347 When I asked the non-titulars (e.g., Korean and Ahıska Turkish diasporas, Russians, Germans) to give 
concrete illustrations of how the preferential treatment worked, the frequent response were that it was the head 
(nachal’nik, increasingly of the Kazak or Uzbek nationality) who decided who should be recruited and who 
should be fired. “You cannot prove all this,” and “we do not have a lawful structure (u nas niet pravovogo 
obshhchestva) or any civilized norms” were frequent responses on the part of the non-titular nationalities. 
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their neighborhood.348 On the other hand, only 31 percent of the Kazaks noticed 
any pronounced change in the ethnic profile of their work or residential 
environment.349 Moreover, less than a third of the Kazak respondents felt that the 
natives do not have an adequate share in the leadership positions, whereas over two 
thirds of the Russians expressed their concerns over the nationalization of the top 
positions.350 
Contrary to common wisdom, the most crucial obstacle to such language 
revival is not posed by the sway of Russian speakers. Interestingly, language revival 
is constrained by the fact that vast majority of the best educated and qualified 
stratum of Kazaks or Uzbeks are primarily Russian speakers, reared in a 
Russophone Soviet culture. They are not at ease with the nationalizing policies of 
the state which seek to foster a total correspondence between ethnicity and language 
repertoire. The complexities of language revival are most clear in the urban areas of 
Kazakstan and Uzbekistan where Russian is the dominant language still spoken, 
even among titulars. So in case of Kazakstan, there is a portion of Russian-speaking 
Kazaks who are uncertain about tendencies toward an all Kazak language 
movement, as pointed out by Bhavna Dave: “The commonly-held assumption of a 
                                                 
348  Nursultan Masanov, “Ethnopoliticheskii monitoring,” Ethnopoliticheskii monitoring v Kazakhstane 
(Almaty: Edition 1, ARKOR, Fall, 1995), p.3. 
349 Ibid. 
350 Ibid. 
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salient and natural ethnic divide between Russians and Kazak is misleading; it 
downplays or even ignores internal differences and contradictions within the 
national revival movement.”351 An important notion here is that mankurtizatsiia, 
which is a term often used to convey a sense of rootlessness and cultural amnesia 
among the Sovietized and Russified strata of non-Russian nationalities. Hence, 
nationalists and pure Kazak speakers from time to time employ the term ‘mankurt’, 
a term of disapproval, against their urban brethren, chastising them for abandoning 
their native language and ancestral knowledge to imbibe Russian language and 
culture.352 In their perception, mankurtizatsiia is a distinct, if regrettable, trait of 
urban Kazaks. As the Kazak scholar Nurbulat Masanov argues, “the main cleavage 
in Kazakstan is not between Kazaks and Russians: rather it is between urban 
Kazaks and those Kazaks new to the cities or still in rural areas.”353 The hostility 
against the Russian language and culture displayed by the migrants, arriving from 
the ethnically homogeneous aul to the urban areas, is directed not just against the 
Russians, but extends toward the Russian-speaking cosmopolitan Kazaks as well. 
The extensive structure of titular preferences and the shrinking share of Russians 
                                                 
351 Bhavna Dave, “Language Revival in Kazakhstan: Language Shift and Identity Change,” Post-Soviet Affairs, 
vol.12, no.1 (1996), p. 52. 
352 Ibid. 
353 Nursultan Masanov, “Perceptions of Ethnic and All-National identity in Kazakhstan,” in Middle East Series, 
no.51, The Nationalities Question in Post-Soviet Kazakhstan (International Eurasian Institute for Economic and 
Political Research, 2002), pp. 14-15. 
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and other ethnic groups in the state organs suggest that the competition for this 
positions and resources within the state sector will acquire an intra-ethnic 
dimension.354 Even the findings during the fieldwork in Kazakstan suggest that 
serious constraints to the implementation of Kazak as the state language are posed 
by Russian-speaking Kazaks and their Russified offspings, rather than the non-
titular Russian-speaking population. In this environment, Russian speakers (e.g. 
Korean diasporas) are unlikely to turn to learning Kazak until a fundamental 
restructuring of the language among Kazak takes place. On the contrary, although 
there were relatively small portions of Russified Uzbek elites in the socio-political 
arena, the majority of the Uzbeks have traditionally lived relatively isolated from 
Russian communities.  As a result, Uzbekistan has a more titular oriented society 
with more homogenized consensus. Accordingly, compared with the Koreans in 
Kazakstan, the author could find more Korean diasporas who were versed in Uzbek 
language or have willingness to learn the titular language in Uzbekistan. A Korean 
diaspora who thinks he has historical roots in Kazakstan claims that he would have 
mastered Kazak language long time ago, if only there were a need to know it.355 
The necessity to learn Kazak language was not sufficient for non-Kazak people 
                                                 
354 Bhavna Dave, p. 57. 
355 Interveiw with a Soviet Korean, Elena Pak, a 40 years old mathamatic teacher, Almaty, Kazakstan, 2003. 
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living in Kazakstan. In addition, as mentioned earlier, higher birthrates amongst the 
indigenous population, coupled with the migration of part of the non-titular 
population, will leave only a relatively small Russophone minority in Uzbekistan, 
virtually guaranteeing that linguistic Uzbekization will proceed of its accord. 
Even in Kazakstan, the switch from Russian is considered irreversible 
because a critical mass of potential speakers of Kazak exists in the large youthful 
population in the country, especially in the rural, Kazak-speaking regions. Of course, 
a shift away from Russian to one’s titular language can hardly take place quickly; it 
typically requires a generational change. Perhaps, for Uzbekistan or Kazakstan five 
or ten years phase is too short a time to assess the success of language revival, 
because language shifts are discernible only in intergenerational terms. 
Although its hegemony has dwindled, Russian is too deeply rooted in 
Kazakstan and Uzbekistan to be forgotten in a matter of generations. The Russian 
language is still a widespread mode of communication in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan 
(especially in Kazakstan). Perhaps, it may find ways to become more incorporated 
into a political identity in which it now finds itself underrepresented. Finally, the 
free-marketization of the economy and the continuation of strong economic ties to 
Russia mean that identities of many Russified-titulars and other Russophone 
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population (the Korean diasporas in our cases) will likely remain Russified to some 
extent.  To quote from Olzhas Suleymanov, a former leader of Kazakstan’s People 
Congress, “Practically every Kazak speaks Russian. Why and to what purpose 
should we reject Russian language, which give us definite advantages in the sphere 
of culture and international relations?” 356  Gaining proficiency in one’s own 
forgotten native language, without abandoning Russian, and learning English 
actively to catch up with the global trend is the strategy that seems to be the most 
dominant among upwardly mobile strata in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan.  In other 
words, more and more individuals are responding to the state’s attempt at reversing 
the language shift by taking strides toward multilingualism, rather than simply 
going back to a primordial attachment.357 In this environment, it is less appealing to 
the Korean diaspora, or to other diasporas especially the Russophone minorities, to 
learn the titular language earnestly. In any case, in the interim, the nationalist 
titular’s goals are to break out of the regional hegemonic arrangement of Russia and 
its culture. No matter how much social, cultural and inter-ethnic conditions favor 
                                                 
356 “Suleymanov views on Ethnic Russian Issues,” Foreign Broadcast Information Services (FBIS), June 28, 
1994. 
357 During a private dinner with a Uzbek politician’s family with the author, his teenage kids and other family 
members were eager to speak English with the author and Russian with the author’s local South Korean friend. 
The Uzbek politician seemed to be happier when his kids could speak Russian and English fluently with his 
guests rather than speaking Uzbek with them. It seems that such attitudes were typical phenomenon among 
titular elites or titular upwardly strata who already have a relative advantage in the usage of their titular (native) 
language compare to non-titulars.  
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bilingualism, current conditions at the level of the ruling elites advance an ethno-
national conception of statehood. 
 
Political Kazakization and Uzbekization 
As was shown earlier, many of the characteristics of the Soviet system still 
exist in Uzbek and Kazak elite behavior. In Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, political 
elites from the old Soviet system have succeeded in keeping the nationalistic 
opposition from developing into a viable political force. Political resources are still 
concentrated at the top in the position of the president. There is no dispersal of 
political power from central authorities to the outside groups. The most obvious is the 
disappearance of a state ideology, and a strong centralized party. The strategy of each 
president (Kazakstan and Uzbekistan) has been to establish strong executive control 
over policymaking and over the mechanisms of executive accountability. In these 
circumstances, it is the president who is guiding the transition in Uzbekistan and 
Kazakstan, and who will decide the outcome. The parliament appears to be a mere 
extension of the president rather than a check on his power.358 The parliament has 
become an appendage to the president as has the judiciary, which is now subjected to 
                                                 
358 Martha Brill Olcott, “Central Asia’s Political Crisis,” in Dale F. Eickelman (ed.), Russia’s Muslim Frontiers 
(Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1993), p. 179. 
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presidential appointment and under the supervision of the president’s office. 
A fear of instability arising from political and economical liberalization 
was the explanation used by these leaders when they defend their patterns of rule. 
Each of the two presidents has stability and economic recovery as his top 
priorities.  To put it briefly, preservation of ethnic harmony, reform of the 
economy, and social stability are Karimov’s and Nazarbaev’s common goals and 
they believe that these goals can be achieved through their being the 
indisputable authority in every area of Uzbekistan’s and Kazakstan’s political 
life.  Because of the difficulty in initiating the economic program while 
maintaining stability, political liberation may be seen as far off in Uzbekistan 
and Kazakstan. Democratization is also perceived as linked to political 
instability. In such conditions, political stability appears to be equated with the 
harsh repression of opposing organizations. In a nutshell, the fears of instability 
are being exploited by the leaders to justify oppressive policies (e.g., Karimov 
and his use of Islam is one example). Interestingly, the authoritarian leaderships 
of Karimov and Nazarbayev were welcomed by many Korean and Ahıska 
Turkish diaspora communities. Many members of these diasporas feared that the 
changing leadership might bring a more nationalistic regime than the present one. 
 188
A similar trend was found among Russians in Central Asia after 
independence. Russians in Central Asia were much less likely to favor political 
change compared with Russians in the Russian Federation. In 1992, of Russians 
living in Russia, 52 percent desire political change, while only 32 percent of 
Russians in Uzbekistan, and 36 percent in Kazakstan wanted change.359 A 
possible explanation could be that Russians, including Russophone populations, 
were afraid of what political change might mean to their status in Central Asia.  
As Olcott has noted, Russians in Kazakstan are aware that “any successor of 
Nazarbayev is likely to be more Kazakh, and thus less sympathetic to their 
concerns.”360 Thus, this helps to make Nazarbayev’s position appear to be stable, 
despite the Russian and Russophones’ misgivings. Likewise, in 1995, when 
asked which political system would best promote the resolution of their 
country’s problems “half of all respondents in Uzbekistan and almost two-thirds 
of Kazakstani respondents supported any system as long as there was order.”361 
Such a view was also dominant among the Ahıska Turkish and Korean diasporas. 
The major concern of respondents was maintaining order in their states rather 
                                                 
359 Ada W. Finifter and Ellen Mickiewicz, “Redefining the Political System of the USSR: Mass support of 
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361 Nancy Lubin, “Views of Leadership in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan,” in Timothy J. Colton and Robert C. 
Tucker (eds.), Patterns in Post-Soviet Leadership (Bolder: Westview Press, 1995), pp.218-219. 
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than acquiring democratic freedoms. Many Korean and Ahıska Turkish diaspora 
expressed concern about ethnic tension rising from any political change. The 
most serious challenge facing the two countries was seen to be the need to 
“strengthen social order and discipline.”362 In Kazakstan fewer than 40 percent 
of the respondents and in Uzbekistan 47 percent of them believed that securing a 
free press and the right to free speech were essential.363 This meant that more 
than one-third of the respondents in both countries believed that these 
democratic rights were not important, and around two percent in Uzbekistan and 
four percent in Kazakstan said that these rights were not even desirable.364 
Overall, the data suggest that the notion of democracy is only an ideal to the 
people of Kazakstan and Uzbekistan.365 Unfortunately, many basic democratic 
values were poorly understood in these two countries. Maintenance of order and 
stability were more important than political freedoms. (See Figure I and II 
below)  This helps to explain the continued support for leaders who were 
formerly members of the Communist Party, and who maintain a centralized hold 
on political power.366 
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366 In general, most of the current political, economical, and religious elites were subordinated to Karimov and 
Nazarbayev in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan. These elites have no reason to support other groups, such as ultra-
 190
Figure I 
Best Political System for Kazakstan 
 
2.2 4.5 2.6
5.7
3
2.2
17.2
62.4
No Answer(2.2%) Don’t Know(4.5%) Communism(2.6%)
Socialism(5.7%) Capitalism(3.0%) Islamic State(2.2%)
Western Democracy(17.2%) Anything that brings order(62.4)
Source: Nancy Lubin, “Views of Leadership in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan,” in Timothy J. Colton and 
Robert C. Tucker (eds.), Patterns in Post-Soviet Leadership (Bolder: Westview Press, 1995), pp.218. 
 
Figure II 
Best Political System for Uzbekistan 
 
2.2 7.9
2.6
11.8
3.6
10.2
11.5
50.4
No Answer(2.2%) Don’t Know(7.9%) Communism(2.6%)
Socialism(11.8%) Capitalism(3.6%) Islamic State(10.2%)
Western Democracy(11.5%) Anything that brings order(50.4)
Source: Nancy Lubin, ibid., p.219. 
                                                                                                                                        
nationalists etc., as they owed their license to operate to the Karimov and Nazarbayev regime. For instance, 
revolution might very well be personally costly to them. 
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Kazak clan favoritism and other forms of nepotism have determined not 
only the republic’s economic life but also the social and political composition of its 
state structure. In the first years after independence, some 80 percent of 
Nazarbayev’s administrative appointees, including regional governors, were ethnic 
Kazaks.367 With most of the republic’s key posts given to Kazaks, administrative 
appointments, as often noted, do not reflect the ethnic composition of society.   
Boris Giller and Viktor Shatskikh documented the disproportionately 
highly titular representation in key government positions. The ratio of titular and 
non-titular groups in key position is shown in Table XIV: 
 
Table XIV 
Titular and Non-titular Share in Key Government Positions at the Center and in Oblasts in 
1993-94 
 
 Titular Non-titular 
Position at the Center 
Presidential apparatus 6 1 
Deputy Prime Ministers 6 1 
Education 6 1 
Finance 5 3 
Transport 4 2 
Information and Press 4 1 
Economy 7 1 
Justice 4 1 
                                                 
367 Martha Brill Olcott, “Post-Soviets Kazakhstan: The Demographics of Ethnic Politics,” Problems of Post 
Communism, vol.42, no.2 (1995), p. 25. 
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State TV and Radio Committee 5 0 
Oblasts 
Karaganda 6 2 
Pavlodar 6 3 
Turgai 6 3 
Southern Kazakstan 8 1 
Atyrau 7 1 
Almaty 9 2 
Source: Boris Giller and Viktor Shatskikh, “Oredelenie berege: russkoiazychnyie v 
Kazakhstane,” Karavan (12 December 1993) 
 
As the figures reveal, the titular nationals’ share is disproportionately high 
in regions with a large Russian speaking population, such as Pavlodar, Karaganda or 
Almaty. The non-titular share in Kazak dominated southern oblasts is nominal. The 
Kazaks appointed by the center often had no ties to local Russian (or other 
Russophone) communities, thus widening the rift between non-titulars and Kazaks 
and between northern periphery and central authorities in Almaty. 
Kazaks held 64.2 percent of all jobs in the various government departments 
in 1994, whereas 21 percent were held by the Russophone population.368  In the 
following year, the Kazak share had increased to 81.4 percent, while the 
Russophone share had fallen to 14 percent.369 Although Russians and other non-
titulars express concerns and anxieties at the rate at which the ethnic composition of 
                                                 
368 Moskovskii Komsomlets (24, August 1995) cited in Bhavna Dave, “Language Revival in Kazakhstan: 
Language Shift and Identity Change,” Post-Soviet Affairs, vol.12, no.1 (1996), p .58. 
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the government, administrative offices, educational establishments and even 
residential areas is undergoing a change, many Kazaks consider these changes to be 
natural.  
A clear example of the politicization of Kazak identity in motion was the 
March 7, 1994 parliament election in which, of 177 parliamentary seats, 42 were 
appointed by Nazarbayev, not by election. In addition, although over 700 candidates 
applied for the remaining 135 seats, the Kazak electoral commission disallowed 200 
of these candidates on the basis that they tended to represent Russian nationalist 
interests.370 In the end, Kazaks filled 60 percent of the parliamentary seats, other 
non-titulars a mere 32 percent, virtually guaranteeing Nazarbayev concentric circles 
of power.371 The share of Kazaks increased further in the new parliament elected in 
December 1995.  Among the 38 elected members of the Kazakstans’s Senate 
(upper house) 26 were Kazaks. In the 67 member Majlis (lower house) there were 
42 Kazaks, 19 Russians, with the remainder belonging to other ethnic groups (one 
Korean diaspora member included).372 In Nazarbayev’s effort to increase native 
control, he has also sought a selective co-optation of Russians and member of other 
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nationalities. However, few local Russians or non-titulars regarded the presence of 
their ethnic counterparts in government as a factor facilitating their welfare.  The 
biased procedure in the selection and elimination of parliamentary candidates to 
guarantee the Kazak domination of the political process left non-titulars with little 
stake in the political system. 
If Kazakstan was in such a situation, needless to say, in the ethno-
linguistically more homogeneous and culturally more traditional Uzbekistan, there 
has been an even stronger processes of indigenization and nationalization. Uzbeks 
dominate elite structures in the republic: the party and administrative structures, the 
intellectual and cultural sectors, as well as the informal economic and religious 
sectors.373 Russians and other non-titulars occupy a small portion of the technical 
and scientific elite structures. So long as they played a role in political structure, 
non-natives were hand-in-glove with whatever patterns of corruption that existed.374 
Clan politics defined the game in Uzbekistan: anyone who contended for 
power had to play accordingly. Karimov has been successful at this power game and 
oppressed all opposition as he was a relative outsider brought in by Moscow as a 
compromise after the devastation of the cotton purges. Much to everyone’s surprise, 
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Karimov played the role of a powerbroker among the weakened and relatively 
disorganized clans until he had secured himself an unassailable position. He took 
advantage of the clans’ disarray to make himself necessary to all, a compromise 
leader who balanced clan interests. The clan leaders thought they could control him, 
but he played them against each other, won supporters in the various clans and 
made himself necessary. Throughout all this time, Karimov has remained the 
dominant leader of the country. While stating that Uzbekistan must develop a 
pluralist society, he has also expressed doubts regarding the appropriateness of 
pluralism in this stage of Uzbekistan’s development.375 Cementing and expanding 
personal dominance is considered by Karimov to be an essential prerequisite to all 
other objectives.376  In sum, the competition for power in Uzbekistan did not take 
place in the streets, but in a private dance among Uzbek leaders of the relevant 
clans.377 Hence, there was no room for non-titulars to participate in the socio-
political arena.  
The Uzbek government is characterized by the concentration of power in 
the hands of the president and the office of the president. Instead of having a 
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separation of powers between branches of government there is a monopolization of 
power by the executive organs with the legislative and judicial branches, which are, 
in effect, subordinate to the former. Governors at the oblast and raion levels are 
appointed directly by the president. To be sure there has been little place for non-
titulars here. In addition, at the local level, Karimov utilized and strengthened the 
mahalle (quarter-hood), presumably as they were viewed to be useful tools for state 
penetration into local affairs.  Karimov viewed the mahalle as a potential dual-
faced institution, serving both as means for both gathering information on society, 
and for projecting state policy to local levels.378  The mahalle has been the basic 
unit in traditional Uzbeks public life. It is headed by a group of elder men, the 
aksakals, who generally were of the upper classes. Consequently, it automatically 
excluded non-titulars who were outside of such a socio-political body. Even though 
mahalles became a hybrid of old and new structure, which came to play a central 
role as local building blocks of power, non-titulars remained only as bystanders. 
Another discriminative nationalizing measure is the law on citizenship 
which provided a further cause for non-titulars to perceive inequity in independent 
Kazakistan and Uzbekistan. The citizenship law adopted a “zero option” approach 
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which automatically conferred citizenship on all permanent residents of Kazakstan 
and Uzbekistan at the time of the law went into effect. However, they added an 
article which allowed dual citizenship to their titular compatriots who are citizens of 
a foreign state.379 Kazaks and Uzbeks wishing to come back were given automatic 
citizenship and they could also retain their dual citizenship if permitted by the other 
country. To be sure, the option of dual citizenship was not extended to non-titular 
groups. The leaderships of Uzbekistan and Kazakstan have rejected the dual 
citizenship of non-titular groups in their states, arguing that it would result in 
divided loyalties among their respective Russophone population. President Karimov 
has stated that “Dual citizenship is impermissible.”  He asks, “Why should some 
nationalities be protected by two laws and have a reserve airport, and how can you 
demand love, selflessness and self-sacrifice for the motherland from a person with 
two citizenship?”380 But what about titulars, perhaps Russified titulars, who have 
dual citizenship?  Coupled with the law on immigration of compatriots which 
provided financial support for titulars returning to Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, the 
citizenship law resulted in an estimated several hundred thousands titulars returning 
home.  
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As nationalizing regimes, Kazakstan and Uzbekistan have accorded a 
higher status to their respective titular nations, which remain sharply distinguished 
from the citizenry of the state as a whole. They have legitimized the adoption of 
policies and practices that aim to promote the specific interests of Uzbeks and 
Kazaks. Titulars’ covert and overt nationalizing activities provided a strong 
indication that titulars (Kazaks or Uzbeks) were “first among equals.” Its been more 
than a decade since their nationalizing process. However, it seems likely that in the 
coming years, Kazakstan and Uzbekistan will continue to implement elaborate 
policies promoting the revival and domination of the Kazak or the Uzbek identity in 
many aspects of economic, political and cultural life. Like language revival, their 
nationalizing activities require a generational change. It can hardly take place in 
short order. Nonetheless, it is obvious to Kazaks and Uzbeks that time and 
demography are ultimately on their side. In the meantime, the current negative 
birthrate among the non-titulars (especially amongst the Russophone nationalities, 
Russians, Koreans, Germans, etc.) in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan could bring more 
favorable outcomes to the titular state. In 1993, considering the Soviet legacy and 
the past, Kuttykadam argued in the newspaper, “We cannot, say like Turkey, declare 
all our inhabitants as Kazaks.” 381  However, considering the last decade’s 
                                                 
381 Seidakhmet Kuttykadam, “Sladkii veter svobody,” Kazakhstanskaia Pravda (May 4, 1993) 
 199
indigenization development it seems feasible in the near future to make a 
declaration similar to that of Turkey.  To be sure, such a stand would have critical 
implications for the Korean and Ahıska Turkish diasporas in the region for their 
survival. They need to reset and reorganize their diaspora organizations accordingly 
if they do not want to remain as unacknowledged diasporas in each republic. 
Recently, many members of the Korean diaspora are willing to embrace a “second 
among equals” status and adapt to the new reality of a titular dominated Kazakstan 
and Uzbekistan. On the other hand, the Ahıska Turks, having not forgotten the 
Fergana events382, have usually preferred to play a lower profile in terms of national 
activities in the new republics. Such different adaptation patterns of the two 
diasporas in the Kazakstan and Uzbekistan will be elaborated in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE DIASPORA NATIONALISM  
IN THE KOREAN AND AHISKA TURKISH DIASPORAS 
 
 
Throughout the Soviet period, the Koreans and Ahıska Turks, and perhaps 
all peoples of the Soviet Union, were subjugated to great losses in the realm of 
national culture. Under Soviet ideology and a policy encouraging the “merging of 
nationalities” they were forced to downplay their national specificities and culture. 
After the deportation, the Korean diasporas developed a modus vivendi of 
adaptation to the harsh circumstances of life in exile and consequent integration into 
a Russian/Russified society in a relatively short period of time. From a practically 
all-agrarian population, they were transformed into a well-educated urbanized 
community but all in Russian. Many Soviet Koreans, especially intellectuals, argue 
that they had no choice but to move in step with the changing environment and to 
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focus their energies on securing a stable socio-economic base. The Korean diaspora 
adopted a lifestyle that was thoroughly pro-system and assimilative. Thus, before 
perestroika, as German Kim and Valeriy Khan note, the Koreans in the Soviet 
Union barely had the opportunity to get their bearings.383 In other words, the Soviet 
Koreans didn’t pay much attention to issues like a Korean national revival, 
returning to their homeland and other series of movements for cultural and identity 
preservation. Despite the Soviet Koreans’ remarkable economic and educational 
advancement since their deportation, their excessive assimilation raised the question 
of the long-term survivability of their culture and identity.  Indeed, most of the [ex-
]Soviet Koreans did lose the Korean language as their mother tongue or do not 
speak of at all. Not only among the educated children who moved into the cities and 
studied in the universities, but also among the farmers whose collectives were 
absorbed into the giant multi-ethnic sovkhozes or kolkhozes of Kazakstan and 
Uzbekistan, assimilation has separated Koreans from their cultural and ethnic roots. 
On the other hand, the Ahıska Turks engaged themselves more in preserving their 
identity and culture during the Soviet period.  Since the end of the 1950s, the 
Ahıska Turks formed an underground organization named “Homeland Society” 
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(Vatan Cemiyeti) and engaged themselves in a struggle for repatriation and 
rehabilitation.  This was the only organization leading the Ahıska Turkish 
movement during the Soviet regime. Despite the harsh assimilationist policies of the 
Soviet authorities during the 1960s and 1970s the Ahıska Turks preserved their 
identity and culture. Although the Soviet authorities imprisoned and arrested many 
members of the Ahıska Turkish movement, the Ahıska Turks actively continued to 
demand their relocation to their homelands and staunchly proclaimed their 
Turkishness.384 While many Soviet Koreans urged their children to speak Russian 
and educated them in a Russian atmosphere for their social advancement and 
economically well-being, many Ahıska Turks mentioned that they were primarily 
concerned with teaching their children the importance of their own tradition, 
traditional values, religion and language.385 As mentioned in the earlier chapter, the 
Ahıska Turks have, in a way, used their language to identify themselves and have 
also used it as a tool against assimilation. Yavuz Zeybek argues that language is one 
of the most important elements for the formation of identities for the Turks.386 
Regardless, the Ahıska Turks passionately preserved their own language which 
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fortified their ethnic consciousness and solidarity. 
In accordance with the common Soviet practice, the nationality (ethnicity) 
of the citizens of the USSR were written in their passports and other official 
documents. Hence, automatically the Koreans couldn’t deny their nationality even if 
they wanted so. Of course, this did not mean that they tried to hide their ethnicity. 
When asked about their nationality they all answered that they are Koreans.  It was 
not only they who called themselves Koreans, but other people labeled them as 
Koreans too. At present, the level of self-esteem and ethnic identity among Koreans 
is very high. It might be the paradox in history, however, for the Soviet Koreans, the 
Soviet internal passport system was an obstacle for their merging fully into the 
Russified society, since their children also inherited the ethnicity of their parents 
regardless of their Russified identity. As a result, even for the Koreans who adopted 
the Russian language and culture and lost their language and culture in the process, 
they could not change their ethnicity to Russian. This created a barrier for the full 
assimilation of the deported Koreans into Russian society, and lead them instead, to 
integrate into the Russian society while maintaining their ethnic distinctiveness. On 
the contrary, the situation of the Ahıska Turks was different from the beginning. As 
mentioned earlier, even before the deportation, many Ahıska Turks could not 
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designate themselves as a “Turk” or an “Ahıska Turk.”  Most of the Ahıska Turks 
in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan had to register as Azerbaijanis, Uzbeks or Kazaks. For 
this reason, many Ahıska Turks’ nationality was written in their passports variedly. 
However, regardless of what was written in their passports, they knew themselves 
as Turks. Consequently, the Ahıska Turks had to fight for the basic right to call 
themselves Turks or Ahıska Turks. The strong assimilation policy of the Soviets to 
remove Turks from their ethnic identity stimulated the Ahıska Turks to stick to their 
ethnicity and collectivity more firmly. As one interviewee said, “We always tried to 
keep our language,” since she thought it was the critical mark of resistance to the 
regime in which the nomination “Turk” was a pejorative term.387 Thus, unlike the 
Koreans who automatically acquired their ethnic designation and did not worry 
about  its essence, Ahıska Turks had to engage in struggling to preserve their 
ethnic identification. Besides, the Soviet Koreans were deported from the Russian 
Far East, i.e., not their homeland per se but an alien territory, where they had fled 
from their homeland due to the Japanese occupation. On the other hand, the Ahıska 
Turks considered themselves descendents of the Ottoman Empire and as members 
of the dominant power in the region, thus boasting a strong ethnic pride and identity. 
There is one thing that the author would like to point out about the 
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Koreans’ peculiarity in terms of their Russified identity. Many scholars mentioned 
the exclusive ability of Koreans to adapt to the new economic and social conditions 
and pointed out this character as an evidence of assimilation into the Russian 
society. It is argued that their adaptation during a short time led to an acculturation 
process. However, this process did not really give way to assimilation. The Koreans 
strategy of adaptation was “integration” rather than assimilation.  As mentioned in 
Chapter II, integration implies some maintenance of the group’s cultural integrity as 
well as a move to become an integral part of the host-society.388 Although the terms 
“integration” and “assimilation” may appear as synonyms in some literature, it 
should be stressed that the term integration as used here is clearly different from 
assimilation: while the maintenance of the cultural and ethnic identity is sought in 
the former case, in the later there is little or no interest in such continuity. Although, 
there was not political mobilization or cultural association during the Soviet period, 
the Soviet Koreans preserved their traditional customs, values and cuisine. Like the 
Ahıska Turks and many other deported nationalities, the Soviet Koreans also 
mythologized the deportation and utilized its memory in preserving their ethnicity. 
The sufferings of deportation facilitated the strengthening of ties among the 
Koreans. Even a third generation half-blooded Soviet Korean said that his family 
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always ate Korean food as their way of maintaining Korean traditions.389 One could 
easily observe in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan that no matter how Russified a Korean 
might be, he proudly mentions that he eats Korean food. Thus, a national cuisine 
seems to have a great deal of significance in terms of their heritage culture. In 
addition, while they may not speak their mother tongue and may not always observe 
traditional celebrations, the Soviet Koreans always expressed feelings of kinship 
with fellow Koreans. Thus, it would not be correct to define the situation of the 
Soviet Koreans as “assimilation” (rather than integration), since many of them still 
maintain and develop at least some ethnic distinctiveness. They simply had 
integrated very well into the mainstream population (Russian in this case) for their 
socio-economical well-being and advancement. To use Berry’s term, the Ahıska 
Turks’ and the Koreans’ adaptation strategies were different, leading to different 
outcomes.390 Therefore, according to Berry’s categorization, the Ahıska Turks’ 
acculturation strategy fits into “separation” which implies that the original culture 
(or ethnic identity) is maintained strongly and relationship with the host-society are 
not considered critical.391 
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In all events, perestroika and the subsequent breakup of the Soviet Union 
brought about radical changes in the life and consciousness of the Ahıska Turks and 
Koreans in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan. Due to the dramatic changes in the economic, 
social, and political environment, both diasporas are in the process of reconstructing 
their national or diaspora identity in order to unify themselves. Moreover, they now 
have the chance to connect with co-ethnics from their respective homelands. After the 
Koreans made contact with the homeland and other Korean diasporas around the world, 
they started to embrace a new conception of themselves (one which puts more 
emphasis on Koreanness) and change their (Soviet) identities. For the Ahıska Turks, it 
was a time to realize their long-cherished hope: immigration to Turkey which is 
perceived as their homeland. As one woman from Tashkent region told the author, 
about forty percent of the Ahıska Turks in her village left for Turkey from the beginning 
of the 1990s.392 For diaspora minorities, formation of the independent titular nations in 
Central Asia was both a challenge and an opportunity to revive their ethnic identity and 
culture. 
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V.1.  Diaspora Movement and the formation of the Diaspora Organizations. 
For the Soviet Korean diaspora, the break up of the Soviet Union has 
provided an opportunity to find their own roots and culture. In the wake of these 
events, a Korean national revival began along with a series of other movements for 
cultural autonomy among Kazakstan and Uzbekistan’s multi-national population. 
Many intellectuals have been attempting to revive a sense of Korean identity among 
the Soviet Koreans through language and cultural education. After years of forced 
silence, the Korean diaspora took the opportunity to lobby actively to develop their 
national customs, traditions, language and culture. This initial development of the 
Korean movement was shaped primarily by academic intellectuals. These scholars 
played important and positive roles in the organization of Korean centers; the 
methods and contents of their activities and forging ties with homeland Korea.393 
There are several reasons for the predominance of intellectuals on the sphere of 
social sciences in the leadership of Korean association. First, their ties to the party 
and its government organs gave them access to the power which was needed to 
resolve organizational questions related to the establishment of Korean cultural 
centers. In addition, these same ties allowed them to lobby on behalf of the Korean 
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centers. Furthermore, their professional specialization and work experience in party 
organs meant that the professors were better grounded in the preparation of 
statutory documents, conceptualization of cultural centers, and management of 
organizational work. Finally, since these faculty members were all experienced in 
organic elements of the party-state system, their roles as the leaders of cultural 
centers was agreeable to the organs of power.394 Consequently, the Korean cultural 
associations in their early stages copied the working style of the Communist party 
and other Soviet organs.395 Later, these social associations became automatically 
accountable to the titular government organizations as well as dependent upon them.  
A central concern of this Korean movement was the establishment of 
Korean national organizations. Consequently, after the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, the Koreans in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan founded dozens of Korean 
cultural organizations on each oblast, city and regional level which served different 
populations of Koreans in different areas. They arose almost simultaneously in 
Tashkent, Samarkand, Fergana, Almaty, Kyzl-orda, Chimkent and elsewhere where 
substantial numbers of Koreans lived. As German Kim and Valeriy Khan noted, 
other ethnic groups “look on us with astonishment as our Korean centers, 
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organizations and societies grew and multiplied like dormant seeds after rain.”396 In 
March 1990, the Koreans in Central Asia gathered in Almaty Kazakstan and 
organized the First Annual Congress of the Koreans of Soviet Union. At this 
Congress the Korean diasporas from each of the Central Asian republics, founded 
the Republican Association of Korean Cultural Centers. 397  In Kazakstan the 
organization was named “The Association of the Koreans in Kazakstan” and in 
Uzbekistan it was christened “The Association of the Korean Cultural Centers in 
Uzbekistan.” These organizations came to being upon the adoption by the [ex-
]Soviet republics of the law “on social groupings,” which gave the right to form 
ethnic organizations.398 All these associations placed emphasis on the revival of the 
Korean language, customs, and tradition as their basic goals and missions. The 
awakening of ethnic consciousness took place against the background of these goals. 
The goals of the Koreans societies coincided with generally accepted trends during 
this period. The leaders of the Korean organization in the 1990s studiously omitted 
any mention of goals in their statutory documentation that might complicate their 
relations with titular authorities. Consequently, Koreans did not regard themselves 
as subjects of political activity during the formative period of their new 
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organizations; their political consciousness had not yet been awakened.399 No doubt, 
these Soviet Korean leaders were very loyal to the ruling regime in their respective 
countries of residency.  Therefore, the association’s ethnic agenda was primarily 
cultural rather than political. As of 2001, the Associations (in Uzbekistan and 
Kazakstan) have come a long way toward fulfilling the goals set four years ago at 
the Third Congress. It has consolidated and unified all of the various Korean groups 
in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan. The ties between the center and the regions have been 
strengthened as well as the relationships between business people and the academic 
and cultural intelligentsia. To a certain extent, the Associations have awakened the 
ethnic consciousness of the Korean diaspora. Moreover, in recent years, they have 
helped to raise the professional and political profile of the Korean diaspora. 
Looking closer at matters below the official level, many Korean intellectuals have 
increasingly become aware of their social and political rights. Since 1999, three 
members of the Association of Koreans in Kazakstan’s presidium have been 
actively participating in the activities of the Assembly of Peoples of Kazakstan, as 
members of the Council.400 
Compared with the Korean diaspora, the Ahıska Turks have a long history 
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of ethnic organization. Until the end of 1980s, the Vatan society, as the only 
organization of the Ahıska Turks, led the Ahıska Turkish movement. Its leaders 
continuously fought against the Soviet authorities for their rehabilitation to the 
homeland and their rights to proclaim themselves as Turks. However, due to 
demographic dispersion and efforts of the Soviet authorities to control and 
disorganize the Ahıska Turks the movement was fragmented. Also there was the 
disagreement between the leaders in the organization. After the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union, numerous other societies were founded by the Ahıska Turks residing 
in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan. A Central Association of the Ahıska Turks was 
founded in Almaty and Tashkent in 1991. These Associations presented a somewhat 
different perspective on the issues of importance to Ahıska Turks, though not 
departing significantly from the mainstream. One of the important points on their 
agenda is still obtaining permission and means to emigrate to Turkey, which they 
consider as their homeland. However, they are also concerned with the problems of 
the community still living in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan. The improvement of the 
Ahıska Turks’ socio-economic conditions was central to the Association’s agenda.  
Anyhow, compared with the Korean associations, they worked towards their 
rehabilitation to homeland. The Ahıska Turkish associations made close contact 
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with the Turkish embassy and prepared and submit the list of the Ahıska Turkish 
families willing to migrate to Turkey.401 During the interview with the leaders of 
the Associations in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, they both said that their primary 
activities after the formation of the associations were emigration from the titular 
states to other places, if possible, to Turkey. 402  Within this framework, the 
associations made the necessary demands to the responsible authorities of titular 
states.  
On the contrary, the Koreans did not make any demands to the titular 
authorities. And unlike many other diaspora minorities, such as Russians, Germans 
and Ahıska Turks, the Koreans did not leave Kazakstan and Uzbekistan in large 
numbers. This fact coincided with the Koreans Associations’ (in Uzbekistan and 
Kazakstan) official stance. For example, the Association of the Koreans in 
Kazakstan’s vice President Gurri Khan stated at a session of the Assembly of 
Peoples of Kazakstan that they do not support the idea of Korean emigration from 
Kazakstan. He said, “for us Kazakstan has become our motherland.”403 Hence, the 
Korean Associations cooperated closely with the titular regime and tried to lobby 
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for their interest and representation. 
However this was only the official stance of the Associations. Like the 
Ahıska Turkish Associations, there was a lack of communication between the 
Association and the community members. Many ordinary Koreans, who were at the 
periphery of the movement, residing in rural areas were not aware of such activities 
of the Associations. Actually many Koreans were like Ahıska Turks in their 
indifference towards politics. Many of them think that nothing will be changed by 
voting in elections. But they often expressed disappointment that, in contrast to the 
former Soviet Union, there are few Koreans in the executive or legislative bodies at 
the national level. Nevertheless, in official appearance the Koreans looked more 
loyal to the regime (even in the eyes of the titular bureaucrats.)404 Some Soviet 
Koreans think that the Korean Association is too politically and business-oriented, 
although they concede that nothing can be done in the present political climate 
without money. 
It seems this is resulting from the psychological perception of their ethnic 
identity. Many Ahıska Turks perceived their ethnic identity in a negative form. That 
is, the Ahıska Turks think that, as during the times of the Soviet Union, they 
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continue to be an unwanted nationality in the region. They considered themselves as 
not being a privileged group in the region although they were ethnically and 
religiously similar to the titulars. Many Ahıska Turks have thought that they were 
among the most discriminated nationalities.405 On the other hand, many Koreans 
expressed their identity in positive terms. They think that their ethnic identity holds 
them in high regard, characterized by traits such as diligence, workaholic, patient, 
filled with goodwill, and persistent in achieving their goals.  In other words, they 
consider that the attitude of other nationalities towards Koreans has always been 
positive. Accordingly, many think that they are a wanted nationality in the host-
states for the development of the nation.406  Having carved a niche for themselves 
in the Soviet economy and transcended the status of criminality that brought their 
community to Central Asia, Koreans appear far more willing to embrace a “second 
among equals” status and adapt to the new reality of a titular dominated Kazakstan 
and Uzbekistan. By contrast, the Ahıska Turks are presented with an idealized 
vision of a better life in the distant homeland of Turkey and have had less success in 
transcending the status of “other” within which they have existed throughout the 
Soviet period. A comparison of Ahıska Turks’ and Koreans’ reactions after the 
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formation of their associations in titular states reveals a clear divergence in the 
degree to which these communities feel they may legitimately vest their future in 
the new states. 
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V.2.  Territorialization in Titular states 
Considering the aforementioned, this section will show a textured picture 
of re-territorialization identity within titular states as well as shed light on the 
general nature of diasporic identity in the context of post-Soviet space. As 
suggested by Table XV, which was acquired during the fieldwork, in comparison 
with the Ahıska Turkish community, a far higher percentage of Koreans consider 
the states they live in (Kazaktan and Uzbekistan) as their homeland. This constitutes 
the central issue in this examination of the territorialization of identity and compels an 
exploration of the degree to which members of both groups feel that they are capable 
of full integration into the civic nation. 
Table XV 
Q. Where is your homeland? (Multiple answer possible) 
Nationality Koreans (%) Ahıska Turks (%) 
Place of birth 46.3 20 
Soviet Union 20 0 
Titular States 
(Kazakstan/Uzbekistan) 
42 22.2 
Land of forefathers 
(Russian Far East / Ahıska region) 
22 80 
Historical Homeland 
(Korea / Turkey) 
43 96 
Source: Data derived from survey conducted in Kazakstan (2003) and Uzbekistan 
(2005) from Ahıska Turks and Koreans, 150 samples in each country and diaspora 
(total 600)  
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 Table XVI 
Q. Who should be considered native residents of titular states (Multiple answer possible) 
Nationality Koreans (%) Ahıska Turks (%)
Titulars (Kazak or Uzbek) 7.2 15 
All people who were born in titular states 52 38 
All citizens  50 42 
Difficult to say 2 5 
Source: Data derived from survey conducted in Kazakstan (2003) and Uzbekistan 
(2005) from Ahıska Turks and Koreans, 150 samples in each country and diaspora 
(total 600)  
 
Taken together, Table XV and XVI demonstrate that both groups attribute 
considerable value to “being born in a place” as a criterion of indigeneity. Such a 
trend was high among youths and middle-agers who think they have certain rights 
in their countries of residence. This, more or less reveals their desire rather then the 
reality of dwelling states. 
The following quote from a middle-aged Korean in Almaty conveys a 
common thread of interview responses from both communities, in which the 
complex interaction of ethnic, territorial, and national identities remains unsettled. It 
shows a dynamic process of identity formation. 
In my heart, I feel I am a native of this place – I mean this 
city or maybe this country. I don’t know. I know that I never 
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lived in Korea, neither did my father and mother. Thus I am 
not quite sure if it is my homeland. At the same time, however, 
I now live in a country that I did not choose. Neither did my 
father or grandfather choose to come here. I really don’t know. 
You ask me difficult questions.407 
In general, the Korean diaspora tend it to have a “hyphenated identity” 
which is composed of a territorial-based citizenship and ethnicity (i.e. Korean-
Kazakstani or Korean-Uzbekistani). On the other hand, such a trend rarely appears 
among the Ahıska Turks. In other words, there is a far greater willingness among 
Koreans to embrace a long-term association with the titular states.408 As one Kazak 
official stated, “Koreans were forced to come here, but once here, found a way to 
contribute greatly to the Soviet Union and now Kazakstan. It makes them an 
important part of the Kazakstani people.”409 In an instrumentalist sense, such a 
remark may have contributed to Koreans’ higher levels of territorialization within 
Kazakstan. In addition, a more sentimental approach to Koreans’ sense of belonging 
to Kazakstan is evident in many of their writings. However, Table XVII shows a 
                                                 
407 Interview with a member of the Korean diaspora, Anatoli Kim, Almaty, 2003. 
408 However, there is a difference of degree between the Koreans in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan. Koreans in 
Kazakstan tend to have more willingness compared with those in Uzbekistan. This is because, the Koreans in 
Uzbekistan were worried about the increasing Islamization and titular nationalism compared to relatively socio-
politically liberal Kazakstan. Such an anxiety in Uzbekistan makes less willingness to territorialize among the 
Koreans in Uzbekistan. 
409 “Kazakstanui Koroyoin,” Dong-a Ilbo, May 22 2005. 
 220
continued significance of ethnic self-conception. It seems that the prominence of 
ethnic identity among both groups results from a combination of the legacy of 
Soviet nationality policy and the role of the homeland after having contact with 
them. 
 
Table XVII 
Q. What is your primary community of belonging? (Multiple answers possible) 
Nationality Koreans Ahıska Turks 
Own ethnicity 98 100 
Soviet nation 20 0 
Kazakstani (citizenship) 38 13 
Source: Data derived from survey conducted in Kazakstan (2003) and Uzbekistan 
(2005) from Ahıska Turks and Koreans, 100 samples in each country and diaspora 
(total 400)  
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V.3.  Self-identification and Homeland Image 
The Ahıska Turks always defined themselves as Turkish. Their identity is 
significantly based on an emphasis on Turkishness, which derives from their belief 
that they were the only Turks in the Soviet Union and part of the Ottoman Empire 
and modern Turkey. Many Ahıska Turks stated that they enjoy quite a high degree 
of ethnic solidarity compared to other diasporas, indicating their strong self-
identification. Sometimes they even disparage Kazaks since many Kazaks do not 
know their own language. They considered this shameful and a symbol of weak 
ethnic identity. Even though in their passports in some cases they were defined as 
other ethnicities, they always recognized themselves as Turks (or Ahıska Turks).   
By referring to themselves as ‘Turks,’ which is the same self-designation used by 
their homeland compatriots, Ahıska Turks are rediscovering their Turkish heritage. 
It has helped to awaken and mobilize the Ahıska Turkish diaspora in Uzbekistan 
and Kazakstan.  Perhaps, this suggests a good lesson to the Koreans who use 
different self-designations between the homeland and the host state. While Koreans 
in the Korean peninsula indicate themselves ethnically as Han-Min Jok, they do not 
seem to extend this term to the Korean diaspora in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (and 
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other CIS regions as well).410  In addition, the members of the Korean diaspora in 
Kazakhstan refer themselves as ‘Koryo Saram.’  Although German Kim, a Korean 
diaspora scholar, argues the term ‘Koryo saram’ is appropriate for their designation 
since they had different experiences during the last decades,411 it seems that this 
will estrange the diapora from the homeland compatriots rather than bringing them 
together. This will not lead to the recovery of their divergent culture.  As German 
Kim notes, there are indeed some substantial cultural differences between the two 
peoples of the same origin.412 Many members of the Korean diaspora have been 
strongly Russified during the past decades.  However, this does not mean that one 
has to consider the Korean diaspora utterly distanced from the homeland Koreans. 
This is a tragedy that one must overcome. As seen from the case of the Ahıska 
Turks, a common designation between the disapora and their compatriots in the 
homeland seems to be the starting point to narrow the gap between them. 
In this context, the Ahıska Turks’ image of a homeland is clear and well 
constructed compared with that of the Korean diasporas. As Zlatko Skrbis argues, 
the relationship between ethnic homeland and diaspora is crucial in understanding 
                                                 
410 Chong Jin Oh, “Diaspora Nationalism: the case of ethnic Korean minority in Kazakhstan and its lessons 
from the Crimean Tatars in Turkey,” Nationalities Papers, vol. 34, no.2 (May, 2006), p.120. 
411 German Kim, “Koryo Saram or Koreans of the Former Soviet Union in the Past and Present,” unpublished 
article, 2003 
412 Ibid. 
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their ethnic identity and nationalism.413 The idea of homeland had always special 
meanings to the Ahıska Turks, as a romantically defined goal towards which almost 
every single aspect of an individual’s life was directed. To the Ahıska Turks, the 
homeland was a spatial representation which was influenced by political and 
cultural factors, rather than a simple fact of geography.414 Many elderly Ahıska 
Turks told the author that they would know the place and be able to find their way 
around even if they were blind.415 Such narratives of the homeland certainly form 
the logic and basis for their identity. Accordingly, almost all of the Ahıska Turks in 
Kazakstan and Uzbekistan feel themselves to be in a state of continuous exile. All 
Ahıska Turkish diasporas indicated during the course of fieldwork that they were 
outsiders, though they pointed to their cultural and linguistic ties to Kazakstan and 
Uzbekistan. Outsiders, such as Koreans and others from different cultures, might 
have a hard time differentiating Ahıska Turks’ culture, life style and language with 
the titulars, since they have many similarities. Yet, they do differentiate them with 
the titulars. Many Ahıska Turks argue that their language (dialectical difference), 
food, household design and style of dress distinguish them from the titulars who are 
                                                 
413 Zlatko Skrbis, Long-distance Nationalism: Diaspora, homelands and identities (Aldershot: Ashgate 
Publishing Ltd, 1999), p.38. 
414 As mentioned in the Chapter III, although the Ahıska region is now located as the part of Georgia, many 
Ahıska Turks consider their homeland as Turkey, since the region and themselves used to be the part of 
Ottoman Empire. 
415 Interview with Ahıska Turks, Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, 2003, 2005.; Here, as the same reason with the 
footnote 410, the Ahıska Turks describe the region (Ahıska) as part of Turkey. 
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also Turkic peoples.416 Moreover, they say that titulars (Uzbeks and Kazaks) refer 
to them as “Turks” though they themselves are also technically Turkic peoples.417 
Thus, although they are residing in Turkic Muslim countries, many Ahıska Turks 
think that being a Turk and preserving their tradition there is difficult.  A 
representative of the Ahıska Turks, Tafur Abuzer, argued in 1989, “There are no 
Meskhetian Turks just like there are no Uzbek Turks.” “There are only Turks and 
Uzbeks,” thus he claims that they should go to Turkey.418 Also the titular states’ 
nationalizing policies and trends all over the societies are pushing their emigration 
to their homeland. Even in Kazakstan, which has been reputed to be a relatively 
tolerant republic in Central Asia and where Almaty is still considered to be one of 
few places where Muslim, Jews, Protestants, and Orthodox Christians could live 
harmoniously, has become less welcoming towards non-Kazaks. Moreover, some of 
the Ahıska Turks confessed their anxiousness that they might be assimilated to the 
titular society in two or three generations if they would continue to live there 
without any help and support from their homeland and host-state. They showed 
their concern about their offspring losing their mother language and customs in 
urbanized cities. As Aydıngün notes, the fear of the disappearance of their 
                                                 
416 Interview with elderly Ahıska Turks, Kazakstan, 2003. 
417 Ibid. 
418 V. Knovratovich, “Sovetskie turki v poiskakh krova,” Izvestiia, 12 October, 1989, cited in Anatoly M. 
Khazanov, “Meskhetian Turks in Search of Self-Identity,” Central Asian Survey, vol.11, no.4 (1992), p.13. 
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community is pushing the Ahıska Turks to migrate to Turkey.419  In such a 
psychology, it is no wonder that the idea of emigration to Turkey is considered as 
the only solution. No doubt, such a mood resulted in having out-migration as the 
main task of the Ahıska Turkish Association. 
Since they did not see their future in the titular states, many Ahıska Turks 
wanted to sell their property to have money ready for the migration to Turkey. 
Initially, many of the Ahıska Turks expected Turkey’s help in organizing their 
migration to Turkey. Like the case of Germans or Jews they wanted to migrate with 
all of their family to their homeland country, i.e., Turkey. However, Turkey’s 
reaction was something paradoxical since their official stance and informal practice 
was different. The official position of Turkey toward the Ahıska Turks was to solve 
this problem within the context of its general policy towards all ethnic Turks outside 
Turkey.420 Therefore, officially the Turkish government wanted the Ahıska Turks to 
stay in their residing countries and develop their life there. Yet, informally, the 
Turkish government did not prevent the illegal migration of the Ahıska Turks to 
Turkey. Although there was a lack of political initiative and the desire from the 
Turkish government, they welcomed all the Ahıska Turks who came to Turkey, 
                                                 
419 Ayşegül Aydıngün, “Creating, Recreating and Redefining Ethnic Identity: Ahıska/Meskhetian Turks in 
Soviet and post-Soviet contexts,” Central Asian Survey, vol.21. no.2 (2002), p. 195. 
420 Zakir Avşar, “Ahıska Türkleri,” Türk Dünyası, vol.16 (July-August, 1997), p.1626. 
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whether they arrived legally or illegally. Consequently, Turkey’s policy toward the 
Ahıska Turks, was between Germany and Korea’s stance toward their co-ethnics 
abroad. Germany accepted their compatriot diasporas migrating to Germany after 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union. But the Korean government (South Korea) had 
a firm stance against the migration of the diaspora Koreans to Korea. The Korean 
government only wanted to cultivate cultural and economic ties with its co-ethnics 
in the CIS. Thus, the South Korean government hoped to avoid a massive 
immigration, which estimated around 650,000, of CIS Koreans to South Korea. 
Actually, Turkey’s paradoxical standpoint and policy also resulted from the 
fear of massive migration from Central Asia and elsewhere. At one point the 
Turkish government accepted a limited number of Ahıska Turks to Turkey. Under 
the law number 3835421 on July 2nd 1992, which is the law concerning the 
acceptance and settlement of Ahıska Turks in Turkey, the Ahıska Turks received the 
status of settled immigrants and had certain benefits.422 The Act provided property 
rights for the Ahıska Turks, support for shelter, settlement and transportation of 
their to Turkey and even allowed dual citizenship.423 It was a generous and 
expansive piece of legislation, however, it was not fully enacted. With this 
                                                 
421 see appendix for the Legislation number 3835. 
422 Zakir Avşar and Zafer Tunçalp, Sürgünde 50. Yıl Ahıska Türkleri (Ankara: TBMM Kültür, Sanat ve Yayın 
Kurulu Yayın, no.30, 1994), pp.49, 78. 
423 see appendix for the Legislation number 3835. 
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legislation only 500 Ahıska Turkish families could settle in Turkey in 1992 and 
1993.424 Although, the legal measures to accept the Ahıska Turks to Turkey were 
applied for a limited time with limited people, informally Turkey continued to 
receive those who migrated to Turkey by their own means.425 But this didn’t lead to 
a mass migration of Ahıska Turks to Turkey.  Because even though they were 
allowed to resettle in Turkey unofficially, they have been excluded from all social 
security and welfare systems since they did not receive Turkish citizenship. They 
are approved illegal aliens without any rights. This meant that they had to withstand 
all hardships for a certain period (until they received citizenship) in order to have a 
proper resettlement and life. Such a situation automatically discouraged mass 
migration to a large extent. Those who were well off or had higher education in the 
titular states couldn’t take such venture. For example, they heard from those Ahıska 
Turks who have migrated to Turkey during the early stage that reality was often 
inconsistent with the dream that compelled their return. This is not overtly 
surprising given the tendency for diasporic peoples to construct essentialized, 
idealistic visions of their homeland during their years of dispersal. It has been the 
case for numerous other groups inspired to migrate on the basis of an essentialized 
                                                 
424 Ibid.; in 1992 150 families and 350 families in 1993. 
425 They come with a tourist visa and then somehow get a working permit, later a resident permit. According to 
an Ahıska Turk immigrant to Turkey, it is not so difficult to get Turkish nationality. He said, one could get 
citizenship around after five years. 
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“return myth,” the reality of integration within the homeland is often more 
complicated than anticipated. According to an elderly Ahıska Turk, who came back 
from Turkey and resettled in Sirdarya, Uzbekistan, Turkey became too westernized 
in terms of culture and language that he was disappointed and had a hard time 
adopting himself to this new environment.426 Like many other Ahıska Turks, he had 
been obliged to live in an isolated way for decades and was unaware of the changes 
that were going on in Turkey. Actually, for them preserving the Ottoman traditions 
was the main engine for the survival of the community. Many elderly Ahıska Turks 
or Soviet Koreans, didn’t seem to understand that the culture doesn’t stand in the 
same place. With the transformation of the traditional society to an industrial one 
and with the global internationalization, this type of culture (e.g., customs, rituals, 
beliefs, moral norms, etc.) has been transformed into industrial-urban culture. To 
conclude, migration to their homeland is an expansive and arduous undertaking for 
Ahıska Turks. This fact divides the potential migrants into those more thoroughly 
territorialized and those simply lacking the finical resources to move. The second of 
these categories brings into question the level of development of the homeland 
(Turkey): its potential to support or sponsor return migration. 
Among the youth and middle-aged Ahıska Turks, the importance of their 
                                                 
426 Interview with an elderly Ahıska Turk, Sirdarya, 2005. 
 229
homeland started to have a practical and real dimension which is related to 
economic survival. For example, in 2005, which is about a decade after the 
titular’s independence, when the author asked people about which country they 
consider their homeland, Ahıska Turks often responded by stating among other 
things, an explanation of what an ideal homeland is. This includes a description 
of the ideal economic and social conditions of living in a homeland. Currently, in 
Kazakstan, and to some extent Uzbekistan, Ahıska Turks were able to attain 
relative economic prosperity. For, younger Ahıska Turks and people in their 
thirties and forties, life in Kazakstan is relatively prosperous. As Ahmet, a truck 
driver and a father of three children in his forties, told the author, “Home is where 
you can have your own house and where you can send your children to school 
and where they can have a future.”427 When contemplating the possibility of 
migrating to Turkey, Ahmet and many other young Ahıska Turks understand that 
without land and support for economic life, migration is not feasible, even if the 
law allows it. They also require houses to be built for them to live in. Yıldız, who 
runs a small business in Turkistan and claims himself as an ardent nationalist 
admitted this and argues, “Of course we want to return, but we need houses and 
                                                 
427 Interview with Ahmet Ali-Osman oğlu Nabiyev , a truck driver in Chimkent, 2003. 
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land. Without these it is not possible to go back.”428 The characteristic of this 
younger generation is that they have a pragmatic image of their homeland and a 
myth of return rather than having the nostalgic longing for their homeland. One 
elderly Ahıska Turk lamented the current situation as such; “Previously, we 
couldn’t travel as the law prevented it, now money stop us.”429 In the case of the 
Ahıska Turks, the question becomes not whether they would like to migrate to 
Turkey but whether they feel they that they have a right to do so. It gives them a 
certain feeling of comfort to possess the right to migrate to their homeland, i.e., 
Turkey, even if they might not actually migrate at the moment due to economic 
and other reasons. In general, all the Ahıska Turks hope to see their future in 
Turkey and perceive it as the only place where they can feel at home. 
Compared with the Ahıska Turks, the Soviet Koreans take on a new aspect 
on their self-identification and their homeland image. Rather than searching for the 
common Koreanness with the homeland, many Korean diaspora intellectuals tended 
to underscore their distinctiveness. Many Korean diaspora organizations and the 
Korean government (South Korea) made a great effort for a national revival in the 
last decade.  Its main thesis was “all of us are Koreans.” Thus the paradigm of 
                                                 
428 Interview with Yıldız Osmanov, Turkistan, 2003. 
429 Interview with an elderly Ahıska Turk, Tashkent, 2005. 
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national revival was the reviving Korean culture, Korean language, and developing 
Korean identity. It was directed at the strengthening of Korean idea and Korean 
unity. And the model of this Koreanness in the revival was from South Korea (in 
terms of language and culture). Accordingly, many Korean diaspora intellectuals 
started to rethink about this national revival. Valeriy Khan argued, “There are many 
programs of national revival but it is not easy to find clear theoretical understanding 
of the essence of national revival in these programs.”430 Also, German Kim wrote, 
“As for reviving Korean customs and traditions we have more questions than 
answers.”431 The problem for them was that they wanted to have clear theoretical 
understanding of the national essence of Soviet Koreans. 
Many Korean diaspora intellectuals argue that Koreans in Central Asia and 
Koreans from the peninsula have many common features: customs, food, language, 
anthropological type, etc. On the other hand they also argue that there are many 
differences in customs, food, language, etc.  Valeriy Khan notes, “Even outward 
appearance is not same. At least it is not difficult to distinguish Koreans from 
Uzbekistan from Koreans in Korea.”432 He goes even further in saying that Koreans 
                                                 
430  Valeriy Khan, “Paradigmy i problemy natsional’nogo dvizheniia: sotsio-filosofskii analiz,” Izvestiia 
koreevedeniia v kazakhstane i srednei azii, vol.1 (1993), p. 23. 
431 German Kim, “Topical problems of Korean Diaspora in Kazakhstan,” Izvestiia koreevedeniia Kazakhstana, 
vol.1 (1996), p. 85. 
432 Interview with Valeriy Khan, Tashkent, 2005. ; Valeriy Khan, “Paradigms and problems of national 
movements: Social-philosophical analysis,” Occasional Papers, vol.2 (Korean-American Historical Society) 
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in Central Asia differ from both North and South Koreans in language, mentality, 
values, outlook, behavior, customs and traditions.433 He says, Soviet Koreans’ 
cultural genetic fund is synthetical. It is the synthesis of traditional Korean, Russian, 
Central Asian and European cultures.434 Actually many Soviet Koreans living in 
urban areas, generally who had more chance to have contact with Koreans (South 
Koreans), stated that sometimes Koreans from homeland are more alien for Soviet 
Koreans than Russians, Uzbeks, or Kazaks. They said that for Soviet Koreans in 
Central Asia very often it is easy to understand the psychology and behavior of 
Russians, Uzbeks, Kazaks than the psychology of Koreans from Korea. Dimitri 
Men, a Korean diaspora Professor in Almaty state University in the history 
department gave his idea of self-identification as such;435  
Am I Korean in general? Yes, I am if we take my genetic roots. But 
I have many essential differences from Korean Koreans. Who am 
I? We can identify myself in the following way: I am Korean by 
my genetic roots, I was educated in the Soviet system, my native 
language is Russian, my outlook is based on world culture, I have 
                                                                                                                                        
(1996), p.23. 
433 Valeriy Khan, “The Korean Minority in Central Asia: National Revival and Problem of Identity,” 
International Journal of Central Asian Studies, vol.3 (1998), p.69. 
434 Ibid. 
435 Interview with Dimitri Men in Almaty, 2003. 
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European-Asian thought, I am adopted to various cultural 
environments and I live in Kazakstan. Thus, the so-called Korean 
nature has not been a dominating factor in my human nature. 
 
Accordingly, he said, it would be naturally illogical if Koreans from homeland 
expect the Soviet Koreans to bear the same psychology and same value orientations.  
To a certain extent, such negative statements or reactions result from the 
homeland or the associations’ excessive attempt to dictate a model of behavior and 
consciousness to the Soviet Koreans. In the initial phases, all the members of the 
Koreans diaspora suddenly felt themselves Koreans and wanted to be similar to 
homeland Koreans.436 There was a boom of Korean language, culture, and trend 
during this period. In fact, this seemed to be a phenomenon of mechanical imitation. 
Such an attempt to imitate the homeland Koreans led the Soviet Korean intellectuals 
to have the complex of being defective Koreans. Therefore, while reviving the 
tradition and culture of homeland not only the level of external attributes but also 
the level of the internal content should be considered in order to overcome the 
criticism of being an external imitation of homeland culture. As German Kim 
                                                 
436  Valeriy Khan, “Paradigms and problems of national movements: Social-philosophical analysis,” 
Occasional Papers, vol.2 (Korean-American Historical Society) (1996), p.19. 
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pointed out, recovering the cultural and, to some extent, language difference should 
not be a lopsided imposition of the homeland (South Korean) culture.437 In fact, 
South Koreans very often try to impose their culture on the Soviet Koreans as if that 
is the meaning of cultural revival. It should also not be forgotten that these Soviet 
Koreans were one of the most integrated ethnic to the Soviet society. As their 
dissimilation from the Korean culture was a process that occurred over decades, 
their re-embracing of it would also take time, if it is to take place totally or partially 
at all.  
Since the Korean government has a firm stance against the repatriation of 
the Soviet Koreans, almost none of them see their future in (South) Korea. As a 
result, many former Soviet Koreans seemed to decide their resettlement in the 
titular states, generally Kazakstan since they perceived it as more multi-ethnic with 
a relatively liberal atmosphere compare with other republics in the region. Such a 
decision is continuously reaffirmed by the Korean diaspora associations during their 
gatherings. Compared with Turkey, which has a more flexible attitude toward its 
diasporas, Korea showed its clear commitment that it will help its diasporas but not 
allow the repatriation. While Turkey’s immigration policy has steadily become less 
                                                 
437 Interview with German Kim, Professor, Koreans Studies Department, The Sate University of Kazakstan, 
2003. ; German Kim, “Koryo Saram or Koreans of the Former Soviet Union in the Past and Present,” 
unpublished article, 2003. 
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welcoming over the last decade, South Korea’s policy reveals an even more overt 
resistance to diasporic return migration. The Turkish president, Süleyman Demirel 
showed his commitment to the Ahıska Turks in the Turkish Daily News in 1999, as 
“Turkey is a receiving country with many demands but Ahıska Turks had always 
been given priority in migration.” On the other hand, he also proceeded to state that, 
“[our] goal is not to offer citizenship in Turkey but to revise the nationalization 
process in the titular state where these Turks lived.”438 Accordingly, it showed the 
typical contradictory policies of Turkey, between the official and informal measures. 
However, when the president of Korea, Kim Youngsam, first visited Kazakstan to 
celebrate the first CIS Korean festival with the President of Kazakstan Nazarbayev 
in 1993, he delivered the clear message of the homeland. He said;  
“My dear countrymen! Your long friendship with the peoples of 
Kazakstan is an important bridge in the heartfelt good-neighbor 
relations between our two countries. I hope that you will continue 
to work to develop Korean culture and traditions with pride and 
that you will also continue to fulfill your social obligation to the 
state of Kazakstan. I also hope that you are able to partake in the 
development and growth of our common homeland. As for our part, 
                                                 
438 Turkish Daily News, January 29, 1999. 
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we guarantee that your historical homeland is prepared to help you 
and protect your peaceful and prosperous future in Kazakstan.”439 
 
In response to this, the President of Kazakstan noted: 
“In Kazakstan, we honor the great work of our Korean citizens 
toward the development of our economic and cultural life and its 
future potential. We know the Koreans well as great masters of 
labor as well as important figures in the world of science, culture, 
and art. I would like to express my sincere confidence that our 
Korean citizens will always have a special place in our republic 
and will be able to apply their national traits of wisdom, love of 
work, and desire of knowledge to their participation in economic, 
social, cultural, and political activities of our state.”440 
 
By and large, such official announcements have led the Soviet Koreans to 
see their future in the titular state and accelerated a percentage of Koreans 
conceptualizing the titular states (Kazakstan and Uzbekistan) as their homeland. In 
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other words, this constitutes the central issue in this examination of the 
territorialization of Korean diasporas’ identity. These statements reflect the realization 
that for the community to exist in Kazakstan, its members must vest themselves in the 
state, not simply at a micro-level but as members of the citizenry at large. This 
nesting of identity is far more prominent among Koreans whose urbanized localism is 
couched within an increasingly cosmopolitan self-conception as Kazakstani 
citizens.441 A measure of cosmopolitan trends are also evident among urbanized 
Ahıska Turks but lack the goal of an eventual acceptance of the state-level civic, 
“Kazakstani” identity. 
A Korean diaspora scholar, German Kim, gives his idea of returning to the 
homeland as such, which more or less reflects the thought of Korean diaspora in 
general : 
“It is not so important whether the homeland governments (South or 
North Korea) are interested in repatriation of Soviet Koreans. We know 
the fact that South Korea is a very crowded country. Thus, every year 
tens of thousands of South Koreans are pushed out of their homeland 
for a myriad of different reasons,442 and hundreds of thousands of 
                                                 
441 Tae Hyeon Back, “The Social Reality Faced by Ethnic Koreans in Central Asia,” Korean and Korean 
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North Koreans are running away from North Korea trying to escape 
starvation. So how can we talk about repatriation? But even if such an 
appeal sounded from Korea, I don’t think that many Soviet Koreans 
would move to their historical motherland.  I have already explained 
the reasons: we would be aliens there, we do not know the language, we 
have a different mentality, habits, way of life, we cannot live in a mono-
ethnic environment, and we would be absolutely incompetent there. I 
have experienced it myself. In Korea, despite the distant but existing 
kinship, I felt as a stranger.”443 
 
Actually, the likelihood of advancement for even native-born Koreans is 
complicated and requires a combination of social networking, specialized training, 
and a great deal of hard work. Viktor Kim, a graduate student in Uzbekistan, gives 
his impression after his recent visit to South Korea as follows: “Our people do not 
have contacts in the business world of Korea, our education is not highly respected 
and, to be honest, they work very hard there – harder then we are accustomed to.” It 
is, therefore, considered illogical for relatively successful Soviet Koreans to migrate 
                                                                                                                                        
ethnic Koreans from the country. 
443 Interview with German Kim, Almaty, 2003. 
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to South Korea. 
Despite the Koreans and the Ahıska Turks’ historical association with 
Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, a variety of factors effect the groups’ collective 
willingness to vest itself in the future of the new states. While, at least in theory, 
most Ahıska Turks clearly favored emigration, the majority of Soviet Koreans have 
opted to embrace Central Asia, and quite often Kazakstan, as their homeland. 
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V.4.  Language Revival and Education 
Compared with the Korean diaspora, the Ahıska Turks preserved their 
language far better, since Ahıska Turks somehow used their language to identify 
themselves and used it as a tool against assimilation. Table XVIII, which is the data 
collected from the 2001 Statistical yearbook of Kazakstan, prepared by the 
European Union’s Tacis program, somehow illustrates the general situation of 
language knowledge of Ahıska Turks and Koreans. 
 
Table XVIII444 
Level of Language Knowledge of Ahıska Turkish and Korean Diasporas 
Among them those who know language 
Native (TU/KR) Kazak Russian 
Nationalities 
Total 
Population 
Thsd. 
person 
Thsd. 
person
As % of 
total 
population
Thsd. 
Person
As % of 
total 
population 
Thsd. 
person 
As % of 
total 
population
Korean 99.7 25.7 25.8% 28.7 28.8% 97.4 97.7% 
Ahıska 
Turk 
78.7 59.6 75.7% 57.8 73.4% 59.5 75.6% 
Source: European Union Tacis Program, Statistical Year Book of Kazakhstan 
(Almaty: Agency on Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2001), p.434 
 
                                                 
444 As mentioned earlier, due to some difficulties of calculating the Ahıska Turkish population, data in this table 
seems not accurate; moreover, Ahıska Turks are artificially and arbitrarily divided into “Ahıska Turks” and 
“Turks” in the original data. Thus, the Ahıska Turks’ data shown in Table XVI are reorganized (combined) by 
the author. However, these data give some information about the knowledge of language between Ahıska Turk 
and Koreans.  
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Although the Ahıska Turkish community has, by and large, preserved its 
native language, recently signs of change are visible among those who live in cities, 
and especially among those who have higher education. Thus, many Ahıska Turkish 
intellectuals point out that the lack of education in Turkish is an important factor 
contributing to the loss of language, especially children born and raised in the urban 
centers of Kazakstan and Uzbekistan. Moreover, since the elderly people, who 
possessed high levels of tradition and language, are now aging and passing away, it 
has become more difficult for the younger generation to learn and speak Turkish. 
Although there are schools and Universities founded by Turkish charities or 
religious organizations and also Turkish departments in major universities, 
unfortunately these institutions are not designed to help the ethnic revitalization of 
the Ahıska Turks. In general, all these Turkish institutions have a bigger agenda, 
such as the solidarity of all Turkic peoples in Eurasia. Thus, there aren’t any 
organized language courses to revitalize the mother language for the Ahıska Turkish 
diaspora.  
On the other hand, the Soviet Koreans have many organized language 
teaching institutions all over the titular republic. At the beginning of the 1990s there 
was a certain boom in learning the Korean language among the Soviet Koreans and 
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numerous courses in Korean were organized by Korean cultural centers and Korean 
missionary churches. Perhaps this can be related to the Korean diaspora’s urgent 
desire to revive their language compared with the Ahıska Turks. Also, the Korean 
government overtly supported the revitalization of their compatriots’ mother 
language. Many language centers were established with the help of the Korean 
government and many Korean books, dictionaries, computers and other technical 
assistance were provided by South Korea. In the regions where the Koreans lived in 
a compact form, such as Ushtobe (near Almaty) in Kazakstan and Politotdel (near 
Tashkent) in Uzbekistan, the Soviet Koreans have managed to organize Korean 
language courses as part of the regular curriculum in primary and secondary 
education.445 In other words, the Korean language has been taught at schools (from 
elementary to high school), and even in Kindergartens. In higher education, 
numerous Korean departments were opened after the 1990s in a number of 
universities and colleges in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan. The total number of students 
of Korean departments in Kazakstan is about 250, and in Uzbekistan there are about 
350.446 The most well known Korean departments in Kazakstan are in the State 
                                                 
445 The author couldn’t get the exact number of schools that are giving Korean language in regular curriculum, 
however according to the information gathered from a member of the Korea Association, there are about 13 
schools in Kazakstan and 19 schools in Uzbekistan. 
446 Also in Kyrgyzstan there are 250 students in 3 main universities, therefore in Central Asia there are around 
nearly 1000 students, mainly the Soviet Korean students, who are studying the Korean language.; German Kim, 
“Korean Studies in Kazakstan and Central Asia: the Past, the Present, and the Future,” paper presented in the 
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University of Kazakstan and Almaty State University. In the case of Uzbekistan 
there is a Korean department even in the pedagogical university which has almost 
200 students itself. Tashkent Nizami Pedagogical University, and the Institute of 
Oriental Studies are the two main universities in Uzbekistan, where specialists in 
Korean studies are trained. One of the big differences between these institutions 
compared with Turkish departments in the region is that the majority of students of 
Korean departments are from the Korean diaspora. Both in Uzbekistan and 
Kazakstan, the Korean diaspora constitutes around 80 percent (sometimes more, in 
the case of Tashkent Nizami Pedagogical University Korean diaspora compose 92 
percent of its students) of students in Korean departments.447 There is only one 
exception in the State University of Kazakstan where the Korean diaspora represent 
only one third of its students due to the official policy of supporting Kazak 
students.448 According to Vronislav Lee, the chairman of the Korean department at 
Tashkent Nizami Pedagogical University, reasons why young people enter Korean 
departments are as follows:449 (Order is according to the preference) 
1. Nationality 
                                                                                                                                        
17th AKSE (The Association for Korean Studies in Europe) conference, April 1995. 
447 One of the interesting things about the students in the Korean departments is that most of the students are 
girls, boys constitute only about 10-20 percent. If we consider the role of women and their influence while 
raising their children this data suggests something positive to the language revival of Koreans diasporas in the 
future.; German Kim, “Korean Studies in Kazakstan and Central Asia: the Past, the Present, and the Future,” 
paper presented in the 17th AKSE (The Association for Korean Studies in Europe) conference, April 1995. 
448 Ibid. 
449 Interview with Vronislav Lee, Tashkent, 2005. 
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2. Parent’s wish 
3. Possibility to go to Korea 
4. Possibility to get a good job after graduation (For example with Korean 
Conglomerates, Samsung and LG) 
 
Accordingly, unlike the Turkish departments in the region, the Korean departments 
are playing a crucial role in revitalizing and preserving the Korean language for the 
Soviet Koreans in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan. 
In addition, numerous churches around the region, even in the rural areas, 
provide Korean language courses to the Korean diaspora free of charge whenever 
they express an interest in it. However, such classes are not a part of any larger 
revitalization effort on the part of the churches. As pastor Lee Bumsuk in Tashkent 
explained, the Korean church is not seeking out Koreans per se, and neither is the 
church attempting to play any direct role in a nationalizing project.450 Nevertheless, 
the existence of Koreans in the region has made it possible for them to gain a 
foothold in that country and seemingly this allows the South Korean missionaries to 
play a role in the fostering of transnational network among co-ethnics. As a 
consequence, many Korean churches, including the American churches ran by 
Korean-Americans, hold Korean language classes for church members as well as 
                                                 
450 Interview with Pastor Lee Bumsuk, Tashkent, 2005. 
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for other locals (including Korean diaspora and titulars) on a formal basis. As a 
result, these churches indirectly contribute to the revitalization activities, though it 
may not be intentional on their part. In other words, their contribution to the 
language (or tradition) revival can be assessed as an unintended consequence of the 
missionaries’ evangelizing work. 
There are also some differences for the reasons to learn the mother 
language between the Ahıska Turkish and Korean diasporas. By and large, Ahıska 
Turks have symbolic or primordial reasons for seeking language and cultural 
education; on the other hand, the Korean diaspora seems to have more instrumental 
reason. When the author asked Soviet Koreans what their goals were in learning 
Korean, many Koreans stated that learning Korean would be useful for professional 
opportunities. One interviewee professed that their learning of Korean was not an 
interest in the nationalizing projects pre se, but to study or work in South Korea or 
to find employment, possibly with a South Korean firm, which are certainly 
instrumental reasons. For example, the narrative of Vladimir Pak, a 26 years old 
Korean from Tashkent gives an idea of the issue. Vladimir grew up on the Korean 
collective farm in Politotdel near Tashkent and is a bilingual Russian-Korean 
speaker. After graduating from university, he obtained an internship with a South 
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Korean firm in Seoul, where he worked as an apprentice for two years. There he 
learned to speak the standard Korean dialect and has been employed as a director of 
the TashCom Computer School in Tashkent for the last few years. As this is a South 
Korean company, his manager is a South Korean. Vladimir acts as his manager’s 
unofficial liaison to the outside community, and he also provides translating and 
interpreting services for him. Vladimir considers himself very fortunate in that he 
grew up speaking Korean. He attributes his language skills in helping him to get the 
internship in South Korea and to secure employment with a South Korean company 
in Tashkent. Consistent with this case, many Soviet Koreans acknowledge that 
language abilities certainly can work in their favor. 
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V.5.  Compact Living vs. Urbanization  
One characteristic feature of the Korean diaspora society in post-
independence Uzbekistan and Kazakstan has been its accelerated pace of 
urbanization. This phenomenon is far more conspicuous among the Korean diaspora 
than among other nationalities, of course, including the Ahıska Turks, in Uzbekistan 
and Kazakstan. Table XIX summarizes the urbanization of the Korean diaspora in 
Kazakstan and Uzbekistan. 
 
Table XIX 
Urban and Rural Population Ratios of the Korean diasporas in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan 
Year 1970 1979 1989 1999 
Urban 73.5 80.1 84.1 87 Kazakstan 
Rural 26.5 19.9 15.9 13 
Year 1959 1970 1979 1989 
Urban 15 57 72 80 Uzbekistan 
Rural 85 43 28 20 
Source: A.D.Pak, Demograficheskaia Kharakteristika Koreitsev v Kazakhstane i 
srednei azii (Almaty: 2002), pp.27, 42. 
 
As seen from the Table XIX, at present approximately 90 percent of the 
Soviet Koreans live in cities, which marks them as one of the most urbanized ethic 
groups in Central Asia. Increasing urbanization has been evident among Koreans 
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since the 1970s, and has involved trends of migration from poorer regions to 
wealthier regions and resettlement in more cosmopolitan settings. This trend has 
brought about considerable changes in the Korean community. Longstanding areas 
of compact living, such as the Korean kolkhozes or sovkhozes, have witnessed a 
major reduction in the percentage of Korean inhabitants these days, thereby altering 
the ethnic nature of these places. According to Tae Hyeon Back, the present pattern 
of resettlement is better described as an exodus from farming areas to escape from 
economic problems than as urbanization for the purpose of individual 
advancement.451 In any case, the Soviet Koreans in their 30s and 40s with any 
economic means have been leaving the countryside for the cities. 
What is more, group resettlement is quite rare among these Koreans - most 
Soviet Koreans make decisions to relocate on the basis of their individual situations 
and inclinations. When asked the question, “Is it important to live in an area of 
compact living?” 68.7 percent of the Korean respondents stated that the existence of 
an area of compact living was essential for preservation of their culture in 
Uzbekistan and Kazakstan.452 However, 57 percent of the Koreans revealed that 
                                                 
451 Tae Hyeon Back, “The Social Reality Faced by Ethnic Koreans in Central Asia,” Korean and Korean 
American Studies Bulletin, vol.12, no.2/3 (2001), p.46. 
452Sang Cheol Kim, Im Young Sang, “Jung-ang Asia jee-yuk 3, 4 Saedae Koryo-in ŭ-shik-kwa Seng-hwal 
Munwha Byeon-wha”, Project Paper, Center for International Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign 
Studies, 2001. 
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they did not feel that they (personally) should live within a compact Korean 
settlement.453 Therefore in urban areas, where most of the Soviet Koreans are 
located, they live more independently, confining themselves within small nuclear 
families. In contrast, the majority of the Ahıska Turks are settled in the rural areas 
of Kazakstan and Uzbekistan and they live in closely-knit communities, which help 
them to retain their language and traditions. Moreover, their migration pattern is 
different from that of the Koreans. Rather than individual migration they prefer 
group migration. Thus, even in the big cities, such as Almaty or Tashkent, they form 
their own quarter-hood in the suburban area maintaining their area of compact 
living. Ahmet, an Ahıska Turks in Tashkent said to the author, “We chose 
community over family life.” “Instead of family unit migration, Ahıska Turks 
choose to be with other Turks first.”454  In sum, if they had the option to be with 
only their families in an area, say somewhere in Almaty, where there were no other 
Turks, many Ahıska Turks choose to move to an area where there are Turks. As a 
result, in Uzbekistan or Kazakstan Ahıska Turks have lived closer together. To be 
sure, they also show signs of urbanization and scatteration, especially among those 
who have higher education. However, even in such exceptional cases, many young 
                                                 
453 Ibid. 
454 Interview with an Ahıska Turk, Ahmet Ali-Osman oğlu Nabiyev, Tashkent, 2005. 
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Ahıska Turks still preserve some of their traditions and their ethnic identity in urban 
areas and resist assimilation. Besides, such a behavioral distinction between 
educated and uneducated or rural and urban is a phenomenon that can be found in 
every diaspora community. Compared with the Korean diaspora there is no serious 
question of the loss of compactness in their settlements which is an important factor 
in disintegration. 
It is clear that the practice of endogamy contributes to this rigid structure, 
and thus to the survival of the Ahıska Turkish community. Many village headmen in 
the Ahıska Turkish villages proudly mentioned to the author that they rarely give 
their brides away to other nationalities. Mixed marriages, even with other Muslim 
communities were not accepted. On the other hand, in the case of the Korean 
diaspora, the last ten to fifteen years have witnessed a significant rise in the 
proportion of inter-ethnic marriages among urban Koreans. Such cases are more 
visible in Almaty rather than in Uzbekistan. The Korean diaspora in Almaty tend to 
have more openness and bohemian-lifestyle compared with those Korean diaspora 
in Uzbekistan. In Almaty, a city that is home to one in every five Koreans in 
Kazakstan, approximately 40 percent of marriages take place across ethnic lines.455 
                                                 
455 Natalia Em, “K probleme national’nosmeshannykh brakov (po reszul’tatom aktovykh zapisei gorarkhiva 
ZAGS Almaty),” Izvestiia Koreevedeniia Kazakhstana, vol.2 (1997), p.43. 
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As a result, the present generation of diaspora Koreans includes a large group of 
marginal Koreans with very weakly developed ethnic consciousness. What is more, 
uncertainty in current socio-political changes lead many Koreans to have general 
tendency to have fewer children, which eventually results in the danger of natural 
depopulation. Certainly, the nuclearization of Korean settlement in the titular 
republics aggravates the problem of preserving the Korean diaspora as an 
independent ethnos. In this context, the Korean diaspora nationalists are anxious 
about a Balkanization of what was once a single ethnic group, “the Soviet 
Koreans.”  To be sure, the widening of policy differences between Uzbekistan and 
Kazakstan, would lead to a different range of living environments for Koreans.  
One way or another, this might affect the intra-ethnic consolidation of the Soviet 
Koreans between Uzbekistan and Kazakstan. 
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V.6.  Socio-economic Issues 
The Soviet Koreans were well known, prior to independence, for their zeal 
and their achievements in education, and this reputation still prevails in Uzbekistan 
and Kazakstan. The Soviet Koreans have always enjoyed considerable social 
prestige as scholars, teachers, doctors, lawyers, engineers and technicians of all 
descriptions, accountants, etc. Moreover, successes in these professions helped to 
secure their socio-economic status.  However, the changes in the economy since 
the independence of the titulars have created a situation of pursuing material wealth 
in the first place. And this has redirected the attitudes of the Korean diaspora toward 
their employment. In other words, the Korean diaspora has become more 
materialistic in their employment preferences as a result of the transition to a market 
economy. Many Koreans are currently engaged in commercial activities of various 
descriptions. However, many Korean diaspora intellectuals point out that such a 
situation drastically threatens to lower their intellectual level in the future. To be 
sure, this trend is influencing the younger generation, whose educational and 
academic achievements are declining noticeably. A large number of Soviet Koreans 
formerly active in science, education, health care, culture and other fields have left 
them for small and medium-sized businesses. Other Koreans have reinvented 
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themselves as interpreters and translators for South Korean business and churches. 
Actually, since independence, many Korean professionals were under the pressure 
of the low wage level and experienced difficulty obtaining promotions in the public 
sector.  
It must also be said that increasingly frequent contacts with South Koreans, 
too, have accelerated the materialistic turn of the Korean diaspora society. Since 
independence, a substantial number of South Korean businessmen, from the biggest 
Conglomerates down to lower-level representatives of private business, have set up 
offices and factories in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan. Moreover, large numbers of 
South Korean missionaries are active in numerous areas throughout Uzbekistan and 
Kazakstan.456 While the missionaries do not have the same goals as the business 
people, both need the help of local Koreans in order to establish themselves as 
quickly as possible. Some Soviet Koreans have been able to hone their economic 
instincts quite rapidly through contacts with these South Koreans, and have also 
been quicker to find better job openings. On the other hand, these contacts have had 
a number of undesirable side effects.  
At present, most of the Soviet Koreans, regardless of their level of 
                                                 
456 Numerous protestant churches (sects) are activating in Central Asia. It is impossible to estimate them since 
their activities are veiled. The major protestant sects in Korea are; the Presbyterian church, Methodist church, 
Baptist church and Holiness church. However, there are more than 100 sects of Protestant churches in Korea. 
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educational attainment, living in the Central Asian cities are engaged in business. 
This trend toward commercial enterprise among the in Korean diaspora community 
enables the Korean diaspora to adapt quickly to a new economy, and in many 
regions one might even say that they are leading the way in this respect. In some 
instances, the Korean diaspora entrepreneurs have taken over special areas. For 
example, in Almaty the distribution network for the South Korean electronic goods 
and food items is mostly controlled by the Korean diaspora. In Tashkent, the Soviet 
Koreans have taken the lead in the computer business.  In 1999, more than 1,500 
Korean diaspora businesses were registered in Almaty, which has a total Korean 
diaspora population of just 19,000.457 Thus the Korean diaspora accounts for a 
significant proportion of all businesses registered in city. 458  If one adds the 
unregistered, small-scale Korean diaspora businesses and the Korean vendors in the 
wholesale and retail marketplaces, a majority of the Soviet Koreans in Almaty is 
involved in some kind of business. 
In the same vein, Ahıska Turks also sought for opportunities to capture 
specialized areas and niche economies. They also understood that business 
enterprises allow the greatest possibilities for accumulating wealth on the basis of 
                                                 
457 Dmitri Men, “Smena pkolenii sredi koreitsev Kazakhstana i izmeneniia v ikh etnicheskom samosoznanii,” 
Koryo Ilbo, July 14, 2000. 
458 Ibid. 
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individual effort and ability. The fields of self-employment or home business that 
are flourishing at present are farming and commerce.459 In Uzbekistan, most Ahıska 
Turks are involved in the farming enterprise. In Kazakstan, they are also in farming 
business, however, the author witnessed quite a number of truck or taxi drivers as 
well, who were all self-employed.  With the 1992 enactment of privatization as a 
part of economic reforms, the sovkhozes and kolkhozes were privatized, and land 
usage rights were also transferred to non-government hands. Ahıska Turks used 
much of this policy for their economical survival. Private farming has become 
prominent among the Ahıska Turks after the independence. Moreover, their farming 
enterprise represents, perhaps, a new historical type of agricultural production that 
combines elements of socialist collective system with small-scale capitalist farm 
management in order to maximize personal profit. The farming cooperatives of 
today resembles this model, but the greatest change has been that all land owned by 
each cooperative is now invested for the cooperative as a whole by each individual 
member. The members farm this land collectively and share the profits. Almost all 
members of the these farms are composed of Ahıska Turk family units. For the 
Ahıska Turks, as an ethnic minority in a multi-ethnic state, forming micro-
communities based on close kin relations was a social necessity that expanded into 
                                                 
459 Interview with Ömer Salman, the Head of Ahıska Turk Association in Uzbekistan, 2005. 
 256
the farming sphere. The fundamental working unit in this farming enterprise is 
always an Ahıska Turkish micro-community. In other words, it is not a style of 
farming undertaken by individuals.  
This sort of farming enterprise is currently expanding among Ahıska Turks 
in Uzbekistan. In order to provide sustainable financial support many Ahıska Turks 
are looking for investors from Turkey and elsewhere. In addition, they use their 
Ahıska Turkish networks in Kazakstan (e.g., truck drivers and merchants) for the 
distribution of their agricultural products.460 By selling their products to Kazakstan 
(rather than Uzbekistan), where the economy is booming and their products are worth 
more, Ahıska Turks in Uzbekistan are increasing their profits. Moreover, by 
cooperating with their compatriots in Kazakstan it creates a win-win situation for all 
Ahıska Turks in the region. The hard work and farming enterprise method 
demonstrated by the Ahıska Turks serves as a good model for overcoming the current 
economic difficulties as well as preserving their ethnic identity and culture in rural 
areas. This also reflects the Ahıska Turks’ tendency to preserve their ethnicity 
foremost rather than making social advancement their primary goal. In one aspect, 
private business became the economic base of a relatively high degree of personal 
                                                 
460 For example, the Ahıska Turks are running a greenhouse plantation, as a cooperative farming, in Sirdarya, 
Uzbekistan, which borders near Chimkent Kazakstan, is cooperating with their compatriots in Chimkent for 
their product’s delivery and distribution in Kazakstan. 
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freedom and independence. As a result, the economic liberty made its imprint on the 
diaspora’s behavior, worldview, and inter-personal relations, including reluctance to 
work as part of a team. This lack of commitment to teamwork also influenced the 
solidarity of the diaspora community. These differences must be taken into account as 
we continue to work on strategies and tactics for the Korean or Ahıska Turkish 
movements. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE HOMELANDS (TURKEY AND 
KOREA) ENGAGEMENTS WITH THEIR OWN DIASPORA 
 
 
The Seoul Olympics opened the eyes of Soviet Koreans, who started to 
realize that South Korea was a dynamically developing country which had already 
achieved considerable economic success.461 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
the independent Kazakstan and Uzbekistan established diplomatic relations with 
both Korean states (North Korea and South Korea). At first, North Korea tried to 
compete with South Korea in establishing and developing ties with the Soviet 
Koreans in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan. For instance, in 1989 three thousand 
textbooks in Korean were sent from Pyongyang.462 Professors and taekwondo 
instructors came from North Korea to teach the Korean language and traditional 
                                                 
461 Valeriy Khan, “Koreiskaia disapora segodnia,” Koryo Ilbo, January 22 1994. 
462 Georgii Kan, Istoriia Koreitsev Kazakhstana (Almaty: Gylym, 1995), p. 45. 
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martial arts. In addition, the North Korean government financed the All-Union 
Association for Promotion of the Unification of Korea. This organization was to 
promote a pro-North Korean diaspora thus many materials they brought were 
propaganda materials rather than those for purely educational purposes. During the 
first years of its activity this organization made it possible for several hundred 
Soviet Koreans to visit North Korea. However, the deep economic crisis which has 
struck North Korea in the mid-1990s forced Pyongyang to close its embassy in 
Almaty and call back all its diplomats. In Uzbekistan, only minimal personnel were 
left over (3 persons). As a result, on the whole North Korea left no noticeable traces 
and failed to impress and influence the Korean diaspora in any significant manner. 
Relations with South Korea developed quickly and widely from the 
beginning. Thousands of Soviet Koreans were able to visit South Korea and in turn, 
thousands of South Koreans came to Uzbekistan and Kazakstan.463 The Korean 
conglomerates such as LG, Samsung, and Daewoo have invested hundreds of 
millions of dollars in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan. Dozens of Korean companies, 
including joint ventures, operate in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan. Such investment gave 
the Korean diaspora a great opportunity to work. Also the Association of Koreans in 
                                                 
463 Korean embassies in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan estimate the number of their citizens with permanent 
residence in their respective countries as such: Kazakstan, 2000, Uzbekistan, 1700. 
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Kazakstan and Uzbekistan contributed to signing a number of contracts between and 
South Korean companies and Kazak authorities. By doing so they could consolidate 
their position in the titular republics. Many Soviet Koreans mentioned that the image 
of South Korea as an economically developed country has contributed to the high 
status of the Korean diaspora. 
For instance, the president of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, realized the 
potential for investment and growth with South Koreans’ input when he visited 
South Korea in 1992.464 That visit dealt primarily with questions of cooperation in 
the economic sphere between the two countries. During that visit, agreements were 
signed indicating that the two countries would agree to work together to promote 
the expansion of large South Korean firms such as Daewoo and Samsung in 
Uzbekistan. In this trip, Karimov stated, “I am convinced that we have set out on 
the correct path and further contact with the South Korean government…(means 
development) retarding not only economic questions but also ethnic and political 
questions.”465 It is the presidents of these two countries, and not only individual 
entrepreneurs, who foresaw the potential for increased contacts in the economic 
sphere, not to mention the spheres of politics and ethnic relations. Currently, South 
                                                 
464 Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan: Along the Road of Deepening Economic Reform (Tashkent: 1995), p. 96. 
465 Pravda Vostoka, March 5, 1993. 
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Korea is the third biggest investing and trading country of Uzbekistan. South 
Korean’s investments were more than 1.7 billion US dollars in 1997.466 
Of the various leaders of the Korean movement interviewed, one pointed to 
the significance of nurturing Korean business ventures as a mean to promote not 
only the economic well-being of the Korean communities but as a way of forming 
potential ties among Koreans and Soviet Koreans in Central Asia. This individual, 
the president of a smaller Korean cultural organization, expressed that both the 
South Korean and local Korean diaspora businessmen working as citizens of their 
titular republics were not only helping to promote the economies of their own 
republics but also strengthening their ethnic solidarity. To be sure, when the 
economic well-being of local Korean communities is assured, this self-sufficiency 
can support various projects taking place at socio-cultural level.  One Korean 
diplomat said that the funds that South Korea spent to support the Korean diaspora 
in Central Asia could create conditions for them to develop business in the region 
which will reduce their desire for emigration, thereby reflecting the interests of all 
three sides, Kazakstan/Uzbekistan, Korea, and the Korean diaspora.467 
In socio-cultural aspects, South Korea has been active in its support for the 
                                                 
466 Korea EXIM Bank, Uzbekistan Kukga Hyun Whang mit Jinchul Bang-an (Seoul: 2005), p.119. 
467 Interview with a Counselor of Korean Embassy in Tashkent, 2005. 
 262
Korean diaspora communities. For example, with regard to cultural programs, such 
as the 60th anniversary of the Korean residence in Central Asia in 1997, the Korean 
government provided 150,00 US dollars for the ceremony and festival. It also 
provided 20,000 US dollars for the Central Asian Korean Newspaper Koryo Ilbo, 
and it sponsored various small and mid-sized businesses of the Korean local 
diaspora. Not only the South Korean government but also various South Korean 
based social support foundations have invested several million US dollars in the 
establishment of cultural or language learning centers, which teaches Korean 
language as well as the titulars’ language (Kazak/ Uzbek). In these educational 
centers, they teach Korean language, promote traditional Korean art, disseminate 
facts about Korean history and culture, and hold various events to bring the Korean 
diaspora together. Every year these branches are expanding to other cities where 
there is a compact Korean population.  All of the main buildings of the Association 
of Koreans in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan were refurbished and modernized by the 
South Koreans. Not only the buildings or facilities, but also numerous teachers from 
South Korea are sent to Kazakstan and Uzbekistan since the independence. Every 
year, South Korean government is giving its teachers (from primary to high school) 
and professors a chance to work in Kazak or Uzbek’s schools and universities and 
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its own language centers during their sabbatical year.468 
There are three main governmental organizations of South Korea which 
deal with the Korean diaspora: The Korea Foundation, the Overseas Koreans 
foundation and KOICA (Korea International Cooperation Agency). The Korea 
Foundation is under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its main project is to 
support Korean studies in region. Hence, it is running numerous visiting programs 
and fellowships and scholarships for students, teachers and professors of Korean 
studies or language.469  
The Overseas Koreans Foundation is also under the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, but its mission differs with the Korea Foundation. While the Korea 
Foundation supports academic affairs, the Overseas Koreans Foundation focuses its 
support on various diasporic centers and organization. The Overseas Koreans 
Foundation was founded with the announcement of the “Overseas Koreans 
Foundation Legislation” (Law No. 5313) passed on March 27, 1997.470 Then on 
October 30 of that year, the Foundation was inaugurated and put into official 
operation. All of its efforts have been focused on various cooperative programs, 
                                                 
468 Every year the Korean government is sending around 20 teachers to each republic. The government is 
providing housing and living expenses. Moreover, they all have their regular salary coming from their own 
institutions. Thus the competition is pretty high. One can extend its duration up to 3 years. 
469 Also, prominent Korean diaspora scientists in various fields are included in this program. They get grants or 
fellowships to do their further research in various Korean institutes. 
470 Overseas Koreans Foundation Brochure (Seoul: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2005) 
 264
since the government thought that these initiatives would be a great help to overseas 
Koreans and serve as a driving force for the Korean community. The Overseas 
Koreans Foundation’s aim is to help overseas Koreans to maintain a sense of 
national fellowship among them and live as exemplary citizens in the nations where 
they are residing. In order to accomplish its mission, the Foundation took every 
measure to complete the construction of the Overseas Koreans Center, with the goal 
of providing exclusive service for Koreans living abroad when they pay a visit to 
their ethnic homeland. In this context, it gives support to diaspora’s radios, 
newspapers, TV stations, language and cultural centers, etc. In terms of a personal 
exchange program the foundation offers various homeland visit programs to elderly 
Koreans and juveniles. In reverse, it gives South Korean high school and 
universities students’ visit and voluntary activities in the compatriots’ village, 
organizations or centers during their vacation.  In addition, to support the 
maintenance of national homogeneity it created the cyber Korean community 
Hanminjok Network, and established the Korean business network as an integrated 
hub for those overseas Koreans engaged in the fields of commerce, trade, 
information technology, science and technology.  
KOICA is also under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: its project may 
 265
overlap with the Korea Foundation and the Overseas Koreans Foundation, however 
its mission and projects are broader in scope compared with the other two 
organizations. Rather than focusing on the Korean diaspora issues, its mission is 
targeted to the whole country, i.e., Kazakstan or Uzbekistan.  KOICA focuses more 
on general issues such as supporting human resources development and providing 
the material and physical aid necessary to reduce poverty and achieve sustainable 
development.  KOICA’s aim is to contribute to strengthen Korea’s friendly 
relationships with its partner countries by promoting the socio-economic 
advancement in the developing world. Within this context, they are sending 40-50 
experts in every field, from agricultural experts to IT (Information Techonology), 
Taekwondo masters, and even Korean language teachers, to Uzbekistan and 
Kazakstan every year.471 These experts are sent to various titular governments’ 
institutions and offices. For example, generally Korean language experts are sent to 
Universities while Taekwondo masters are sent to military or security related 
institutions. Actually, KOICA’s projects are not designed to support the Koreans 
diaspora in a direct manner. Nonetheless, the author witnessed during the fieldwork 
that not a few of the local Koreans were benefiting from these programs as well.  
Besides, such activities from the homeland are giving great pride to the Korean 
                                                 
471 KOICA, Annual Report 2004 (Seoul: KOICA, 2004), p. 4. 
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diaspora in the region. 
Like the Korean diaspora, the dissolution of the Soviet Union gave the 
Ahıska Turks the opportunity to learn about their homeland, Turkey. During the 
Soviet period, many Ahıska Turks mentioned that they knew Turkey as very poor 
and under developed country. However, when they had a chance to properly see the 
situation in Turkey they all said they were shocked. Most of the Ahıska Turks were 
impressed by the level of development of Turkey and its modernization. 
Considering the pride they took in Turkishness throughout the Soviet era, this fact 
certainly boasted the morale of the Ahıska Turks in the titular states. However, 
Turkey’s role in engaging with their diaspora, Ahıska Turks, has been quite 
disappointing. As Aydıngün argues, “Turkey did not officially take into its agenda 
the problem experienced by the Ahıska Turks, in order not to damage its relations 
with Kazakstan and Uzbekistan.”472 Turkey always had a bigger agenda when 
dealing with the region. To Turkey, Kazaks and Uzbeks and other Turkic ethnics 
were also lost brothers who were newly found after their independence. As a result, 
Ahıska Turks were pushed behind in terms of priority by Kazaks and Uzbeks, the 
dominant ethnic (or perhaps ruling ethnic) of the titular states. As mentioned earlier, 
                                                 
472 Ayşegül Aydıngün, “Ahıska (Meskhetian) Turks: Source of Conflict?” The International Journal of Human 
Rights, vol.6, no.2 (2002), p.59. 
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Turkey’s official position concerning the Ahıska Turk’s issue was always in the big 
framework, “regarding all ethnic Turks outside Turkey in general.”  There were 
only limited measures to repatriate some Ahıska Turks in the region. However, there 
are still many remaining in the titular states.  
TICA (Turkish International Cooperation Agency), which is more or less 
similar to KOICA in terms of their mission and objective, is the only Turkish 
government body that deals with the region. Therefore, its mission is not to support 
the Ahıska Turks directly. Rather, TICA focuses on more general issues such as 
providing material and technical assistance to the titular states for their socio-
economical development. Like KOICA’s objective, Turkey seeks to strengthen its 
friendly relationships with Uzbekistan and Kazazkstan with various projects. On a 
small scale TICA is sending Turkish books, newspapers, and other printed materials 
to the Ahıska Turkish community and organizations but it is generally done in a 
rather covert fashion. During talks with the head of TICA and KOICA together in 
Tashkent, the author could see the official attitudes of these two governments.473 
Faruk Uysal, a chairman from TICA Tashkent office, denied firmly that there is no 
such direct support program for the Ahıska Turks. Moreover, he said, it is TICA’s 
position to avoid the ethnic issues in their project which were sensitive subjects in 
                                                 
473 Interview with Faruk Uysal from TICA and Dong-ho Kim from KOICA, Tashkent, 2005. 
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the region. On the other hand, Dong-ho Kim, KOICA chairman in Tashkent, said 
openly that his Organization is working hard to aid the Korean diaspora as much as 
possible with his programs. The difference has, perhaps, resulted from the policy of 
Turkey having no proper agenda on the Ahıska Turks’ issue.   
Although Uzbekistan and Kazakstan are Turkic countries, which share 
many heritages in common with Turkey, it seems Korea is freer from the titular 
governments’ censorship. As a result, Ahıska Turks get limited support from the 
Turkish government even that in indirect ways or from behind the scenes. For 
example, the Turkish government had a program to train the Ahıska Turks as 
teachers of Turkish classes in ordinary Kazak schools which are in the regular 
curriculum. However, its intention is neither to promote Ahıska Turk’s cultural 
revival, nor to preserve the Turkish language for them. In sum, such projects are 
more oriented toward the titulars (Kazaks or Uzbeks) rather than the Ahıska Turks. 
In economic aspects, Turkish businesses are engaging with the Ahıska 
Turks while expanding their enterprise in the region. Though the scales of these 
businesses are smaller than that of Korea, Turkey is still one of the important 
economic actors in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan. There are many small and mid-sized 
Turkish enterprises active in the region. Since there is almost no difference in terms 
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of language between the Turks of Turkey and the Ahıska Turks, as local Turks, the 
Ahıska Turks have been playing a crucial role in building a bride between the 
Turkish entrepreneurs and Kazak counterparts. To the Turkish entrepreneurs, Ahıska 
Turks are important for their businesses since they are fluent both in Russian, the 
titular language, and in Turkish. Moreover, Ahıska Turks are familiar with the 
procedures and the business manners of Kazakstan and Uzbekistan. Consequently, 
if they are qualified for the job, the Turkish companies offered a good number of 
opportunities to the Ahıska Turks.  
However, this favorable situation did not last long for the Ahıska Turks. 
First, as mentioned, many Ahıska Turks resided in rural areas generally dealing with 
agricultural production. Thus, there were shortages of well-educated urban Ahıska 
Turks who could coordinate the work between the Turkish businessmen and their 
Kazak counterparts. As a result, the Ahıska Turks could not totally preoccupy such 
opportunities in the initial stage when they had a chance to play as an important 
middleman. Second, after a few years titulars become their vital competitors. Since 
the titulars, Kazak and Uzbek, were all ethnically Turkic whose languages were 
similar to Turkish, it didn’t take long to learn Turkish themselves. Moreover, after 
the independence, Turkey has been actively engaged with the titular states with its 
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pro-Central Asian policy. With this welcoming policy, Turkey invited thousands of 
Kazaks and Uzbeks to study and do research in Turkey. Likewise, many Turkish 
departments in the Universities were occupied by the titulars (Kazak or Uzbek).474 
After the mid-1990s many titulars were equipped with Turkish language skills and 
good connections with their governments. Consequently, Turkish entrepreneurs 
started to prefer qualified Kazaks or Uzbeks (who had a good language ability, 
qualified diploma and connections with the local partners) rather than the local 
Ahıska Turks.475 The author rarely met Ahıska Turks in Turkish companies. It 
seems that priority is given to the titulars rather than Ahıska Turks within the 
Turkish enterprises. Actually, some Turkish companies did not have any 
consideration of the Ahıska Turk at all. It was not in their agenda while employing 
the employees.476 In this sense, perhaps, unlike the Korean diaspora, a certain degree 
of urbanization and emphasis on education is needed among the Ahıska Turks. 
Although the official homeland engagement toward the Ahıska Turks is 
                                                 
474 To remind, many Korean departments in the region were occupied by the local Koreans. Also, since many 
Ahıska Turks preserve their language very well there is no merit to study the Turkish departments. 
475 As one of Turkish businessman in Tashkent said during the interview, “It is more advantageous to work 
with a Uzbek who speaks Turkish, since he is more likely to overcome the difficulties of the complex system 
while doing businesses.” He also mentioned that there were many Uzbeks who can speak Turkish in the labor 
market these days. Also, many Turkish businessmen could speak the titular languages to some extent. It wasn’t 
hard for them to learn Kazak or Uzbek. During a visit to a couple of Turkish enterprises in Kazakstan and 
Uzbekistan, the author witnessed many titulars (Kazaks or Uzbeks) who were playing as a middleman between 
the Turkish entrepreneurs and local counterparts. 
476 Many Turkish businessmen said that if one knows Turkish, Russian and perhaps local language with 
qualified profession in ones fields they did not care about ethnicity, or giving priority to their compatriots, 
Ahıska Turks.  
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nominal for developing and preserving their ethnic identity, the Turkish media is 
playing a crucial role in keeping the Turkish identity. The Turkish government 
started satellite broadcasting in 1994 with its successful launch of the TURKSAT 
satellite system. Turkish media influence was made possible when Central Asian 
states gained independence. With this satellite system, there are numerous private 
channels, as well as state channels, airing through out Central Asia. There is even a 
channel which is targeted at Central Asia. TRT-Eurasia (Avrasya) TV (Currently 
TRT TURK) service has started to foster ethnic unity and reinforce a Turkic identity 
to various Turkic peoples.477 Its aim was to establish a basis for Turkic pride and 
ultimately pan-Turkic goal of a strong solidarity among all Turks.478 The Turkish 
government thought that this project was achievable, since Turkish people and 
Turkic peoples living in Central Asia are culturally and linguistically similar. Some 
Turkish politicians viewed the television channel as a propaganda tool in a larger 
campaign to establish the groundwork for a greater solidarity and cooperation 
among the Turks in the world.479 As Schram mentioned, mass media might control 
interpersonal communication, planting new ideas in the minds of individuals.480  
                                                 
477 Haluk Sahin and Asu Aksoy, “Global Media and Cultural Identity in Turkey,” Journal of Communication, 
vol.43, no.2 (1993), p.33. 
478 Ibid. 
479 Ibid., p.38. 
480 Daniel Lerner, “Book review: Mass Media and National Development by Wilbur Schramm, 1964,” 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol.14, no.2 (1966), pp.243-247. 
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As part of its educational policy, TRT-Eurasia TV (TRT-TURK) has been 
encouraged to broadcast in Turkish with Turkish subtitles to promote familiarity 
with the Istanbul Turkish.481 According to Robins, it was Turkey’s intention to 
encourage Central Asian Turkic republics to switch their alphabets to the Latin 
script Turkey uses.482 TRT-Eurasia channel especially focused on cultural programs 
such as documentaries of the Turkic heritage and history. Such programs reminded 
the viewers of their past history, culture, and language. There were few channels at 
the beginning, however there are now more than 70 channels, all broadcasting in 
Turkish, covering topics ranging from news to music, entertainment, documentaries, 
etc. In other words, the Ahıska Turks in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan can see all the 
state and private channels of Turkey. Increased knowledge of the homeland means 
an increase in empathy toward them. In particular, these satellite television channels 
are playing an important role in the development of identities. To be sure, this 
satellite system was not established for the Ahıska Turks or other diasporas. It 
implies a bigger and broader project and mission of Turkey. However, its influence 
on the Ahıska Turks is huge in terms of revitalizing their national identity and 
culture. 
                                                 
481 Philip Robins, “Between Sentiment Self-interest: Turkey’s policy toward Azerbaijan and Central Asian 
states,” Middle East Journal, vol.47, no.4 (1993), p.607.  
482 Ibid. 
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One can find a big satellite antenna in every house of Ahıska Turks these 
days. Almost all of the houses that the author visited were equipped with the 
satellite system which allows Ahıska Turks to see all of the Turkish channels. An 
Ahıska Turk village headman in Sirdaria mentioned, “It isn’t expensive to install a 
satellite system in the house these days. Thus, almost every household can watch 
the homeland television now.”  All the Ahıska Turks were enjoying Turkish 
television. There was no one who was watching the state-controlled, boring local 
channels. Many Ahıska Turks in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan see Turkish channels as 
very trustworthy, objective or impartial.  If people have a goal of gaining 
information for important issues, they will become highly dependent upon available 
media which they see as credible. In other words, it should be said that the more 
credible channel, the more likely people would become dependant upon it. Thus, it 
was not only a matter of nationalism or ethnic identity which made them to watch 
Turkish channels, but the channels’ credibility as well as the content of the channels 
led to Ahıska Turks continuously watching Turkish television channels. The 
contents of local channels have by no means been qualified enough to compete with 
the programs of the Turkish channels. The programs from the Turkish channels 
were more rich and varied in the eyes of the viewers. As one Ahıska Turk said to the 
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author, “We have never experienced this (watching the Turkish television) before. 
Thus it is exciting and quite interesting for many.”483 Without a doubt, Turkish 
television is more open (practices free speech tenets) compared to the currently 
available local titular’s channels. Although Uzbekistan and Kazakstan are 
independent, the old communist apparatus of power is not fully eradicated. 
Domestic TV broadcasting is most heavily politically controlled. The people of 
Uzbekistan and Kazakstan are only informed within the dictates of current regime, 
learning the truth long after the events. This situation led almost all the Ahıska 
Turks fixing their channels to Turkish television. Table XX shown below is the top 
4 responses collected from the Ahıska Turk during the fieldwork about the reasons 
for watching Turkish satellite television. 
 
Table XX 
The reasons of watching Turkish satellite television by Ahıska Turks 
Q. What is the reason of watching Turkish satellite television? 
1. It is trustworthy and impartial. Objective on events reporting. 
2. It shows a Turkish way of life (Turkish daily life, music, folklore, etc.) 
3. Turkish TV imparts in people a sense of Turkish pride 
4. It teaches the Turkish language 
Source: Collected from the interviews of the Ahıska Turks, Uzbekistan, Kazakstan, 2005, 2003. 
                                                 
483 Interview with an Ahıska Turk in Chimkent, 2003. 
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 The Soviet Koreans are also in the same situation, however, they don’t 
have as many chances to watch homeland television compared with the Ahıska 
Turks. Since the Korean satellite system is focused on East Asia and the Asian 
Pacific region, it does not cover the Central Asian region. However, there are two 
Korean satellite channels operating in the region. Interestingly, these two channels 
were almost useless in motivating the Korean diaspora to accumulate their cultural 
heritage, heighten the diaspora’s awareness and contribute to their ethnic 
development. Even though these two channels were state owned channels, one of 
them, KBS WORLD, is a paid channel so that one has to pay 40 dollars every 
month to watch it. Koreans in America, Japan or other developed countries might be 
able to afford such a fee to watch a Korean channel but for the Soviet Koreans in 
Central Asia it is too expensive to watch. As a result, it can be watched only in the 
big language or cultural centers operated by South Koreans who can afford the fee. 
Another channel, which is called Arirang TV, is free of charge, thus some Soviet 
Koreans are watching it. Yet many of them are complaining about the channel and 
its orientations. Although there are some programs introducing homeland Korea and 
current issues, trends and language, which may be useful for the Korean diaspora to 
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recreate their identity, absurdly all these programs were broadcasted in English with 
English subtitles. The English-centered broadcasting of the Arirang channel result in 
the Korean diaspora abandoning the channel since it was unfamiliar to them and 
hard to understand. As a result, many Koreans watch the Russian channels 
broadcast from Moscow, which they are familiar with. It is the result of the South 
Korean government’s Western oriented mentality, thinking that broadcasting in 
English would bring them a more globalized and have a bigger effect. But to 
whom? Among the hundreds of channels in the satellite, a person who chooses the 
Korean channel to watch will have a willingness to learn about Korea and Korean. 
Thus, broadcasting in Korean with English subtitles will be enough to meet all of 
the expectations of the viewers. Perhaps, Yavuz Zeybek gives a good statement 
related to the issue. He states that Turkish Eurasia TV does not make Central Asians 
or Turkish diaspora Turkish. They all identify themselves as Turkish or Turkic, then 
they watch the channel. They already know who they are so that the position of 
Turkish Eurasia TV is to promote this already known identity.484 
As Teheranian argues, the mass media can create a national identity and 
culture.485 Mass media functions as an agent of gradual change through existing 
                                                 
484  Yavuz Zeybek, “Turkish Television to Central Asia: Perception of Turkish Avrasya Television in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzhstan,” Unpublished Ph.D dissertation, The University of Oklahoma, 1996, p.125. 
485 Majid Teheranian, “Communications and national development: Reflections on theories and policies,” in 
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structures rather than directly modifying the structural constraints of 
development.486 Consequently, there is no doubt that its consequences are huge and 
will have a deep impact in the long run. In the case of diasporas, the more they watch 
homeland broadcasting, the stronger become their ethnic identity. Moreover, once the 
mass media system is well-established it is not expensive to maintain and develop it. Its 
impact will be broader and deeper than any other measures. Although there is a lack of 
support from the Turkish government for the Ahıska Turks, due to the Turkish satellite 
Television system Ahıska Turks are very well informed about their homeland and its 
current issues. Even the younger generations who did not have a chance to visit Turkey 
knew all of the current Turkish pop-stars and streets of Istanbul and cafes by watching 
various programs. Without a doubt, this will narrow the gap between the diaspora and 
the homeland compatriots.  
These examples of homeland engagement with diasporic communities 
reveal the power and longevity of ethno-national bonds. These bonds do not 
necessarily bridge the cultural distance created over decades, however, in the long 
run this distance may become narrower by various engagement policies from the 
homeland. 
                                                                                                                                        
eds., Majid Teheranian, Farhad Hakimzadeh, and Marcello Vidale, Communication policy for national 
development (London: Routledge & Kegan Pou, 1977), pp.17-25. 
486 Everett Rogers, “Communication and development: The passing of the dominant paradigm,” in ed., Everett 
M. Rogers, Communication and development: Critical perspectives (California: Sage, 1976), pp. 121-130. 
 278
  
CHAPTER VII 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
At present, the societies of Uzbekistan and Kazakstan are being 
restructured with the titular nationalities being as the new dominant ethnic groups. 
Whether the indigenization process is a successful or not, the higher birthrates 
amongst the indigenous population coupled with the migration of the titular 
population from other countries will force non-titular ethnic minorities in 
Uzbekistan and Kazakstan to accept Uzbekization and Kazakization. This 
development does not mean that the current nationalizing process restricts the 
Korean and Ahıska Turk diaspora movements in any systematic way. Nonetheless, 
discrimination stemming from the nationalistic sentiment on the part of the titular 
nationalities can be felt in every sector of the society. The most fundamental change 
in the consciousness of the Korean and Ahıska Turkish diasporas in Uzbekistan and 
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Kazakstan since the breakup of the Soviet Union has been the recognition that they 
have no choice but to adapt to the current state ideologies and their new 
nationalistic tendencies. As mentioned, these two diasporas were composed of the 
ethnic groups who had been deported from their homelands by Stalin and who 
today have nowhere to go. Officially or legally they have been all undesirable in, or 
unable to move to, their original homelands. Consequently, a decade later, the 
majority of Koreans and Ahıska Turks in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan now seem to 
accept their status as ethnic minorities in the newly independent states and are 
adapting rapidly to their host-states. Hence these two diasporas are in the process of 
reconstructing their national identity or diaspora identity in the newly formed 
environment to unify themselves. The flow of migration has dropped off, 
particularly after the mid-1990s, and it has become clear that at least a significant 
portion of the Korean and the Ahıska Turk diasporas residing in Kazakstan and 
Uzbekistan will remain in the region, at least for the foreseeable future. As seen 
from the previous chapters, the decision to stay, however, is not necessarily a 
portent of assimilation. They are busier than ever before revitalizing their traditions 
and languages in their host-countries.  
The socio-economic adaptation strategies of the Soviet Koreans showed a 
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number of differences from the Ahıska Turks in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan. The 
character traits emphasized by the Soviet Koreans during the Soviet period, actively 
coping with the situation (or social change), have served them well in the post-
independence circumstances. Indeed, this is one of the defining features of the 
Korean diaspora society against the historical backdrop and regional peculiarities of 
Central Asia. In addition, the outstanding human resources built up among the 
Soviet Koreans during the Soviet period in many specialized fields have been 
diverted into commercial fields. Many Soviet Koreans are currently engaged in 
commercial activities of various descriptions. In this respect, the Soviet Koreans are 
said to be the leading diaspora who are quickly adapting to a new economy. 
Although some Korean diaspora intellectuals worry that such a situation might 
lower their intellectual level in the future: influencing the younger generations to 
choose commercial activities rather than educational or academic achievements. 
This phenomenon is perhaps best understood as a temporary, adverse phenomenon 
arising from social and economic transitions. In this transitional period, material 
independence or economic well-being is important in mobilizing the diaspora 
movement and various activities. Abundant funding would enable the Soviet 
Koreans to organize and maintain their associations and centers more effectively 
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and powerful throughout the republic.  
In the case of the Ahıska Turks, their farming communities have been 
undergoing a number of changes; perhaps the most important of such changes has 
been the pursuit of privatized management and massive plantation in all aspects of 
agriculture. This type of strategy, as a form of private farming or cooperative 
farming, is exercised by the Ahıska Turks who remained in rural areas. This strategy 
enabled the Ahıska Turks to overcome the current economic difficulties while 
preserving their traditions and language by maintaining their compact living in rural 
areas. This, more than any other factor, intensifies the productive competitiveness of 
the Ahıska Turks in sustaining their ethnic identity in the titular states and slowing 
down their migration from rural areas to the cities. For the titulars’ part, each 
republic desperately needs to develop policies to promote investment in and 
development of their agricultural sectors. Thus, if the Ahıska Turks can find a 
sustainable financial support from the outside, perhaps from Turkish investors, their 
strategy can create a win-win situation for them as well as the host-states. 
There have been speculations that the Korean diaspora had long been 
assimilated into the Russified society. Lacking the proper conditions to develop 
diaspora activities, assimilation for them seemed inevitable. However, as mentioned 
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in previous chapters, for the Korean diaspora, speaking Russian as a first language 
did not mean a renunciation of their ethnic identity. They have identified themselves 
unequivocally as Koreans since the Soviet period. Despite centuries of assimilation, 
it is worth noting that the Soviet Koreans have somehow managed to perpetuate 
their ethnicity and diaspora nationalism. The Koreans strategy of adaptation was 
“integration” rather than assimilation.  As mentioned, integration implies some 
maintenance of the group’s cultural integrity as well as some movement to become 
an integral part of the host-society.487 Although, there was no political mobilization 
or cultural associations during the Soviet period, the Soviet Koreans somehow 
preserved their traditional customs, values and cuisine. Like the Ahıska Turks and 
many other deported nationalities, the Soviet Koreans also mythologized the 
deportation and utilized its memory in preserving their ethnic identity and collective 
consciousness. The sufferings of deportation facilitated and strengthened the ties 
among Koreans. While they may not speak their mother tongue or may not always 
observe traditional celebrations, the Soviet Koreans have always had strong 
kinships and ethnic unity among them. Thus, the author contended that it would not 
be correct to use the term assimilation (instead of integration) in the case of Korean 
diaspora, since many of them still maintain and develop at least some degree of 
                                                 
487 See Chapter II, Acculturation section, pp.57-62. 
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ethnic distinctiveness. The Korean diaspora had simply integrated well to the 
mainstream population (Russian in this case) for their socio-economical well-being 
and advancement. 
Especially from the beginning of the 1990s when the Soviet Union was 
dissolved, many Korean solidarity associations and other diasporic activities 
emerged in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan. Moreover, recently, many people have been 
uncovering their Korean ethnicity and registering themselves with Korean 
associations in various places in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan. Arguably, the driving 
force of the current vigorous activities of the Korean diaspora results from the 
abundance of well-educated intellectuals and continuous material supports from the 
homeland, i.e., South Korea. While the Ahıska Turks had many problems due to 
lack of funding and cadre during the process of the reorganizing of their 
associations and activities after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Korean 
diaspora did not face such problems during their revitalization movement. The 
relative lack of an intellectual stratum among the Ahıska Turkish population in 
comparison with the Soviet Koreans led to their organizational weakness. The 
shortage of well-educated urban Ahıska Turks, also with the emergence of titular 
people as their competitors in the economic field, made the Ahıska Turks miss their 
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opportunity to play the role of middlemen between the host-states and homeland 
after the mid-1990s. In sum, despite the Ahıska Turks preserved their ethnic identity 
and language far better than the Korean diaspora during the Soviet period, the 
Ahıska Turks diaspora movement after the 1990s is incomparably weaker than the 
Korean one and less active. This reveals the importance of cadre and funding in 
diaspora movements.  
Since the independence of titular nations, i.e., Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, 
the South Korean government overtly and continuously announced its intention to 
the Korean diasporas that it would not repatriate its compatriots in the region but 
guaranteed to help and protect their peaceful and prosperous future in the states they 
resided. Such consistent policy of the homeland made the Korean diasporas to vest 
their future in the titular states and actively participate in the diaspora activities 
(including politics) to maximize their benefits and advantageous position in each 
republic. Many Soviet Koreans in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan and South Korea have 
been able to capitalize to varying degrees on their shared ethnicity to further their 
socio-economic prospects. In contrast, the lack of Turkey’s firm commitment to the 
Ahıska Turks left the latter like stray sheep. Many Ahıska Turks defined their 
situation as an exile situation in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan. They could neither vest 
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their future in the titular states nor see their future in their avowed homeland Turkey. 
Accordingly, the Ahıska Turks’ diaspora movement is not revitalizing (or 
successful) at the moment. Many Ahıska Turks hope to see their homeland Turkey 
show certain interest in and responsibility for them. Actually, rather than the 
material support, many wanted to see Turkey’s public claim against them, even 
though it might be symbolic.488 Many Ahıska Turks believes that this sort of action 
from Turkey would protect their rights and decrease discriminations from the titular 
states. Turkey’s paradoxical standpoint between the official policy and informal 
practices did not provide a solution for the survival of Ahıska Turks as a diaspora in 
the region.  
In this context, we cannot emphasize homeland engagement with diaspora 
communities too much in the matter of strength and longevity of ethno-national 
bonds. Due to the various communally useful and beneficial activities of the 
different foundations and organizations of South Korea, many indifferent (or 
ordinary) Soviet Koreans also participate in the diaspora movement. Even some 
individuals, who do not profess an interest in the nationalizing project per se, 
participate in the various nationalizing projects for their instrumental reasons (to 
                                                 
488 As one Ahıska Turk mentioned, “What we want is not material help from our homeland Turkey, but the 
homeland’s interest and its public claim against them.” Such response was very common among the Ahıska 
Turks during the interview. ; Interview with Ahmet Ali-Osman oğlu Nabiyev, a truck driver in Chimkent, 2003. 
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study or work in South Korea or to find employment, possibly with South Korean 
enterprises, etc.). When the Soviet Koreans came to learn about various 
opportunities with South Korean foundations, organizations, and enterprises they 
began to seriously entertain the idea of pursuing studies in the Korean language and 
traditions. Truly, compared with the Ahıska Turks, symbolic or primordial reasons 
for seeking language or cultural education are lacking among the Soviet Koreans, 
who are motivated to learn Korean for instrumental reasons. Whatever the reason 
may be, the participants of the Korean diaspora movement are increasing every day 
since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Many Soviet Koreans in Uzbekistan and 
Kazakstan are rapidly rediscovering their ethnic identity with their language and 
traditions.  
The sense of shared ethnicity is instrumental to lead co-ethnics to establish 
initial ties between the [ex]Soviet Korean and Koreans from the homeland. 
Nevertheless, the ethnicity factor alone is not sufficient for members to strive to 
maintain ties unless there is an economic element involved, that is, unless there are 
economic benefits to be gained from such an association. It is on this point that the 
Turkish intellectuals from Ahıska and Turkey leading the cultural revitalization 
movement have faltered. They have failed to link their symbolic nationalist project 
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with the instrumental motivations among ordinary Ahıska Turks to use their cultural 
capital for economic betterment. Today, it is the economic factor alone that seems 
sufficiently powerful to motivate the settlements of diasporas from wherever they 
currently reside. 
The South Korean government and the leaders of the Korean diaspora in 
Uzbekistan and Kazakstan exhibit varying degrees of adaptive strategies which 
require the manipulation of various aspects of their ethnic capital, whether it be 
linguistic, economic, educational, or symbolic. Despite apparent divisions among 
the Soviet Koreans in the region, they demonstrate the ability to use the various 
forms of capital for both group gains (especially for the leaders of the revitalization 
movement) as well as for personal profits (e.g., local and South Korean 
businessmen). The Korean diaspora’s ultimate success in mining their ethnic capital 
for personal gain or profit through such networks remains to be seen. Nevertheless, 
it is their cultural capital based on shared ethnicity which allows them to proceed 
with the initial steps in establishing contacts with the homeland Korean in the first 
place. 
The nature of a diaspora is a people who have a homeland, but at the same 
time accept a new place as home. The Koreans in Central Asia brought into play the 
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triadic nature of diaspora in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan to maintain their identity, by 
asserting that they belong both to the titular state (Kazakstan or Uzbekistan) and 
Korea.  In fact, in the end, the Korean and the Ahıska Turkish diasporas have to 
integrate into socio-economic and political life in Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan. But, 
this doesn’t mean full assimilation into the society and giving up their ethnicity and 
identity. Full assimilation will raise the question of the long-term survivability of 
these diasporas. “Partial-assimilation” actually points out the existence of diaspora. 
Diaspora is culturally, not to mention ethnically, hybrid. Therefore, we have to 
acknowledge that the Korean and Ahıska Turkish diasporas in Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan are Koreans and Turkish and at the same time Kazakhstani or 
Uzbekistani citizens.  
Recent urbanization and intermarriage are perhaps seen as the biggest 
challenges in reducing ethnic identity, both for the Ahıska Turkish and Korean 
diasporas. This being the case however, one may also point out to the existence of 
similar challenges to the ethno-national culture in their very homelands, i.e., Turkey 
and South Korea, in the face of globalization or Westernization. This points out the 
critical role of diaspora associations in each republic. They are the engines of 
developing diaspora consciousness and preserving ethnic identity in the host states.  
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However, these associations have limitations in their ability to support such 
activities due to the lack of funding and cadres.  Thus, the diaspora activities 
should be linked to, and cooperate with, the homeland. In one sense, engagement 
between homelands and dispersed communities inherently catalyzes cultural revival 
and re-imagining of the co-ethnic groups as diasporic. Fortunately, both the Ahıska 
Turkish and the Korean diasporas have their own homeland that can support these 
activities.489 The Homeland’s commitment to its diasporas is a key factor in 
preserving the diaspora ethnic identity and nationalism. But we should remind 
ourselves again that supporting does not mean imposing the homeland’s culture and 
language unilaterally. As I mentioned, diaspora nationalism is based on a triadic 
relationship between the homeland, host state/society and the diaspora community, 
which creates its transnational and hybrid structure.  
Although ideas concerning diaspora and its types vary, this study, while 
dealing with the Ahıska Turkish and Korean diasporas, tried to illustrate the 
common concept that can be applied to the Soviet deported diasporas. While 
examining the Ahıska Turkish and Korean diasporas, the study tried to demonstrate 
                                                 
489 Generally Ahıska Turks live in closely-knit communities maintaining their area of compact living, thus if 
Turkey, as the homeland of the Ahıska Turks, has a strong commitment or policy to revitalize the Ahıska Turks’ 
ethnic identity and traditions it would be less costy and easier compared with the Korean government in its 
support to its diaspora in Central Asia. Although the Central Asian Korean diaspora is more urbanized and has 
less area of their own compact living compared with the Ahıska Turks, it is the strong commitment and policy 
of the South Korean government that enable the Korean diaspora to recover their ethnic identity and traditions 
in the recent years. 
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the existence of common concept of diasporas that was mentioned in the 
introduction: an expatriate community dispersed from an original homeland, often 
traumatically, to alien lands; a community which has a collective memory and myth 
about the homeland including its location, history and achievements; a community 
which has a strong ethnic group consciousness sustained over a long period of time 
and based on a sense of distinctiveness. In the mean time, the study demonstrated 
that mere physical dispersion does not automatically connote diaspora. As seen in 
the cases of the Ahıska Turkish and Korean diasporas there has to be more, such as 
an acute memory or image of, or contact with, the homeland.  
To stress a fundamental characteristic of diasporas once more, diasporas 
maintain their ethno-national identities, which are strongly and directly derived 
from their homelands and related to them. They generally either have well 
developed communal organizations or, if not, the determination to establish such 
organizations. Such developments were to be found in both the Korean and Ahıska 
Turkish diasporas throughout the chapters. In addition, ethno-national diasporas 
display communal solidarity, which give rise to social cohesion. They are engaged 
in a variety of cultural, social, political and economic activities through their 
communal organizations. They also take part in a range of cultural, social, political 
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and economic exchanges with their homelands, which might be states or territories 
within states. Diasporas often create trans-state networks that permit and encourage 
exchanges of significant resources with their homelands as well as with other parts 
of the same diaspora. Moreover, in order to illuminate relations between an 
expatriate community and its homeland, this study emphasized the triadic bases of 
diaspora, host state, homeland, and diaspora community, by using the Korean and 
Ahıska Turkish diasporas cases. 
The Ahıska Turkish and Korean diasporas had a similar tragic history: both 
were uprooted from their homeland.  Nonetheless, after the long separation, during 
the 1990s they both established contacts with their respective homelands.  It was a 
critical historic event, since diaspora nationalism (or the preservation of ethnic 
identity among the diaspora) is like a handful of water.  In order to preserve their 
ethnic identities and culture they need to have a continuous supply of the fresh 
water from a riverhead (i.e., the homeland). It was impossible when there was a 
thick iron curtain in the region. Although, the nationalizing titular regime emerged 
in the region, the Ahıska Turkish and Korean diasporas can now have various 
contacts with their own homelands. The homelands’ (South Korea and Turkey) 
strong commitment and continuous engagements with their own diasporas can 
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revitalize the Ahıska Turkish and Korean diasporas’ ethnic identities and culture. 
Perhaps this is the only way to maintain the diaspora identity and nationalism, 
unless the homeland has the willingness for the repatriation of its own diaspora. To 
be sure, it is not an easy task.  However, for the sake of the Korean and Ahıska 
Turkish diasporas’ prosperity and survival it is the course they should take in the 
future.  
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Appendix 1 
* Example of the Kazakstan Passport indicating ethnic identification so-called ‘fifth 
column’ during the Soviet period. 
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Appendix 2 
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Appendix 3 
LEGISLATION ESTABLISHLNG THE AHISKA TURKS’  
RECEPTION AND SETTLEMENT IN TURKEY 
Legislation Number: 3835 
Date of admission: 2/7/1992 
Published in Official Journal: Date: 11/7/1992    No: 21281 
Published in Code of Laws: Disposition: 5 Vol: 31        Page: 
 
Article 1: Among our compatriots who are living dispersed on the republics making up the old 
Soviet Union and who are named as "Ahıska" Turks, those who are willing to come to Turkey will 
be received as free or settled immigrants, with priority given to those within the most difficult 
conditions, and on condition that they do not exceed the annual number to be determined by the 
Council of Ministers. Their acceptance and settlement is to be conducted according to the sentences 
of the present Legislation and the Legislation for Settlement numbered 2510. 
In the settlement that will be conducted by giving property, the governors and lieutenant governors 
will be in authority. On the table of conveyance, all the family members are given equal share and 
are to be registered to the title-deed just as it appears on the conveyance. 
 
Article 2: In order to fulfill the tasks that are determined in the article 3. a high commission is to be 
established under the coordination of a State Minister who will be charged by the Prime Minister, 
and composed of authorities from the Ministries of Internal Affairs. Foreign Affairs, Finance and 
Tariff, Public Education, Development and Settlement. Health, Transport, Agriculture and Village 
Affairs, and Forest; the Undersecretaryship of the State Planning Organization, the 
Undersecretaryship of the Treasury and External Commerce, the General Presidency of the Turkish 
(Kızılay) Association, and the Foundation of the Instigation of Social Aid and Solidarity. 
As attached to the high commission, sub commissions, composed of directors of L-: 
branches and institutions of the ministries and establishments of the provinces indicated in the first 
article, are to be established in the provinces to be determined by the Ministry of State, under the 
presidency of the governor or those to be brought in charge by him, and the specificity of the issue 
being considered. 
Article 3: The tasks of the high commission are as follows: 
a) To determine the conditions of reception, transitory and permanent places of settlement of the 
Ahiska Turks arriving in Turkey as immigrants, 
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b) To prepare the programmes of Placement and Settlement, 
c) To take the necessary measures in order to provide the immigrants with employment, 
d) To fix those among the Ahıska Turks who are willing to immigrate to Turkey and to ensure that 
they are assembled from their places of residence and departure to Turkey, to plan the operations to 
be conducted concerning the issues of board, lodging and health, to establish a coordination 
committee to provide coordination with the authorities of their current countries of residence, 
e) To determine the amount of the fund provided for the expenditure by the coordination committee, 
and for the transport of the immigrants from their current places of residence, their lodging and 
settlement, 
f) To fulfill other tasks to be allocated by the Prime Ministry and the Council of Ministers. The 
decisions of the high commission gain certainty by the ratification of the State Minister in charge. 
 
Article 4: All personal and household belongings of the immigrants and all kinds of furniture and 
animals kept for breeding that are documented as belonging to themselves, are exempted from all 
kinds of taxes, customs duties and fees in the condition that they are brought to Turkey in one 
consignment. 
 
Article 5: Meeting the cost of the transport and settlement of the immigrants as well as the necessary 
funds for their other expenditures is to be given priority. In order to meet these demands, in 
accordance with transferring from the relevant sections of the budget of the Ministry of Finance and 
Tariffs to the sections which are existing or which are to be reactivated within the budgets of the 
relevant ministries and foundations, or for making payments to Turkish Red-Crescent (Kizilay) and 
conducting other operations connected to these. 
 
Article 6: Among the “Ahıska” Turks whether they will be settled in Turkey or stay in the new states 
within the borders of the old Soviet Union in which they are currently residing, the status of double 
citizenship is to be provided to those determined to be eligible by the Council of Ministers. 
 
Article 7: The present Legislaition is valid by its date of publication 
 
Article 8: The sentences of the present Legislation are to be executed by the Council of Ministers 
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